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A number of factors have contributed to the failure of the blocked accounts release scheme to achieve in its first instalment the full results hoped for by the Commission. It is difficult to weigh their relative importance, but all, I believe, deserve consideration in any planning for further instalments. In the first place, prior to the implementation of the UNCCP-Israel Agreement, which began in March, bank statements showing their balances had reached some of the refugee account holders. These showed, inter alia,<\/i> the 10 per cent compulsory loan deduction by Israel and transfer of balances over £500 to the Custodian. Consequent suspicion was not removed by the wording of the original application form and was of course strengthened by the official opposition of Jordan which resulted in the scheme’s suspension in early April throughout the area. Those suspicions including the political argument, that the application entailed some form of recognition of the State of Israel, started the scheme off on the wrong foot and were never wholly eradicated, in spite of the official approval given to the new application form negotiated by Mr. Reedman with the parties concerned and the official resumption of the operation in late June.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
Secondly, opposition on legal grounds persisted in spite of the new forms. It is argued that, by filing an application on the forms specified, an account holder can be said to have recognized the right of the Government of Israel to block his account and to release it at its discretion. It is feared that the banks could accordingly successfully maintain that in the courts such an applicant was stopped from filing suit against them for any unreleased balances.<\/p><\/div>\n
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Such a legal complication was not envisaged, I believe, during the original London negotiations over the terms of a release. Its importance stems from the filing during the past year of numerous legal suits in Jordan by account holders against the depositor banks, Barclays and the Ottoman Banks, for their blocked balances. Judgment in the first such case heard was handed down in June in Jerusalem. The plaintiff won. The bank’s appeal from the judgment is scheduled to be heard on 17 October. Although the plaintiff in this particular case was apparently not an eligible applicant within the terms of the UNCCP-Israel agreement, it is expected in refugee circles that the judgment will be upheld on appeal and establish the principle that Barclays and the Ottoman Baths must pay the refugees their balances. The importance of this test case and the dilemma in which the expected result will place the banks is obvious. They have already been the subject of considerable adverse press comment in the Arab press. The fact that the Arab Bank, Ltd., is reported to have actually paid off all accounts held in the names of refugees in branches located in what is now Israel territory, without of course receiving any funds from Israel, has a bearing upon this complex situation.<\/p><\/div>\n
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The effect of these legal suits in deterring large account holders from filing applications is debatable. News articles by persons indirectly interested in discrediting and obstructing the scheme as a whole may have served to exaggerate its importance, although certain lawyers to whom I have spoken, as well as bank managers in Israel, Jordan and Lebanon, considered the effect considerable. Chiefly affected are accounts over £500, particularly those of the largest account holders who were in general persons of influence and political prominence. There had been general resentment at the stipulated £50 a month per account rate of payment and the maximum figure of £500 releasable under the first instalment because of the understandable desire for full repayment and the feeling that small instalments would be used for consumption and would allow little productive investment. This slow rate of settlement may have been the more important reason for non-application by the larger holders. They could by and large afford to await more favourable terms and not risk compromising their legal rights.<\/p><\/div>\n
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A third reason for not filing — extremist political objections — is not, on balance, considered to have been very influential. In spite of the considerable furor in the press on the subject, one Jordan lawyer stated to me that the fact of the matter was that in money matters politics did not count.<\/p><\/div>\n
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A fourth reason is the long delay which has usually occurred between the filing of applications and the receipt of payment orders. However explicable in terms of the complexity of the operation, such delay has caused expressions of resentment, especially in Lebanon and Syria, clearly lessened refugee faith in the operation and deterred some doubtful Thomases from filing. The delay was caused chiefly by the April-June suspension of the scheme and the slowness of transmission channels between the point of application in the Arab States and the Joint Control Office in Jerusalem, Israel<\/p><\/div>\n
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Finally, there is the question of what caused the strikingly low number of applications among the small holders. Various explanations have been suggested. Ignorance, illiteracy and the failure of fully adequate publicity and explanations from responsible UNRWA camp officers and bank officials to reach refugees in their widely scattered locations; often outside refugee camps and towns; appear to have combined with suspicions engendered by official opposition, rumours of deductions to be made from balances and possible fears of endangering the applicant’s position on the UNRWA relief rolls. In addition there are those cases of the very small accounts for which the applicant could not be bothered to apply. The factors of ignorance and lack of publicity seemed apparent on two occasions when Arabs to whom I was giving a lift proved to be small account holders who claimed never to have heard of the scheme. Such a conclusion contrasts with the view generally expressed soon after my arrival that all accountholders were aware of the scheme and that consequently no further extension of the application deadline need be considered.<\/p><\/div>\n
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In addition, there is the factor of oriental lethargy; which was advanced in conversation but which it was impossible for me to gauge.<\/p><\/div>\n
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The estimated number and percentage of applications from refugees for the first instalment — some sixty per cent — may appear rather low. It scarcely meets the Commission’s hopes. However, the bald statistics give an unduly pessimistic picture, when account is taken of how they are weighted by the total of over two thousand non-applicant small accounts valued at only some £50,000. Leaving them aside and considering the difficulties created by the temporary suspension of the operation and its tray unique nature, the results appear as reasonably successful. <\/p><\/div>\n
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Applications continued to be submitted in a fairly steady flow from all areas up to the final deadline date of 31 August. That fact affords hope that in the case of further instalments the number of applicants might increase considerably, particularly as non-applicants learn that payments are actually been received by their fellow refugees. A belief that all eligible applicants had not been informed of the scheme led London offices of both Barclays Bank and the Ottoman Bank to state somewhat [Missed]redly in a letter dated 16 September that they would be pleased to see the deadline extended for such further periods as might be necessary to provide the capability of the maximum number of “absentees” making applications. Last [Missed]day in London I commented that any such extension appeared impractical at this [Missed]in view of the Commission’s interest in considering immediately the matter of further instalments and the fact that an extension could interfere with an early [Missed]che.<\/p><\/div>\n
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The number and value of accounts not applied for will not be available until [MISSED]ssing of the thirty-two hundred applications for the first instalment has completed. If the Commission wishes such details it would be appropriate to [MISSED]et them now. If it proves true that the largest account holders have noted [MISSED]ed, the balances not yet applied for may well amount to more than one half of total value of the blocked accounts, i.e. £3,200,000. In that case residual [MISSED]ces on accounts applied for under the first instalment would amount to less £1,000,000.<\/p><\/div>\n
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The approaching termination of the operation for the first instalment produced questions during my stay on how the Commission intended to assure completion [MISSED] agreement with Israel for the release of all accounts belonging to former residents of Palestine. Confidence in the Commission would be nurtured by ensuring that successive instalments be made available with no break in time sequence. Such continuity would seem a sine qua non<\/i> so far as the success of the scheme and the image of the Commission are concerned. It is particularly important in view of the assurances given by Israel on the question of balances over £500 transferred to the Custodian, by reason of the importance attached to that question by the Arab Governments and the account holders themselves.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
The number of non-applicants for the first instalment who may apply in the [Missed] will depend considerably on whether the difficulties encountered regarding [Missed]ations for the first instalment persist or whether a further instalment can be arranged, as to surmount them. A second instalment similar to the first would [Missed]r meet the needs of the present situation nor would it ensure the liquidation [Missed] blocked accounts. It appears impractical to make any estimate without knowing what type of further instalment the Commission and the Government of Israel may agree upon. The success of the whole operation would be enhanced, it seems, by broadening it. For instance, an agreement with broader categories of eligible applicants and a payment rate more attractive to large account holders. If it were possible to liquidate all the remaining accounts with one further instalment, the scheme would seem to have the maximum chance of liquidating the problem and thus promoting the practical and psychological purposes of the project. I was assured by a prominent lawyer that the non-applicant large account-holders would fall in with any scheme providing for payment in one further instalment. Such a scheme would not adversely affect the effort to afford justice to the small depositors who have already had and would continue to have their opportunity. It would also help promote the purpose of reconciliation, the world being what it is, by satisfying the rich and influential. Liquidation in one more effort would have the enormous advantage of simplicity and economy of time and effort, for both the banks, the Custodian, the Commission and of course the account holders themselves.<\/p><\/div>\n
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It would .also eliminate petty bickering and irritating “fringe” cases, compromising the project’s purposes.<\/p><\/div>\n
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Any effort to broaden the scheme in the interests of the overall objectives requires, nevertheless, balancing the better overall results from such an operation against the possibility of greater reluctance on the part of Israel to allocate foreign exchange even for the liquidation of residual balances on accounts supplied for under the first instalment.<\/p><\/div>\n
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Negotiations for a further or a concluding instalment will involve consideration of:<\/p><\/div>\n
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(1) the residual balances of applicants for the first instalment; <\/p><\/div>\n
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(2) provision for application by non-applicants for the first instalment, in particular the needy refugees of whom not more than twenty per cent have applied;<\/p><\/div>\n
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(3) broadening the definition of eligible refugee applicants employed for the first instalment; <\/p><\/div>\n
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(4) extending the categories of eligible applicants by affirming the principle of unconditional release, i.e. the idea that while individual accounts were to be dealt with first, the accounts of commercial firms, partnerships, trust accounts, charitable accounts, etc. would be dealt with later;<\/p><\/div>\n
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(5) an increase in the rate of payment and in the maximum sum payable in one instalment to any account holder; <\/p><\/div>\n
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(6) use of the unexpended balance from the first £1,000,000, possibly to make further payments on residual balances of applicants under the first instalment;<\/p><\/div>\n
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(7) an attempt at securing more than tacit co-operation from the governments of Arab States;<\/p><\/div>\n
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(8) consideration of whether to request inclusion in the scheme of the Arab .Bank’s blocked account of £582,931 which was on deposit with Barclays at its Allenby Square branch in Jerusalem (New City) and which represents, in effect, refugee account-holders’ money;<\/p><\/div>\n
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(9) improvement of the mechanics of the operation, including more publicity and the possible addition of another correspondent bank to cover the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabian areas; <\/p><\/div>\n
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(10) maintenance of a Commission representative in Jerusalem to keep in constant touch with the whole operation and with the various authorities involved in order to deal with questions as they arise, questions which could not easily be settled by other people. In the event that he was unable to solve problems, he would keep the Commission informed;<\/p><\/div>\n
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(11) the question of financing the instalment through an advance in sterling from the banks chiefly involved. Confidentially, in separate private conversations, the managers of both Barclays Bank and the Ottoman Bank indicated their interest in such a solution of the problem, provided that they could get adequate guarantees. Their remarks suggested the interest of the British Foreign Office in such a solution. On that occasion I informed them that any initiative in the matter of further instalments or in such an advance would be taken up only at the highest level by the Commission itself.<\/p><\/div>\n
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If I may be permitted, in conclusion, a final non-technical observation, I would observe, that even if arrangements can be made for a final settlement, no spectacular reaction can be expected. I would call to your attention the almost total difference in outlook between the Israelis and the Arabs which was impressed on me in the course of conversation with officials and private individuals on both sides. To Israel the agreement for release of blocked accounts and safe deposits represents a gesture of goodwill which it was not incumbent on them to make. To the Arab owners the blocked accounts and the blocked safe deposits represent property of which they have been unjustly deprived. <\/p><\/div>\n
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In their view, restoration is only an act of simple honesty for which to special sign of appreciation can or should be expected. They see no basic difficulty when they compare the large foreign exchange funds received by Israel each year with the relatively small total of the blocked accounts. Such opposite attitudes automatically pose the question of whether in the present tense situation in the area it is practical for the Commission to press a long-term view that full release and transfer of both accounts and safe deposits would he a wise step forward, if only a small one, towards establishing a climate of opinion in the area which would enable Israelis to live peacefully with their Arab neighbors.<\/p><\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE Summary Record of the 306th Meeting (Closed) Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 2 September 1953, at 11:30 a.m. CONTENTS 1. Adoption of the agenda 2. Report by Mr. John P. Gaillard 2. Second instalment 4. Plan of Work of the Commission 5. Letter dated 9 October 1953 from the […]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"country":[],"document-category":[3053],"document-source":[2041],"committee-meeting":[],"document-subject":[1749],"entity":[5343,1729],"document-language":[6542],"class_list":["post-212192","document","type-document","status-publish","hentry","document-category-summary-record","document-source-united-nations-conciliation-commission-for-palestine-unccp","document-subject-palestine-question","entity-palestine-plo-palestinian-authority","entity-united-nations-system","document-language-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/212192","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/document"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/212192\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=212192"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=212192"},{"taxonomy":"document-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-category?post=212192"},{"taxonomy":"document-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-source?post=212192"},{"taxonomy":"committee-meeting","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/committee-meeting?post=212192"},{"taxonomy":"document-subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-subject?post=212192"},{"taxonomy":"entity","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/entity?post=212192"},{"taxonomy":"document-language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-language?post=212192"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}