{"id":209820,"date":"1994-06-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T19:49:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=209820"},"modified":"2019-03-12T19:49:56","modified_gmt":"2019-03-12T19:49:56","slug":"auto-insert-209820","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-209820\/","title":{"rendered":"Population and demographic developments in the WB and Gaza Strip until 1990- UNCTAD Study"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\t\t<\/span>Distr.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>General<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>UNCTAD\/ECDC\/SEU\/1<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>28 June 1994\t\t<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>ENGLISH ONLY<\/p><\/div>\n

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POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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GAZA STRIP UNTIL 1990<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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Study prepared by Dr. Wael R. Ennab, UNCTAD consultant*<\/p><\/div>\n

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         <\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>*  This study constitutes Part one of the contribution made by Dr. Wael R. Ennab (Al-Najah University, the West Bank) to the intersectoral project of the UNCTAD secretariat on "Prospects for sustained development of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip".  The opinions expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Secretariat of the United Nations.  The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.<\/p><\/div>\n

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GE.94-52723  (E)<\/p><\/div>\n


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\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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Contents<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Paragraphs<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

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Preface<\/strong>\t\t<\/span>  i – v<\/p><\/div>\n

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Introduction<\/strong>\t\t<\/span>  1 – 4<\/p><\/div>\n

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Chapter I.  The demographic characteristics of the Palestinian <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>    people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip until 1967<\/strong>\t\t<\/span>  5 – 41<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>A.\t<\/span>Population growth\t\t<\/span>  5 – 9<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>B.\t<\/span>Natural increase\t\t<\/span> 10 – 15<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>C.\t<\/span>Migration abroad\t\t<\/span>    16<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Migration towards the East Bank\t\t<\/span> 17 – 19<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Migration abroad\t\t<\/span> 20 – 26<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>D.\t<\/span>Types of locality\t\t<\/span> 27 – 30<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>E.\t<\/span>Age-sex structure\t\t<\/span> 31 – 41<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Age composition\t\t<\/span> 31 – 35<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Sex composition\t\t<\/span> 36 – 41<\/p><\/div>\n

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Chapter II.  Population growth and its determinants in the<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>     occupied Palestinian territory, 1967-1990<\/strong>\t\t<\/span> 42 – 70<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>A.\t<\/span>Population size and growth, 1967-1990\t\t<\/span> 42 – 47<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>B.\t<\/span>Fertility, natality, mortality and life expectancy\t\t<\/span> 48 – 70<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Fertility levels\t\t<\/span> 50 – 63<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t\t<\/span>(a)  Crude birth rates<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t\t<\/span>(b)  General fertility rate<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t\t<\/span>(c)  Age-specific fertility rate<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t\t<\/span>(d)  Total fertility rate<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t\t<\/span>(e)  Factors affecting fertility<\/p><\/div>\n


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\t<\/span>Contents<\/strong> (continued<\/u>)<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Paragraphs<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Mortality levels\t\t<\/span> 64 – 69<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t\t<\/span>(a)  Crude death rate<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t\t<\/span>(b)  Infant mortality rate<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Life expectancy\t\t<\/span>    70<\/p><\/div>\n

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Chapter III.  Salient demographic characteristics of the Palestinian<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>      people in the occupied territory<\/strong>\t\t<\/span> 71 – 141<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>A.\t<\/span>Age composition\t\t<\/span> 71 – 87<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>B.\t<\/span>Sex composition\t\t<\/span> 88 – 93<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>C.\t<\/span>Religion\t\t<\/span> 94 – 98<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>D.\t<\/span>Marital status\t\t<\/span> 99 – 110<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>E.\t<\/span>Geographical distribution\t\t<\/span>111 – 114<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>F.\t<\/span>Types of locality\t\t<\/span>115 – 121<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>G.\t<\/span>Household and family size\t\t<\/span>122 – 126<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>H.\t<\/span>Population density\t\t<\/span>127 – 141<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Crude density, 1952-1988\t\t<\/span>127 – 130<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Built-up area and density\t\t<\/span>131 – 136<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Housing density\t\t<\/span>137 – 141<\/p><\/div>\n

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Chapter IV.  Migration from the occupied territory<\/strong>\t\t<\/span>142 – 183<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>A.\t<\/span>Causes of emigration\t\t<\/span>143 – 147<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>B.\t<\/span>Trends\t\t<\/span>148 – 155<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>C.\t<\/span>Characteristics of the emigrants\t\t<\/span>156 – 173<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Age-sex structure\t\t<\/span>156 – 167<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Marital status\t\t<\/span>168 – 169<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Educational status\t\t<\/span>170 – 173<\/p><\/div>\n


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\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Contents<\/strong> (continued<\/u>)<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Paragraphs<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>D.\t<\/span>Demographic impact on the population of the West Bank<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>and Gaza Strip\t\t<\/span>174 – 183<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Age-sex structure\t\t<\/span>175 – 179<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Marriage\t\t<\/span>180 – 181<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Educational levels\t\t<\/span>   182<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t<\/span>4.\t<\/span>Population growth\t\t<\/span>   183<\/p><\/div>\n

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Chapter V.  Conclusion:  Demographic trends, factors affecting <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t\t\t<\/span>them, and some immediate implications<\/strong>\t\t<\/span>184 – 192<\/p><\/div>\n

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List of Tables<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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Tables<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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References<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n


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\t<\/span>Preface<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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i.\t<\/span>As part of the work programme of the UNCTAD secretariat pursuant to resolution 239 (XXIII) of the Trade and Development Board and resolution 44\/174 of the General Assembly, the UNCTAD secretariat initiated, in 1990\/91, the preparation of an in-depth intersectoral project on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Part one of the project deals with a comprehen-sive assessment of the economic and social situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the main impediments to sustained growth and development, pressing needs and corresponding measures for immediate action to promote recovery.  Part two of the project constitutes an in-depth analysis of prospects under various scenarios for the future development of the Palestinian economy.  Part three of the project is intended to provide a strategy framework and policy guidelines for the revival and sustained future development of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

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ii.\t<\/span>For the implementation of the project, a total of 25 in-depth studies were initiated at the field level covering economic and social sectors and issues.  Concurrently, and in order to facilitate the technical aspects of work on parts two and three, the UNCTAD secretariat has also prepared an in-depth study of a quantitative framework examining future options and prospects under several scenarios.  The summary findings of part one of the field studies, in particular an identification of pressing needs and corresponding feasible measures for immediate action, were presented to an expert group meeting (held in May 1992) for consideration.  The report of that meeting is published separately (UNCTAD\/DSD\/SEU\/2) and will be followed by the secretariat's study of a quantitative framework for analysing future prospects (UNCTAD\/DSD\/SEU\/3). <\/p><\/div>\n

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iii.\t<\/span>In order to provide more detailed substantive background to the findings and recommendations of the expert group meeting, and to enable donors further to develop their programmes of assistance to the Palestinian people, the first parts of a selected number of field studies commissioned within the scope of this project are being published in a special study series on Palestinian economic and social development.  The second and third parts of the field studies are being consolidated by the UNCTAD secretariat and will subsequently be issued.<\/p><\/div>\n

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iv.\t<\/span>The present study (prepared by UNCTAD consultant Dr. Wael R. Ennab, Al-Najah University, the West Bank) constitutes a background document reviewing Palestinian population and demographic developments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1948, especially during the period 1967 to 1990.  The first chapter examines the major demographic characteristics of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to Israeli occupation.  It covers population growth, the interplay of natural increase and migration and related aspects.  Chapter II examines in greater detail population growth and its determinants during the period 1967-1990, including fertility, natality and mortality.  Chapter III provides a further analysis of salient demographic characteristics of the Palestinian people, including indicators such as composition by age, sex, religion, social status, geographical distribution and population density.  Chapter IV examines the nature and impact of migration from the occupied territory on Palestinian society.  Chapter V presents some observations on the immediate implications of prevailing demographic trends in the territory.<\/p><\/div>\n

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v.\t<\/span>It should be noted that, in view of the early completion of this and other in-depth sectoral studies undertaken within the context of the intersectoral project, the implications of the accords concluded between Israel and Palestine in 1993 and 1994 could not be reflected in this study.<\/p><\/div>\n


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\t<\/span>INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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1.\t<\/span>This study examines population developments and the demographic situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  It analyses:  (a) the demographic characteris-tics, developments and trends of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory, covering the impact of socio-economic factors; and (b) the distribution and growth of the Palestinian population in different regions.   The aim is to highlight the most important factors which have affected the size and growth of the Palestinian population during the period 1948-1990.<\/p><\/div>\n

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2.\t<\/span>Throughout the study, comparisons are made between the data available from a variety of sources, i.e., Jordanian, Israeli, Palestinian and those derived from original surveys conducted by researchers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Wherever relevant, comparisons are also made between the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and those in Israel, Jordan and other Arab countries.<\/p><\/div>\n

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3.\t<\/span>It is worth noting, however, that the scope of the investigation has been constrained by an inadequacy in data on the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from both Israeli and Palestinian sources.  For example, the Israeli data on the population of the occupied territory (with the sole exception of the 1967 census, which was the last official census) are primarily economic in nature, and do not provide adequate information on the demographic situation after 1967.  This has made it difficult to follow up in sufficient detail the evolution of socio-econo-mic characteristics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population.  In the case of data concerning births, deaths, marriage and education, for example, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics does not systematically provide any distribution of such data with respect to age and sex.<\/p><\/div>\n

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4.\t<\/span>Further complications arise from the fact that after June 1967 Israeli statistical sources have reported the Palestinian population of east Jerusalem as living in Israel and not in the West Bank.  Furthermore, administrative units and boundaries have been changed, and Israeli sources fail to give specific figures pertaining to urban-rural and refugee populations.  Aspects of the quality, reliability and limitations of available data are discussed under the different chapters of the study, as appropriate.<\/p><\/div>\n


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\t<\/span>Chapter I<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP UNTIL 1967<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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A.\t<\/span><\/strong>Population growth<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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5.\t<\/span>Attempts to estimate the number of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially in the early years of the 1948 exodus, are made difficult by a variety of factors.  The so-called "West Bank" and "Gaza Strip" constituted a combination of subdistricts of pre-1948 Palestine.  The demarcation line that divided Israeli-held from Arab-held territory under the armistice agreement of 1949 was cut arbitrarily across the country and the subdistricts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip lost about 25 per cent and 67 per cent, respectively, of their area, (calculated by the author from: Government of Palestine, 1942).  With regard to population, the West Bank lost from 14.4 per cent to 25.5 per cent of its population, and the Gaza Strip lost from 40 per cent to 43.5 per cent.  According to the annual growth rate calculated for the period 1931-1944, the population of the pre-1948 subdistricts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would have been about 577,100 and 141,700 in 1949, respectively.  Most estimates put the figure at between 430,200 and 494,000 in the West Bank, and between 80,000 and 85,000 in the Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

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6.\t<\/span>In addition, the war of 1948 and the expansion of Israel beyond the boundaries proposed by the United Nations partition plan created a large number of Palestinian refugees who crowded into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Statistics on these refugees, whether residing inside or outside the camps, did not figure in Jordanian sources throughout the period 1950-1967 when the West Bank was under Jordanian administration.  Furthermore, Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including refugees from areas of pre-1948 Palestine, continued to emigrate abroad.  The latter category further continued to emigrate, after a period of temporary residence in both areas. <\/p><\/div>\n

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7.\t<\/span>Table 1.1 illustrates various population estimates for the West Bank and Gaza Strip throughout the period presented.  An estimate made by Abu Lughod indicated that the average number of indigenous Palestinians was about 420,000 in the West Bank and about 80,000 in the Gaza Strip by the end of 1948.  Not surprisingly, the West Bank population had increased to 764,900 by 1950, while the Gaza Strip population numbered between 240,300 and 245,000.  This is due primarily to the massive exodus of the Palestinians in 1948.  The West Bank became home to 280,000 additional Palestinians, while the Gaza Strip received about 197,000.  These two areas, therefore, contained about 65.7 per cent of all Palestinian refugees by 1948 since refugees sought the nearest place of safety.<\/p><\/div>\n

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8.\t<\/span>Variations in estimates of the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations are explained by the differences in the assumed annual rate of increase among the various data sources.  All estimates indicate higher annual rates of increase in the Gaza Strip (1.6 per cent to 3 per cent) than in the West Bank (0.4 per cent to 1.4 per cent).  These differences in annual rates of increase are due to the much higher fertility rates among the Gaza Strip population.  In addition, the net migration rates from the Gaza Strip during the 1950s and 1960s were much lower than those of the West Bank.  The greater scope of emigration from the West Bank is suggested by the figures in table 1.1.  In 1950, of the total Palestinian population (including refugees in host countries), more than 51 per cent lived in the West Bank and some 16 per cent in the Gaza Strip.  Since then there has been a downward trend in West Bank percentages while those of the Gaza Strip declined only slightly:  the number of West Bankers had declined to 32-34 per cent of the total Palestinian population by 30 May 1967 whereas the Gazans decreased from 14.5 to 17 per cent of the total. <\/p><\/div>\n

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9.\t<\/span>Population estimates immediately before the 1967 war suggest that there would have been 845,000 to 900,000 people in the West Bank, and between 385,000 and 450,000 in the Gaza Strip.  The Israeli 1967 census reported the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip at 661,700 and 354,700 inhabitants, respectively.  However, according to the Egyptian estimate for 1966 there were 454,900 inhabitants in the Gaza Strip (M. Khlousi, 1967, quoted in A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 30).  The author's estimates are presented in table 1.2, suggesting a figure of about 850,500 to 872,800 in the West Bank immediately before the war, of whom some 123,100 were in the Jerusalem subdistrict (see also table 1.23).  The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip numbered around 442,100 people.<\/p><\/div>\n

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B.\t<\/span><\/strong>Natural increase<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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10.\t<\/span>Since the registration of births and deaths was incomplete and poor in coverage and quality prior to 1967, especially in the rural areas which lacked health services such as hospitals and clinics, it is difficult to be certain about levels and trends of fertility and mortality in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  According to the 1961 census, some 65 per cent of the West Bank population lived in villages, which were too remote to benefit from the health facilities of the urban areas.<\/p><\/div>\n

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11.\t<\/span>However, the 1961 census indicated that the natural increase for the West Bank as a whole was 41.1 per 1,000, comprising a crude birth rate (CBR) of 49.6, and a crude death rate (CDR) of 8.5.  These figures were 33.5, 42.7, and 9.2, respectively in the Jerusalem subdistrict (Jordan Department of Statistics, 1964, pp. 246-249).  For 1966, Jordanian sources indicated that the natural increase for the West Bank was 38.5 per 1,000, comprising a CBR of 44.2, and a CDR of 5.7.  The comparable figures for the Jerusalem subdistrict were 37.9, 45.5 and 7.6, respectively (Jordan Department of Statistics, 1967a, p. 23).  The latter figure, whether in the West Bank or Jerusalem subdistrict, is much too low to be credible, particularly in comparison with the average death rate of 12.92 per 1,000 reported during the period 1968-1987 (see table 1.14).  The Israeli CDR was characterized by better registration of mortality, though not all deaths were being registered.  Data for births seemed more reasonable than those for deaths.  On the basis of the 1961 census data, one estimate (K. Abu Jaber, et al.<\/u>, 1980) put the CDR for Jordan as a whole (East and West Banks) at about 16 per 1,000.  The CBR for the West Bank was estimated by Hill (A.G. Hill, 1982, p. 48) at 51 per 1,000, and estimated by Abu Jaber at 53 per 1,000.  In the East Bank of Jordan, the CBR stood at 47 per 1,000 according to one source (H. Wander, 1966, p. 7) and at 49 per 1,000 according to another (K. Abu Jaber, et al.<\/u>, 1980).  All these figures showed that the accepted CBR of the West Bank was higher than that of the East Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

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12.\t<\/span>The rate of natural increase for the Gaza Strip was lower than that of the West Bank.  For the period 1961-1964, the average rate of natural increase for the Gaza Strip was 36.7 per 1,000, producing a CBR of 46.4 per 1,000 and a CDR of 9.7 per 1,000.  During this same period, the rate of natural increase for the Gaza Strip rose from 32.3 per 1,000 in 1961 to 36.8 per 1,000 in 1964, and the CBR also increased from 41.3 to 46.7, while the CDR increased from 9.0 to 9.9 (N. Issa, 1979, quoted in A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 37).  According to the 1961 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) for the West Bank was 7.48, while the TFR for the East Bank was estimated at 7.32 (K. Abu Jaber, 1980). The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics placed the TFR of the West Bank at about 7.64 in 1968 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1982, p. 703).<\/p><\/div>\n

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13.\t<\/span>Table 1.3 presents data on the CBR, CDR, gross reproduction rate (GRR) and life expectancy at birth in Jordan as a whole, including the West Bank and East Bank, as estimated by the United Nations.  Table 1.3 indicates that the CBR was well above 45 per 1,000 during the period 1950 to 1965, while the CDR was around 20 per 1,000.  The latter reflected the fact that the period before 1967 was character-ized by the under-registration of deaths, in particular.  Over the entire 15-year period of 1950 to 1965, the trend of the inter-period rates of births was upward, increasing from 45.4 per 1,000 during 1950-1955 to 48 per 1,000 during 1960-1965, while that of deaths was downward, decreasing from 21 to 18.7 per 1,000 between these two periods.<\/p><\/div>\n

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14.\t<\/span>The United Nations estimates of births and deaths yielded a natural increase of about 25.7 and 29.3 per 1,000 in the periods 1955-1960 and 1960-1965, respectively.  This is far lower than the average annual rate of natural increase estimated at about 30 and 32 per 1,000 (M. Samha, 1984, cited in The Arabic Institute for Training and Statistical Research<\/u>, 1985, pp. 394-397) for the West Bank during the periods 1952 to 1961 and 1961 to 1967, respectively.  The estimate for the Gaza Strip was about 34 per 1,000 in the period pre-1967.  In the Gaza Strip, a higher propensity to bear children and a more favourable age and sex structure than that of the West Bank brought about a very high CBR of around 50 per 1,000 (ibid.).  The figures in table 1.3 also show that the GRR had remained constant at about 3.5 per 1,000 over the period studied. <\/p><\/div>\n

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15.\t<\/span>The average life expectancy at birth for both sexes was estimated at 48.7 per 1,000 in the period 1960-1965, a figure that is higher than 48 per 1,000 estimated by the Israeli authorities for the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined in 1967 (Israel Ministry of Health, 1986).  Although there was a net gain of 4.7 years in life expectancy at birth for males, and 5.2 years for females between 1950 and 1965, the average life expectancies at birth in Jordan remained much lower than those in other countries:  68.9 years in Japan for both sexes in the period 1960-1965; 70 years in the United States of America and 73.5 years in Sweden.  Lower life expectancies among Palestinians is a reflection of the comparative underdevelopment of Jordan as a whole, i.e., the East and West Banks.<\/p><\/div>\n

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C.\t<\/span><\/strong>Migration abroad<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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16.\t<\/span>Although several studies which analyse the migration of the West Bank population have been carried out, none address the issue of internal migration, i.e. movement between cities or between villages and cities of the West Bank.  One reason for this is the nature of Jordanian data, which pay little attention to the migration component.  The only data available on internal migration are those in the 1967 study of internal migration and full enumeration for the cities of Amman, Jerusalem, Zarka, Irbid and Aqaba.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Migration towards the East Bank<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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17.\t<\/span>The movement of the West Bank population towards the East Bank of the Jordan is suggested by the figures in table 1.4.  In 1961, only 47 per cent of Jordan's population lived in the West Bank as against 56 per cent in 1952. These changes are due mainly to the less developed economic sectors of the West Bank, which resulted in a lack of employment opportunities, forcing many into the East Bank and beyond.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

18.\t<\/span>Further details are provided in table 1.5.  As the table shows, more than 52 per cent of the migrants from the West Bank originated from the Jerusalem district, 27 per cent came from Nablus, and 21 per cent from the Hebron district.  A sizable majority (some 70 per cent) of migrants from the West Bank moved to Amman while 22.8 per cent went to Zarka; together these two cities absorbed some 92.5 per cent of the migrants.  The deteriorating economic and social conditions which prevailed in the West Bank after 1948, and the concentration of development projects in the East Bank, propelled emigration from the West Bank (G. Kossaifi, 1985, p. 75).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

19.\t<\/span>Specific data on internal migration in the Gaza Strip during the Egyptian period were not available.  Consequently, the annual growth rates for the Gaza Strip localities presented in table 1.6 are the author's own calculations.  As the table shows, the individual Gaza Strip localities recorded different rates of growth compared with the Strip average of 3.0 per cent for the period 1958-1966.  Six localities experienced higher annual rates of population growth than the Strip overall; only one locality experienced a lower growth rate, reflecting the movement of the population from villages and refugee camps to urban centres.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Migration abroad<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

20.\t<\/span>The Jordanian census of 1961 revealed that the West Bank had provided about 80 per cent (or 50,262) of all emigrants known to have been outside the Kingdom of Jordan (East and West Banks) in 1961, over 77.8 per cent were males.  This emigration was said to be almost entirely motivated by economic considerations – the search for work resulting from inadequate employment opportunities in Jordan and work opportunities offered abroad, particularly in the oil-producing countries of the Arabian peninsula.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

21.\t<\/span>Details provided in table 1.7 show some 61 per cent of emigrants from the West Bank originated in the Nablus district, 36 per cent from Jerusalem, and only 3 per cent came from the Hebron district.  The greater emigration from the Nablus district may be explained by the fact that some 47.6 per cent of all rural and 33 per cent of the refugee population was concentrated in the Nablus district.  Table 1.7 also shows that of all emigrants from the West Bank, some 81.4 per cent emigrated to other countries of the Arab world, 13.2 per cent to America, and 4.3 per cent to Europe.  These figures further indicate that emigrants from the West Bank did not go far, preferring to remain in the same region, where the social and cultural environment felt more familiar. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

22.\t<\/span>Differences between the three districts also become clear, particularly with regard to destination area.  The Jerusalem district recorded the highest proportion (31 per cent) of emigrants living outside the Arab world, while only 10.8 per cent and 7.9 per cent of the emigrants from Hebron and Nablus, respectively, lived in non-Arab countries.  This may be explained in part by the higher concentration of West Bank Christians in the Jerusalem district, who constituted 92.4 per cent of all Christians in the West Bank in 1961 and who had established links with emigrant communities in Europe and the Americas.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

23.\t<\/span>The above figures indicate that from the early 1950s until the eve of Israeli occupation, the average annual net migration rate was around 20 per 1,000, which almost off-set the rate of natural increase.  Emigration from the West Bank was highly selective in terms of age and sex composition:  males constituted some 78 per cent of emigrants, and young males aged 20-39 outnumbered those over 40; the latter constituted only 9.3 per cent of male emigrants while the former comprised of 65.8 per cent.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

24.\t<\/span>As with internal migration, precise data on emigration from the Gaza Strip during the Egyptian period are not available.  One estimate (Dahlan, 1987, pp. 40-42) of the emigrants from the Strip during the Egyptian period shows that the Strip lost some 12,170 inhabitants in the period 1951-1955, but gained 10,560 between 1956-1958.  In the period 1959-1962, the Strip lost some 21,030, but gained 160 persons in the years 1963 and 1964.  Thus, the Strip lost some 22,480 persons in a 14-year period, or about 0.45 per cent of its population annually.  This net migration rate was unsettled and fluctuated between -0.8 per cent in the first five years, +1.0 per cent in the next three years, and -1.4 per cent and +0.02 per cent in the following four- and two-year periods.  In addition to the impact of the 1956 war (the Strip gained large numbers of people in the period 1956-1958), these fluctuations may have been affected by the accuracy of the vital registration data and the actual figures of the Strip's population.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

25.\t<\/span>In a situation of persistent net migration loss, the population growth that has occurred in the occupied territory has been the product of natural increase.  Estimates of the emigrants from the West Bank (G. Kossaifi, 1985, p. 93) show that some 210,600 persons, or 22 per cent of the West Bank population emigrated between 1952 and 1961, in addition to some 16 per cent who emigrated between 1961 and 30 May 1967 (i.e, approximately 396,200 persons emigrated from the West Bank during the period between 1952-1967).  The author's estimate of emigrants from the West Bank and Gaza Strip are presented in table 1.8, suggesting figures lower than the above estimates:  15 per cent and 11.4 per cent of the West Bank population emigrated between 1952-1961 and 1961 to 30 May 1967, respectively, but more than 34 per cent of this area population emigrated between 1952 and 30 May 1967.  The difference in estimates is attributable to variations in the assumed growth rates used.  In fact, the annual growth rates calculated by the author on the basis of the 1952 and 1961 censuses were significantly higher than those (0.83, 0.05 and 0.54 in the aforementioned periods, respectively) used by Kossaifi.  Also, West Bankers numbered 805,450 in the 1961 census, but only 801,356 were cited by Kossaifi.  The author places the population figure at about 850,543 by 30 May 1967, while Kossaifi estimated it at only 803,600.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

26.\t<\/span>Table 1.8 also shows that some 9.4 per cent of the Gaza Strip population emigrated during the periods 1952 to 1961 and 1961 to 30 May 1967, suggesting modest migratory movements before the 1967 war.  This fact is explained by the restrictions imposed by the Egyptian administration.  In the period 1948-1967, the Egyptian authorities tried to discourage Palestinians from leaving the Gaza Strip by issuing laissez passer<\/u> papers, which created many problems for those Gazans wishing to enter other countries.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the Gaza Strip experienced a lower net migration rate – about 29 per cent – than the West Bank over the entire 15-year period.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

D.\t<\/span><\/strong>Types of locality<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

27.\t<\/span>The only source indicating the distribution of the West Bank population by type of locality during the period 1950-1967 was the 1961 Jordanian census.  In that census, the fully urban population includes all persons enumerated in the 12 towns of the West Bank.  The remainder, with the exception of persons enumerated in tents scattered outside settlements (nomads), is classified as mainly rural.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

28.\t<\/span>Table 1.9, which shows the distribution of the West Bank population by type of locality, reveals that by 1961, a sizeable majority (65.1 per cent) of the total population lived in villages of the West Bank, about one third lived in towns, while the remaining 14,947 persons or about 1.9 per cent of the total were classed as nomads.  This reflects the fact that in the period before 1967, agriculture was the main economic activity, accounting for 38 per cent of all employment and 23 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP).  Industry accounted for 31.3 per cent of employment and 11.4 per cent (W. Sharayha, 1968, p. 182).  The agricultural sector also absorbed many displaced persons, particularly in the early years of the Palestinian exodus, since cultivation depended upon the use of manual labour and draught animals (there were only 23 tractor ploughs in the West Bank in 1952 (Jordan Department of Statistics, 1953, p. 157)).  Industry, similarly, relied upon manual labour and a low level of mechanization, using raw materials which came mainly from the agricultural sector (W.R. Ennab, 1979, pp. 150-189).  About 93 per cent of the industrial plants in the West Bank in 1965 were small with less than 10 workers; of these, about 25.5 per cent produced foodstuffs; all plants were concentrated in towns particularly in Jerusalem and Nablus (Jordan Department of Statistics, 1967, pp. 160-163).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

29.\t<\/span>Differences in the distribution of the rural population between districts are directly related to the concentration of agricultural lands, the largest being in the Nablus (48.9 per cent) and Jerusalem (33.3 per cent) districts.  Also, the high concentration of population in the Jerusalem (54.2 per cent of the total) and Nablus (32.5 per cent) districts is related to the concentration of urban centres in the Jerusalem (7 cities) and Nablus (4 cities) districts.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

30.\t<\/span>The situation in the Gaza Strip was very different.  On the basis of available Egyptian data concerning the distribution of the Strip's population by locality in 1958, some 139,177 persons, or about 38.9 per cent of the Strip's population, lived in the towns of Gaza Strip and Khan Yunis, 41,476 persons, or nearly 11.6 per cent of the total lived in villages, while the remaining 176,873 people or 49.5 per cent of the total, were refugees who lived mainly in camps (141,873) or in tents as nomads scattered throughout the Strip (34,803) (General Administrative Governor of Gaza Strip, 1959, p. 6).  This reflected the limited number of Palestinian refugees living in villages and the concentration of governmental and other non-governmental offices (including UNRWA) in Gaza Strip towns, which caused population movement towards these towns.  Another explanation for the distribution was that the status of settlements in the Strip was preserved as it had been before 1948:  Gaza Strip and Khan Yunis were the only two towns; the refugee camps were left under the authority of UNRWA and were separated from municipal-ities and village councils; and the other localities maintained their status as villages.  In the case of the West Bank, however, the refugee camp population was classified as mainly rural in the 1961 Jordanian census.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

E.\t<\/span><\/strong>Age-sex structure<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Age composition<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

31.\t<\/span>The only source which indicates the age and sex structure of the West Bank population in the period before 1967 is the 1961 Jordanian census.  This source provides information on the age and sex structure at the district level.  The results are given in table 1.10 for both the West Bank as a whole and for Jerusalem district, and in table 1.11 for three districts.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

32.\t<\/span>The age-sex pyramid depicted in these tables is clearly that of a very youthful population.  No less than 45.2 per cent of the West Bank population was below the age of 15 years, a reflection of the high fertility rate as indicated by a CBR of 49.6 per thousand in 1961.  The age group 10-14 is significantly smaller than the younger group (5-9) indicating that fertility in the mid-1950s was higher than in the late 1940s, due mainly to relatively stable conditions of life during the 1950s.  It also indicates a decline in infant and child mortality, owing mainly to the somewhat better health services provided to Palestinians in the later period.  While the age group 0-14 years constituted 45.2 per cent of the West Bank population, those aged 15-29 years made up a further 25.2 per cent; consequently, a little less than three quar-ters of the total were under 30 years of age.  This implies a population of high fecundity, with 44.6 per cent of all West Bank females of child-bearing age (15-49 years).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

33.\t<\/span>The small size of age groups 15-29 years and 30-49 years (the latter constituted only 16.2 per cent of the total) is largely related to emigration by those cohorts.  As a result, the proportion of males was low (46.5 per cent and 44.2 per cent, respectively).  As shown above, a high proportion of emigrants (66.3 per cent) derived from the age group 20-49 years; some 84.5 per cent of these emigrants were males.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

34.\t<\/span>A further 8.2 per cent of the West Bank population was aged 50-64 years, giving a total of 49.6 per cent in the working age group, 15-64 years.  The small size of the working age group, as shown in the table, is largely related to emigration by those cohorts.  As a result, the proportion of males is low (46.2 per cent).  Finally, 5.2 per cent of the total are aged 65 years or older.  The small number in this age group reflects overall high mortality.  The male proportion (49.2 per cent) is influenced by the return of some male emigrants, and also by the residence of some others abroad.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

35.\t<\/span>The differences in fertility, mortality and migration rates of the three districts listed in table 1.11 have played an important role in producing differences in the percentage of people under 15 years of age, and also in the numbers of working age persons.  The more youthful age structure produces a higher dependency ratio in the West Bank as compared to the Jerusalem district.  According to the 1961 census, there were 101.6 dependants for every 100 persons of working age in the West Bank:  91.1 were children below the age of 15 while 10.5 were in the elderly age groups.  For the Jerusalem district, these values were 95.8, 85.5 and 10.3, respectively.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Sex composition<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

36.\t<\/span>With the exception of the sex-ratios for children below the age of 15, which shows very similar values in both the West Bank and Jerusalem districts (113 and 112.7, respectively), the Age Specific Sex Ratios (ASSR) of the 15-19 year age group were much higher in the Jerusalem district than in the West Bank as a whole.  Above the age of 50, however, the reverse is true.  These figures seem to suggest that more emigrants from the Nablus and Hebron districts returned to the West Bank than did those from the Jerusalem district.  In the population below the age of 15, the high ASSR is due primarily to the sex ratio at birth; it also reflects the very limited impact of sex-selective emigration on this age group, as well as a possible under-recording of females in both the West Bank and Jerusalem district.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

37.\t<\/span>Figures in table 1.12 show the differences in the sex-ratio of the urban and rural population of the West Bank:  102.3 for urban population, and 95.3 for the rural population.  This reflects higher emigration levels among the rural population, levels which are highest in the Nablus (90.5) and Hebron (98) districts.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

38.\t<\/span>Disaggregated official data dealing with the Gaza Strip population in the period before 1967 were not available, notwithstanding various estimates by different sources.  In fact, the Gaza Strip had no experience of systematic population enumeration until September 1967, when the Israeli authorities held the first ever census.  Owing to the lower net migration rate during the Egyptian period, however, one may assume that the age and sex structure of the Gaza Strip was probably more favourable than that of the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

39.\t<\/span>From the discussion on population growth just prior to the Israeli occupation, we can note that both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively represent pull and push areas throughout their recent history, beginning in 1948.  As a result of the events of 1947-1948, both areas received the largest proportion (65.7 per cent) of Palestinian refugees.  Thereafter, however, both areas have pushed much of their population abroad, whether indigenous or refugee, owing to limited socio-economic opportunities domestically.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

40.\t<\/span>Political factors have affected the scale of movement as well.  In the period between 1950 and 1967, there was little control over population movement between the West Bank and East Jordan or further afield, while in the Gaza Strip, regulations introduced by the Egyptian authorities restricted the movement of its population almost entirely.  The movement of the Gaza Strip population was quite modest.  Owing to cultural factors, and other emigrant character-istics, Palestinians from the Gaza Strip moved a short distance, mainly to other countries of the Arab world.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

41.\t<\/span>Thus, the only source of population growth in both areas was natural increase, which was also the only source for offsetting emigration.  The rate of natural increase in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was very high (34 per 1,000 per annum), a result of the high fertility and mortality levels in these areas.  Expressed otherwise, high levels of natural increase were the outcome of socio-economic underdevelopment including, of course, the poor state of health-care services.<\/p><\/div>\n


<\/p>\n

\n

\n<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Chapter II<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>POPULATION GROWTH AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN THE<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/strong>OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, 1967-1990<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A.\t<\/span><\/strong>Population size and growth, 1967-1990<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

42.\t<\/span>The last official census of the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations was conducted in September 1967.  Since then, data on the numbers and growth rates of the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations are approximations, which vary from one source to another.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

43.\t<\/span>Current population estimates by age and sex prepared by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics were based on the 1967 census – for the population present only at the time of the census; this excluded residents of both areas who happened to be abroad during the 1967 war, and those who had emigrated from these two areas during June-September 1967.  Those excluded fell into the following categories:  students, merchants, visitors and employees in Jordan and in other countries.  Estimates provided by two other Israeli sources, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence are based on registration records (i.e., identity cards issued by the Israeli authorities), and therefore include students and residents temporarily living abroad, in addition to children who entered the registration records during visits to the occupied territory.  According to the three sources indicated, the estimated number of West Bank Palestinians in 1980 was 724,300, 887,000, and 750,000, respectively.  Benvenisti put the actual number of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip higher by 22 per cent than the estimates of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (M. Benvenisti and  S. Khayat, 1988, pp. 28-29).  In 1987, for example, the total number of West Bank Palestinians was 1,067,000 according to Benvenisti, but only 868,100 according to the CBS, a difference of some 200,000 people or about 23 per cent.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

44.\t<\/span>In contrast, estimates made by the PLO Central Bureau of Statistics (1980-1983) are based on such demographic indicators as intercensal growth rates or rates of natural increase.  In 1980, between 818,300 and 832,400 persons lived in the West Bank, according to the PLO and the United States Census Bureau (United States Bureau of Census, 1985, p. 18) respectively, compared with an Israeli estimate of 724,300 persons (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1981).  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

45.\t<\/span>Estimates of the number of Palestinians living in the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip are presented separately in table 2.1.  The table shows significant differences in the annual rate of change in their number over the entire 22-year period from 1967 to 1988.  One reason for this is the changing rate of out-migration.  The average annual population growth rate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was 1.7 and 2.7, respectively, over the period 1975-1980, compared with 2.4 and 2.9 in the period 1980-1985.  Another factor concerns the 1982 Jordanian regulation which prevented West Bankers and Gazans from spending more than one month in the East Bank of Jordan.  Furthermore, Israeli regulations imposed after 1967 have played a role in these rates of change.  In a study of emigration from the refugee camps of the West Bank, it was discovered that 15.2 per cent of all emigrants remained outside the West Bank because they lacked "reunion permits", while a further 8.3 per cent were kept out for reasons of "security" (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 188).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

46.\t<\/span>Table 2.1 describes the number of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a percentage of the 1967 total.  This index declined abruptly in both areas following the 1967 war.  Thereafter it rose steadily to 98.1 per cent in the Gaza Strip by 1978, and to 99.3 per cent in the West Bank by 1981.  Natural increase, however, has outweighed the effect of migration losses only since 1979 in the Gaza Strip and since 1982 in the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

47.\t<\/span>However, if the annual growth rate of 2.11 per cent, 3 per cent, and 3.3 per cent recorded over the period 1973-1988 for the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and east Jerusalem continues until the end of 1990, the population of the three areas will have reached about 933,577, 625,391, and 143,380, respectively.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

B.\t<\/span><\/strong>Fertility, natality, mortality, and life expectancy<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

48.\t<\/span>Despite the more complete registration system of Israeli authorities as compared to that of Jordan before 1967, Israeli data on the demographic characteristics of the occupied territory, including their age structure, sex, birth and death, are incomplete, owing to such factors as inaccurate reporting on population by age, unreported births, and poor coverage of deaths, in particu-lar.  The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics estimated in 1971 that about two thirds of deaths in the West Bank go unreported (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970, pp. 24-25).  This may be explained by an unwillingness to cooperate with surveys which were conducted by the Israeli authorities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

49.\t<\/span>Although the demographic characteristics derived from the 1967 census are largely affected by the heavy losses of population, the census still constitutes the only available comprehensive source of data for analysis.  Since that census, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics has published annual comprehen-sive data (mainly economic) on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Unfortunately, there has been no separate and complete publication of demographic studies on the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations.  The Bureau publishes data concerning only the total size of these populations and their age-sex structure, compiled from vital registration data which still remain incomplete.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Fertility levels<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Crude birth rate:  (CBR)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

50.\t<\/span>From the available data on fertility rates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (tables 2.2 and 2.3), we note that the population of these areas, as well as Palestinians in general, have one of the highest rates of fertility in the world.  In 1980-1985, for instance, the following CBRs were estimated by the Population Division of the United Nations (United Nations, 1986, 1984 Demographic Yearbook<\/u>, pp. 163-166):  Algeria (45.1 per 1,000), Angola (47.3), Botswana (50.0), Ethiopia (49.2), Kenya (55.1), Sudan (45.9), Syria (46.5), Oman (47.3), Jordan (44.9), Zambia (48.1) and Niger (51.0).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

51.\t<\/span>In establishing territorial control and sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Zionist policy, which began in Palestine before 1948, continued after 1967 through the acquisition of Palestinian lands, the establishment of Jewish settlements, and the encouragement of Palestinian out-migration from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Thus confronted, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained on their lands, and maintained high fertility rates throughout the period of Israeli occupation. <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

In one study of the demographic situation in the Gaza Strip, it was found that 42.5 per cent of the respondents (married women in the Khan Yunis area) were unwilling to practise family planning for political reasons; they thought that the Strip's population should be increased in order to compensate for those lost in the struggle (A. Dahlan, 1987, pp. 177-179) against the Israeli occupier.  Expressed differently, the demographic factor was seen as an important way to achieve national goals. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

52.\t<\/span>Based on the 1988 Israeli figures, the total Palestinian population under Israeli rule (i.e., Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip) numbered 2,435,900 people as against 3,659,000 Israeli Jews or about 40 per cent of the total population of the area (Israel Central Bureau Statistics, 1989, p. 78 and p. 701).  Hence, if Israel were to have annexed the West Bank and Gaza Strip in this period, the Jewish character of the State of Israel would be changed.  This led Israeli decision-makers, like one former Prime Minister to ask Israeli women in 1986 to consider it their national duty to have four or more children (I. Murray, 1986).  It also led some Israeli researchers to conclude that "development policies [towards the Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip] should be planned to contain as many changes as possible which generate conflict with high fertility at the family level" (D. Friedlander, et al.<\/u>, 1979, p. 254).  Certainly the massive immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union and east European countries as of 1990 played an important role in bolstering Israel's Jewish population, including those settled in the occupied territory.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

53.\t<\/span>Factors such as the increase in labour mobility, the rapidly changing occupational structure, the increase in levels of personal income, a growing urban market, educational attainment, and the increase in life expectancy usually tend to act against maintaining high fertility levels in most populations.  However, Palestinians' demographic conflict with Israelis seems to have operated in the opposite direction and delayed fertility decline among the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Figures in table 1.14 show that, in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the CBR has remained well above 40 per 1,000 up to 1990.  In the West Bank, there appears to have been a rise of 8.7 per cent between 1969 and 1976 but a fall of 12.5 per cent between 1976 and 1985.  In the Gaza Strip, these percentages were 6.5 per cent and 9.3 per cent, respectively.  While a high fertility level may be identified as a characteristic of Palestinian women in the occupied territory, this feature is particularly pronounced in the case of the Gaza Strip, reflecting the persistence of a more traditional type of society.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>General fertility rate:  (GFR)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

54.\t<\/span>The general fertility rate of the West Bank was well over 200 births per 1,000 women of childbearing age during the period 1968-1977, then fell by about 13.3 per cent in 1977-1981 before rising again to 93.1 per cent of the 1977 level.  For the Gaza Strip, the GFR was a little less than 200 births per 1,000 women in the period 1968-1971, but it rose to well over 200 during the period 1972-1984, increasing by about 10.6 per cent between 1971 and 1984.  These figures may be compared with a GFR of about 173 births per 1,000 for Palestinian Muslims in Israel in 1980-1984 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989, p. 103), and about 172 persons per 1,000 for Jordan in 1983 (Jordan Department of Statistics, 1983, p. 93).  These figures again reflect the high fertility rates of the Palestinian people.  Differences in GFRs between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are quite small; observed fluctuations may partly be related to differences in the proportion of married women in each area.  It is worth noting that many emigrant women, after becoming pregnant, return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip for their confinement and then, with their babies, rejoin their husbands outside the territory.  In this way, their offspring achieve the "right" of return to the occupied territory, provided that they are not absent for more than six years.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(c)\t<\/span>Age-specific fertility rate:  (ASFR)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

55.\t<\/span>Age-specific fertility rates of Palestinian women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are given in table 2.3.  The table shows that the general pattern in both areas is characterized by a high and broad peak in the curve, which reaches its highest point in the 25-29 age group.  The childbearing period is distributed over a long life span, and thus suggests a minimal use of birth control which may be related both to the socio-economic background of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to the absence of family planning.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

56.\t<\/span>Contrasts in ASFRs between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (table 2.3) are of some significance. In the former case, a slightly higher proportion (3.4 per cent and 8.6 per cent in 1968 and 1977, respectively) of all births occur to women below the age of 20; age groups 20-34 are responsible for 61.5 per cent and 68.5 per cent of all births, compared with 1.9 per cent and 7.4 per cent and 60.6 per cent and 66.2 per cent, respectively in the Gaza Strip.  Women aged 35 and above contributed 37.4 per cent and 26.4 per cent in 1968 and 1977 in the Gaza Strip, but only 35.1 per cent and 23 per cent in the West Bank.  This is probably because women in the Gaza Strip achieve the desired number of children only towards the end of their reproductive years.  In the West Bank, the desired number of children is achieved at a younger age; some women may become sterile as a result of early pregnancy.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

57.\t<\/span>Although women in the Gaza Strip exhibit a longer life-span of childbearing compared with their counterparts in the West Bank, table 2.3 shows that the ranking of the rates and their relative magnitudes across the reproductive period are very similar for women of both areas. In each case, fertility is higher among women above the age of 35 than among those below 20, providing an example of Shryock's generalization that older women make a greater relative contribution where overall fertility is high (H. Shryock, et al.<\/u>, 1980, p. 473).  The figures for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip were nearly the same for the Middle East and Muslim countries, but they differ widely from figures for advanced countries.  The aforementioned age groups under 20, 20-34, 35 and over), for example, were responsible for 1.8 per cent, 68.2 per cent and 29.9 per cent of all births, respective-ly, in Egypt by 1976; for 3.4 per cent, 70 per cent and 26.6 per cent in Tunisia by 1980; and for 4 per cent, 65.7 per cent and 30.3 per cent of all births in Pakistan by 1976.  The parallel figures for Austria and the United States of America were 9.3 per cent, 83.1 per cent and 7.4 per cent in the former by 1983, and about 14.8 per cent, 78.6 per cent and 6.6 per cent in the latter by 1981 (United Nations, 1986, pp. 317-319).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(d)\t<\/span>Total fertility rate:  (TFR) <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

58.\t<\/span>The total fertility rate, which is useful in the analysis of fertility trends (table 2.3), reflects the fact that in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, fertility has been high and has shown very little change over the period 1968 to 1980.  In both areas, TFR was above seven children per woman in most years, but figures for the West Bank show some recent indications of a decline (9.3 per cent between 1968 and 1980), while those for the Gaza Strip indicate a rise of about 8.5 per cent for the same period.  The slightly higher TFR in the Gaza Strip may reflect wider enjoyment of free health services provided by UNRWA and private voluntary organizations.  On the other hand, Benvenisti estimated that the TFR was around 7 or more children per woman in 1986 in both areas (M. Benvenisti, 1987, pp. 4-7).  It has already been shown (in para. 12) that the TFR for the West Bank was 7.48 in 1961; thus, all these figures seem to suggest that no significant change has occurred in the fertility of Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

59.\t<\/span>By comparison, the TFR among Arab Muslims in Israel (the great majority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population are Muslims) were significantly higher than those of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip throughout the period 1955-1974, rising from 8.17 in 1955-1959 to 9.23 in 1960-1964; thereafter it declined to 8.47 in 1970-1974, 7.25 in 1975-1979, 5.54 in 1980-1984 and 4.63 in 1986 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1988).  The decline in TFR was also remarkable among the non-Kuwaiti population of Kuwait (many of whom are Palestinians), from 6.7 in 1970 to 5.3 in 1975 (A.G. Hill, 1983, p. 311).  These differences reflect some recent declines among both non-Kuwaitis and Arab Muslims in Israel, while those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have shown very little change over the period 1961-1986. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(e)\t<\/span>Factors affecting fertility<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

60.\t<\/span>Although the economic structure of the Palestinian population in the occupied territory changed radically after the 1967 war, leading to a redistribution of occupations, it is also true that these communities did not achieve any appreciable levels of economic or social development under the Israeli occupation.  Therefore, the preference for large families remained an important factor influencing fertility levels. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

61.\t<\/span>In a study of the attitude of married couples who had heard about contraceptive methods in the Khan Yunis area, it was found that about 60.8 per cent of the wives were unwilling to practise contraception because of religious reasons, 32 per cent thought that contraception was harmful to their health; and some 14.4 per cent were willing to have more children, thereby increasing the economic burden on their husbands and inhibiting them from taking a second wife (A. Dahlan, 1987, pp. 178-179).  In addition, 46.4 per cent of husbands were unwilling to permit their wives to practise family planning because they wished to improve their social standing by having more children.  Furthermore, 36.6 per cent of couples expected to be supported in their old age by their sons, whether at retirement or in the event of illness.  This correlates with the lack of social security provision in both territories.  In addition to the impact of religious, cultural and socio-economic factors in maintaining high fertility rates among Palestinians, it will be argued that political developments in Palestine since the Balfour declaration of 1917 have also been important, having led to a territorial and demographic contest between Palestinians and Jews in the land both call their home.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

62.\t<\/span>The explanation for the high fertility rate is also partly to be found in the situation of Palestinian females in the West Bank and Gaza Strip communities.  The view that a woman should stay at home and look after her menfolk is still prevalent; some 84.7 per cent of all wives in the Khan Yunis area and 93.5 per cent of all married women in the West Bank camps were working as housewives in 1985 and 1987, respectively (A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 172; W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 312).  Moreover, the bride's parents usually played a major part in the choice of husband, and thus had a strong influence on the girl's age at first marriage (B. Sirhan, 1975, p. 104).  The minimum age of marriage for females in the West Bank is sixteen.  In a study of marital status in the refugee camps of the West Bank, it was found that 6.8 per cent of married women in the refugee camps were married under the age of 15 (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 243).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

63.\t<\/span>Finally, the relatively high infant mortality rate in the occupied territory, as estimated for the Khan Yunis area (88.5 per 1,000 in 1984) and for the West Bank camps (81 per 1,000 in 1986) (A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 167 and W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 168), seems to be of great importance in maintaining high fertility rates.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Mortality levels<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

64.\t<\/span>Mortality follows fertility as the second factor influencing population growth and the pattern of population structure in the occupied territory.  The available data on mortality among the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as mentioned earlier, present similar problems to those of fertility.  This is owing, in part, to the difficulties of collecting data by official agencies, which has led to the under-registration of deaths, especially in the case of newborns and the elderly.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>Crude death rate: (CDR)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

65.\t<\/span>The Israeli figures for the West Bank (table 2.2) show that the CDR declined from 21.8 in 1968 to 14.7 in 1975 and to 6.4 in 1987.  For the Gaza Strip, this rate declined from 20.2 in 1968 to 13.6 in 1975 and then to 5.9 in 1987.  These figures suggest a decline in CDR in the West Bank and Gaza Strip of about 70 per cent over 20 years.  The trends in CDR appear to have been similar for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, probably reflecting the relatively better registration system of deaths between 1968 and 1987.  However, PLO estimates (based largely on Israeli CBS data) of mortality rates for Palestinians show that the average CDR (for the decade 1970-1980) per 1,000 was 15.9 in the West Bank and 18.0 in the Gaza Strip (PLO Central Bureau of Statistics, 1981).  This probably reflects inaccuracies in the Israeli figures, owing to the under-registration of deaths in official records.  Further evidence of this is to be found in the fact that the CDR reported by Ennab in the refugee camps of the West Bank was 16 in 1987 (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 155).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

66.\t<\/span>Among the Arab Muslims in Israel, the CDR is significantly lower than that of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; it stood at 8.02 in 1955, declined to 5.6 in 1975 and to 3.5 in 1988 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989, p. 103), but it is still higher than the CDR of 1.7 for non-Kuwaitis in 1986 (Kuwait Central Statistics Office, 1986).  These figures indicate that both the West Bank and Gaza Strip still have higher mortality rates than other Palestinian population groups, despite a recent indication of decline. Variations in CDRs among Palestinian populations are likely to have been the result of differences in socio-economic status, and the medical care provided in their place of residence; apparently, the lowest levels are to be found in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>Infant mortality rate:  (IMR)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

67.\t<\/span>The infant mortality rate is a critical factor in overall mortality and a good indicator of the overall health status of Palestinians residing in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  The trends in IMRs appear to have been about the same for the West Bank and Gaza Strip; they are estimated to have fallen from 152 and 162 per 1,000 live births respectively in 1967 to 132 per 1,000 in both areas in 1974 (U.O. Schmelz, et al.<\/u>, 1977, p. 76), and then dropped more rapidly to about 53.1 to 56.1 in the Gaza Strip, and about 53.5 to 63.5 in the West Bank in 1985 (S. Vernmund, et al.<\/u>, 1985, p. 26).  Reported IMRs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined are much lower:  33.6 in 1968, 30.7 in 1974, 28.5 in 1985, and 21.4 per 1,000 in 1989 (Israel Ministry of Health, 1984 and 1990, p. 13).  Clearly, a high proportion of infant deaths is not reported.  This is confirmed by Israeli estimates of IMRs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip which suggest figures of 150 prior to 1967, 100 in the mid-1970s and 70 per 1,000 in the early 1980s (Israel Ministry of Health, 1986).  By comparison, the IMR among Arabs in Israel had fallen from 62.5 in 1955 to 39.5 in 1975, and to 17.5 in 1986; among Arab Muslims it had fallen from 66.0 to 18.0 during the period 1955-1986 (Israel Bureau of Statistics, 1989, pp. 103-104).  For non-Kuwaitis in Kuwait, the IMR per 1,000 rose from 30.9 in 1965 to 34.2 in 1975 before it declined to 14.9 in 1986 (Kuwait Central Statistics Office, 1986).  Variations in the infant mortality rate among these groups are attributed to differences in socio-economic conditions, health services provided, migration processes, and to the possible under-registration of deaths. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

68.\t<\/span>Clearly, Palestinians residing in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are subject to poor economic conditions, low standards of medical care, and the emigration of educated persons.  The results of Palestinian sample surveys conducted in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip suggest IMRs much higher than those reported or estimated by the Israelis.  The indirect method used by Palestinian researchers – the Trussell method – for estimating IMRs suggested a figure of about 88.5 per 1,000 in Khan Yunis area (i.e, city, refugee camp and villages combined) by 1984 (A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 167), and a figure of about 81 per 1,000 in the West Bank refugee camps by 1986 (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 168).  Dahlan's sample survey showed that the q(x) values – the total probability of dying – declined from 165.3 per 1,000 to 116 per 1,000 in Khan Yunis area between 1976-1984. In the refugee camps of the West Bank, Ennab's sample survey showed that these values declined from 168.2 per 1,000 to 108.2 over the same period.  In summary, there was a slow but steady improvement in infant mortality over the eight-year period between 1976 and 1984, but the levels still exceeded those for Palestinians now living in Kuwait or Israel, where Palestinians benefited from more advanced health services.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

69.\t<\/span>Notwithstanding the decline in the number of clinics in the West Bank (Israel Military Headquarters, 1977 and 1985) since the mid-1970s and the low ratios of hospital beds to population (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989), other health-related indicators have fared better.  The slight improvement in infant mortality in the occupied territory has resulted from, among other factors from the increasing number of local doctors and nurses, hygiene awareness, and also the increasing incidence of hospital births.  The number of hospital births has increased from 13 per cent in both areas in 1968 to some 55 per cent in the Gaza Strip and 59 per cent in the West Bank by 1986 (ibid).  In addition, there was a rapid decrease in illiteracy rates, particularly among females in both areas.  According to the sample survey conducted in the West Bank refugee camps, the illiteracy rate (per 100 population) declined from 71.4 per cent among females aged 45-49 to only 1.7 per cent among those aged 15-19 (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 295).  By comparison, the sample survey conducted in the Gaza Strip showed that the illiteracy rate of married women had declined from 67.3 per cent in 1960 to 22.6 per cent in 1985 (A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 170).  Since, uneducated mothers are unfamiliar with modern methods of infant care, IMRs range from 178 per 1,000 for illiterate mothers to 70.4 per 1,000 for mothers with a preparatory education and higher in West Bank refugee camps (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 161).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Life expectancy<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

70.\t<\/span>Average life expectancies at birth for the Palestinian population were estimated at 55.5 years for males and 56.3 years for females in 1975, and at 64.9 years for males and 66.7 years for females in 1984 (United States Bureau of Census, 1985, p. 145).  Among Arabs in Israel, life expectancy at birth was 70.6 years for males and 74.2 years for females in 1981 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1987).  For both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli authorities estimated life expectancy for both sexes at about 48 years in 1967, 55 years in the mid-1970s, and 62 years in the early 1980s (Israel Ministry of Health, 1984 and 1986), for a net gain of 14 years over a 15-year period.  By contrast, the net gain estimated by the United Nations in 1981 was only 7.6 years for Arab countries including the Gaza Strip, and 7.5 years in Jordan, for the 15-year period between 1970-1975 and 1985-1990 (United Nations, 1981, p. 94).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Chapter III<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>SALIENT DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A.\t<\/span><\/strong>Age Composition<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

71.\t<\/span>Attention has already been drawn to the inaccuracies in Israeli registration records, which are affected by the under-reporting of births and deaths, and by inaccurate reports on age breakdowns in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The last comprehensive Israeli estimate for the population of the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip available at the time this study was prepared was that of 1987.  Owing to the Palestinian Intifada in these areas, Israeli researchers were unable to collect complete statistical data (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989).  Results of the 1987 age-sex composition estimated by the Israelis are given in table 3.1.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

72.\t<\/span>The age-sex pyramid is that of a very young population.  The age index, which relates to the two extreme age groups by expressing the number of persons aged 65 and over as a percentage of those aged 0-14, is only 5.68 per cent in the Gaza Strip, 7.85 per cent in the West Bank, and 9.90 per cent in east Jerusalem.  Table 3.1 shows that no less than 47.2 per cent and 48.8 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip inhabitants, respectively, were below the age of 15, compared to 41.7 per cent of east Jerusalem inhabitants.  These differences in the proportion of children suggest that fertility is significantly higher in the Gaza Strip, followed by the West Bank, than in east Jerusalem.  Figures for the latter are explained by the inclusion of Christians, who constitute approximately 10.5 per cent of the east Jerusalem population, compared to 5 per cent and 1 per cent in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively.  Among the Arab Christians in Israel, for example, lower TFRs have been mentioned:  3.65 compared to 8.47 among Muslims in Israel in 1970-74 and 2.57 compared to 4.68 in 1988 (ibid.).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

73.\t<\/span>Those aged 15-24 make up a further 20.7 per cent, 20.6 per cent, and 19.9 per cent in the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, respectively.  Hence almost two-thirds of the total are less than 25 years old.  The highest (69.4 per cent) was found in the Gaza Strip, followed by the West Bank (67.9 per cent), and east Jerusalem (62.3 per cent).  If the percentage of those 25-34 years old is added, then more than three-quarters of the total population in Jerusalem, and well over four-fifths in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are less than 35 years old.  The  differences in fertility, mortality and migration rates between these three areas have played an important role in producing these variations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

74.\t<\/span>The high proportion of 15 to 24-year-olds may be related to a variety of factors.  Probably the most important is the establishment of many institutes and universities in the occupied territory in the late 1970s, which provided possibilities for students to continue their education inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  In addition, Israeli military regulations which prevented many people below the age of 26 from returning to the occupied territory before spending at least nine months abroad, have reduced the number of emigrants from this age group.  Furthermore, economic difficulties in the Gulf States, the main labour market for Palestinians, since the early 1980s, have led these countries to cut quotas for foreign employees in new enterprises.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

75.\t<\/span>The age group 25 to 34 is significantly lower than the previous group (15 to 24) in all three areas (i.e., the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and east Jerusalem), reflecting their higher emigration after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.  The development boom, sparked off in the Gulf States by the oil price rises following that war, increased the demand for their labour.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

76.\t<\/span>The small size of age group 35-54, which constitutes only 10.6 per cent of the total population in the Gaza Strip and 9.9 per cent in the West Bank, as compared to 14.7 per cent in the case of east Jerusalem, is also largely related to emigration by those cohorts, and implies that emigration is significantly higher in the first two areas than in east Jerusalem.  As a result, the proportion of males is low; 39.1 per cent in the Gaza Strip, and 40.8 per cent in the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

77.\t<\/span>Some 3.7 per cent and 2.8 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations, respectively, are aged 65 years or over.  The small number in this age group reflects their higher mortality; moreover, women predominate:  53.6 per cent in the West Bank and 54.8 per cent in the Gaza Strip.  The higher number of females is influenced by their longevity, and also by the absence of aged working males.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

78.\t<\/span>The proportion of population in the working age group of 15-64 is highest in east Jerusalem (54.2 per cent of the total) where the proportion of children is relatively low, followed, for the same reason, by the West Bank (49.1 per cent).  The Gaza Strip, with the highest proportion aged 0-14 years old, has the lowest figure (48.4 per cent) for the working age groups.  Despite these variations, the age-sex pyramids for all three areas reflect an extremely young population structure.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

79.\t<\/span>A comparison of the data derived from the 1961 Jordanian census with those derived from the 1967 Israeli census and from later Israeli estimates (table 3.2) reveals significant changes in age structure.  According to the 1961 census, 45.2 per cent and 43.7 per cent of the total population in the West Bank, and 43.7 per cent of the population in east Jerusalem, were below the age of 15, compared to 48.1 per cent and 44.4 per cent, respectively, after the 1967 war.  This is partly explained by the emigration of young adults in the 1967 exodus, as well as the more complete registration of population in 1967 as compared to the 1961 census.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

80.    The slight decrease in the proportion of young people (0-14) between 1967 and 1987, reflects relatively higher fertility rates 20 years ago.  The child-woman ratio, for example, was about 879 and 896 in 1967 in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively, as compared with 818 and 865 in 1987 (calculated by the author from Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970 and 1989, pp. 625-626 and p. 701).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

81.\t<\/span>The apparent increase in the proportion of people aged 15-24 years, in the three areas between 1967-1987, is attributed to:  (a) cumulative fertility rates over the past 20 years; (b) Israeli restrictions on the out-migration of persons below the age of 26; and (c) the establishment of many institutes and universities in the occupied territory after 1967, which kept young people at home and so increased the proportion of young adults.  In 1967, however, the lower percentage of this age group implies that large-scale emigration by those age cohorts may have occurred.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

82.\t<\/span>The higher proportion of people in the age group 25-44 in 1987 (19.1 per cent in the West Bank, 23.5 per cent in east Jerusalem, and 19.8 per cent in the Gaza Strip) as compared with 18.8 per cent, 20.6 per cent, and 19.0 per cent respectively, in 1967, is largely related to the Israeli restrictions on emigration.  However, the slight decrease (between 1967 and 1987) in the proportion aged 45-64 in the Gaza Strip was probably influenced by the return migration, while those from the West Bank, followed by those from east Jerusalem, seem to have stayed abroad for a longer period.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

83.\t<\/span>People aged 65 or over constituted only 4.1 per cent of the population in east Jerusalem, 3.7 per cent in the West Bank, and 2.8 per cent in the Gaza Strip in 1987, as compared with 5.5 per cent, 6.6 per cent, and 4.8 per cent, respectively, in 1967.  Age was probably estimated or reported more accurately in the 1980s, and the numbers may also have been affected by visits by elderly people to relatives abroad.  The lower percentage of aged persons in the Gaza Strip as compared with both east Jerusalem and the West Bank, over the period 1967-1987, may reflect higher overall mortality.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

84.\t<\/span>In summary, after two decades of significant transformation in demographic structure, the population of both the West Bank and Gaza Strip began moving towards a more normal age-sex structure owing to the declining role of migration in the mid- and late 1980s. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

85.\t<\/span>Extremely young age structures produce high dependency ratios.  Table 3.3 gives crude dependency ratios for the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, and shows values similar to those of Arab and Islamic countries, but very different from those of Western countries.  The crude dependency ratio for Tunisia in 1981, for example, was 85.6 dependants for every 100 persons of working age; 77.5 were children and 8.1 were elderly.  Also, the crude dependency ratio in Pakistan was 95.1 in 1981:  86.9 children and 8.2 elderly.  By contrast, the crude dependency ratio for the United States of America in 1984 was only 51 dependants; 33.1 children and 17.9 elderly.  (Calculated by the author from the United Nations 1984 Demographic Yearbook<\/u>, 1986, pp. 194-206.)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

86.\t<\/span>According to the figures in table 3.3, as a result of the differences in fertility, mortality, and migration rates among the population of the areas under discussion, the crude dependency ratio was higher (106.8 dependants for every 100 persons of working age) in the Gaza Strip in 1987, than in the West Bank (100 dependants) and east Jerusalem (84.6 dependants).  The highest dependency ratio for children (101.1 dependants) was in the Gaza Strip, and the lowest (77 dependants) in east Jerusalem.  For the elderly, however, the highest dependency ratio (7.6 dependants) was in east Jerusalem, and the lowest (5.7 dependants) in the Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

87.\t<\/span>Table 3.3 also shows that, in all three areas, much higher dependency ratios for the occupied territory's population were recorded by the Israeli census of 1967.  At that time, there were 120.5 dependants per 100 persons of working age in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip as compared to some 100 dependants in east Jerusalem.  This was owing mainly to the heavy emigration of people of working age immediately after the war, the higher fertility rate at that time, and the higher proportion of elderly people for reasons already discussed.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

B.\t<\/span><\/strong>Sex composition<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

88.\t<\/span>Age-specific sex ratios (ASSR) among the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations calculated on the basis of Israeli estimates are presented in table 3.4.  Values of sex ratios appear to have been about the same for the West Bank and Gaza Strip; they are estimated to have risen from 99.1 and 94.3 males per 100 females in the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively in 1967 to 100.8 in both areas by 1987, owing mainly to emigration of females following their husbands, and because of the Israeli restrictions mentioned above.  Clearly, a high proportion of the Gaza Strip emigrants in 1967 were men, while emigration from the West Bank and east Jerusalem involved entire families – although there was selective emigration of males as well.  This is confirmed by a rise of sex ratios in the West Bank and east Jerusalem from 97.9 and 100.8, respectively, in 1961, to 99.1 and 106.2 in 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

89.\t<\/span>In 1987, about 51.7 per cent of children below the age of 15 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were males, producing a sex ratio of 107.0.  While this is due primarily to the sex ratio at birth, it also reflects the very limited impact of sex-selective emigration on this age group, as well as a possible under-estim-ation of females.  The sex ratios decline steeply from 106.4 in West Bank and from 109.3 in the Gaza Strip in the 25-34 year age group, to 68.0 and 62.7 respectively in the 45-54 year age group.  The ratios rise slightly to 77.0 and 81.1, respectively, at age group 55-64 years, and to 86.6 and 82.6 for the age groups 65 years and over.  These figures clarify the effect of emigration from both areas.  The lower sex ratio in the age groups 25-54 years is influenced mainly by the emigration of males.  Above the age of 55, the higher sex ratio is explained by the return of males to the occupied territory after a period of living abroad, and seems to suggest that more emigrants from the Gaza Strip return by the age of 55 than do emigrants from the West Bank (i.e., emigrants from the West Bank may stay abroad until slightly older in age than emigrants from the Gaza Strip).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

90.\t<\/span>Among those above the age of 35, however, the lower sex ratio in both areas may be explained by the fact that many male emigrants who happened to be outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the 1967 war were prevented from returning, while many others had left or were forced to remain outside the occupied territory for "security reasons", or for lack of a "reunion permit".  In a study of emigration from the West Bank refugee camps, it was found that these two causes accounted for 55.1 per cent of emigrants who left between June 1967 and December 1969, and of nearly one-quarter (22.4 per cent) of all emigrants after 1967 (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 188).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

91.\t<\/span>Among those below the age of 35 years, there are significant variations in sex composition.  The sex ratio rises in both geographic areas from 107.0 among children aged 0-14 years to 113.0 and 111.0 among those aged 15-19 years in the West Bank and the Strip, respectively.  This is largely explained by the emigration of females after marriage.  Beyond the age of 20, the sex ratio declines slightly in the Gaza Strip, to about 109.5, but falls to 106.4 in the West Bank in the age group 25-34 years.  This is explained in part by factors which facilitate or restrict the movement of populations between each area and other territories, and seems to suggest a greater emigration of females from the Gaza Strip who follow their husbands, rather than the emigration of families from the Gaza Strip, or of females from the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

92.\t<\/span>Between 1961 and 1967, the ASSRs in the West Bank as a whole declined slightly before the age of 45 years from 87.0 and 77.2 in the 15-29 and 30-44 age groups in 1961, to 86.5 and 76.4 respectively in 1967.  They then rise slightly from 94.1 to 96.7 in the 45-64 age group, and then more rapidly from 96.8 to 108.8 at age 65 and over.  These figures reflect the emigration of males aged 15-44, in particular, and the exaggeration of reported age, especially by older males.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

93.\t<\/span>Clearly, the emigration of males aged 15-44 from the Jerusalem district in 1961 was lower than the emigration of males from other parts of the West Bank; however, the emigration of females from Jerusalem was much higher than that of females from the Nablus and the Hebron districts.  After the age of 45, the reverse is true; the ASSRs were higher in Nablus and Hebron districts, suggesting that more emigrants from Nablus and Hebron return to the West Bank than do emigrants from Jerusalem.  Table 1.19 suggests significant changes in ASSRs over the period.  In the 0-14 age group, the sex-ratio was virtually the same in all years for each of the three areas for reasons mentioned earlier.  It also shows that the trends in ASSRs appear to have been about the same for the West Bank and Gaza Strip:  they are estimated to have fallen steeply after the age of 15 during the 1970s, and after the age of 29 in the 1980s, but they rise again after age 45 in both periods, owing to factors discussed above.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

C.\t<\/span><\/strong>Religion<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

94.\t<\/span>In the period before the 1967 war, the only Jordanian source describing the distribution of the West Bank population by religion was the 1961 census.  Subsequently, the Israeli 1967 census provided a distribution of the Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem populations by religion, although such data are absent from later Israeli statistical series.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

95.\t<\/span>Table 3.5 shows the distribu-tion of the occupied territory's populations by religion, and reveals the fact that, for the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in 1967, the number of Christians was extremely small, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where Muslims were 94 per cent and 99 per cent of the population, respectively.  In the case of east Jerusalem in 1967, however, Christians constituted about 16.5 per cent of the population.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

96.\t<\/span>The figures in table 3.5 also show that, in 1961, there were some 42,618 Christians in the Jerusalem district, about 92.9 per cent of the West Bank total of Christians.  By 1967, the city of east Jerusalem alone accounted for 26.8 per cent of the total Christians in the West Bank.  Between 1961 and 1967, the population fell by about 143,693 people, 97 per cent of whom were Muslims.  This reflected a significantly higher emigration rate among Muslims compared to Christians.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

97.\t<\/span>It is worth noting that during the period before the June war only a very small number of Palestinian Muslims and Christians lived in Israeli west Jerusalem; they constituted only 2.2 per cent of its population in 1961.  As a result of the Israeli annexation of east Jerusalem on 28 June 1967, however, the proportion of Palestinian Muslims and Christians in east and west Jerusalem as a whole increased to around one-quarter (24.2 per cent in 1968 and 26.7 per cent by 1983) (Calculated by the author from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970 and 1989, p. 27 and pp. 40-41).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

98.\t<\/span>The proportional distribution of the east Jerusalem population estimated by the author (table 3.5) shows that the number of Christians was nearly the same during the 1967-1972 period, reflecting higher migratory rates.  However, in the period 1972-1988, the Christian population increased by 1.4 per cent per annum compared with a rate of 3.4 per cent for Muslims.  Higher fertility levels among Muslims, contributed to a steady decline in the proportion of Christians.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

D.\t<\/span><\/strong>Marital status<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

99.\t<\/span>In the society of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where births outside marriage are virtually unknown, marriage is a prime determinant of fertility.  Thus, the overall fertility of the population is strongly affected by the proportion of the fertile population that is married, the age at which marriage occurs, and the subsequent stability of marriages.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

100.\t<\/span>Tracking down the available data on marital status in the West Bank and Gaza Strip presents similar problems to those for religion (i.e., the only two official sources which indicate the distribution of the West Bank population by marital status are the 1961 and the 1967 censuses, while the only one for the Gaza Strip population is that of the 1967 census).  Such data are absent from later Israeli statistics for both areas.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

101.\t<\/span>Table 3.6 presents basic marital status data derived from the 1961 census for the West Bank as a whole, and data from the 1967 census for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  It also presents results of the 1981 and 1987 sample surveys carried out by individual researchers.  The former covered the Nablus subdistrict only, while the latter focused on the refugee camp population in the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

102.\t<\/span>The table shows that in the West Bank the proportion of both males and females remaining single in 1961 (34.8 per cent and 23.1 per cent of all males and the females aged 15 and over, respectively) is somewhat higher than comparable figures for 1967 (30.7 per cent and 22 per cent).  In the case of those married, the reverse is true:  according to the 1961 census, 62.9 per cent of males and 62.8 per cent of females were married, compared to 66.6 per cent and 63.6 per cent respectively in 1967.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

103.\t<\/span>Table 3.6 indicates differences in the marital status structure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, though these are relatively small.  The most striking contrast is to be seen in the proportions of single people:  the proportion of both males and females remaining single in the West Bank (30.7 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively) is somewhat lower than that of the Gaza Strip (33 per cent and 22.7 per cent).  This reflects the relatively weaker impact of emigration on the population of the Gaza Strip.  According to the 1967 census (see table 3.2), 34 per cent and 35.6 per cent of the total population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively, were 15-44 years old. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

104.\t<\/span>Although the differences in marital status among the populations of the three districts are quite small, some significant distinctions may still be observed.  In all three districts in 1961, the proportion of divorced or widowed people was very small; the great majority were either single or married.  The proportion of both males and females remaining single (31.5 per cent and 16.5 per cent, respectively) was somewhat lower in the Hebron district than in the other two districts.  As a corollary to this, the highest proportion of married males and females (66.4 per cent and 69.9 per cent) was found in the Hebron district.  The traditional social pressure on single males and females compels them to marry early, and likewise for the divorced populations as well.  It would seem that this tendency is stronger in Hebron than in the other two districts.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

105.\t<\/span>A comparison of the data derived from the 1961 and 1967 censuses with those from the two sample surveys mentioned above reveals large differences in marital status structure.  According to the 1961 and 1967 censuses, some one-third of males in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip and less than one-quarter of the females were single, compared to approximately one-half and one-third, respective-ly in the 1980s (table 3.6) in the case of the West Bank.  This large increase in the proportion of single people is attributed primarily to the cumulative fertility rates over the past 13 to 20 years, which led to an increase in the proportion of young adults.  A second reason is the increase in the average age at marriage, mainly for economic reasons.  Thirdly, restrictions on the emigration of persons below the age of 26 have also led to a rise in the proportion of single young adults.  The significantly higher proportion of single males (51.9 per cent) and females (45.1 per cent) in the 1981 study, compared to 46.8 per cent and 36.5 per cent respectively in 1987 study, is related mainly to the inclusion of the urban population in the former study.  The marriage of camp refugees occurs at an earlier age, reflecting the varying levels of socio-economic development between urban and refugee populations.  Another factor is the increased incomes resulting from work in Israel, which allowed more refugees to marry, thus resulting in a higher proportion of married males and females in 1987 (50.8 per cent and 58.1 per cent) than in 1981 (47.2 per cent and 49.9 per cent).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

106.\t<\/span>The effects of emigration, particularly on married males, are also seen in table 3.6.  While the proportion of married females declined from 63.6 per cent in 1967 to 49.9 per cent in 1981 and 58.1 per cent in 1987, that of males followed a similar but sharper trend, from 66.6 per cent in 1967 to 47.2 in 1981, and 50.8 per cent in 1987.  The disparity in the decline results from emigrant males leaving their wives behind in the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

107.\t<\/span>The data also suggest some decline in the proportions of widowed individuals between the 1960s and 1980s.  In the case of males, this was relatively small, from 2.4 per cent to between 0.7 per cent and 2.2 per cent.  In the case of females, however, there was a fall from 13.5 per cent to 4.7 per cent.  The high proportion of widowed females in 1967 is due in part to war casualties among males, and higher mortality among males in general.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

108.\t<\/span>The relative ease with which Palestinian males can remarry, unlike females, accounts for the fact that the proportion of divorced males (around 0.3 per cent) is less than half that of divorced females (0.7-1.0 per cent).  Apparently, the stability of arranged marriage is still influenced by strong religious and social pressures.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

109.\t<\/span>Table 3.7 shows the marital status of the West Bank population by age and sex during the period 1961 to 1987, as well as that of the Gaza Strip in 1967.  The table shows the shifts in marital status which occurred through the various stages of the life cycle.  An increase in the proportion of single persons may be noted.  There was a marked rise in the proportion of single females, in particular.  Up to age group 25-29, the proportion of single males increased from 24.9 per cent and 29.8 per cent in 1961 and 1967 respective-ly, to 43.2 per cent and 38.7 per cent in 1981 and 1987.  For females in the same age bracket, the proportion of singles increased from 13.7 per cent and 16.3 per cent to 34.6 per cent and 31.7 per cent between the same dates.  Put another way, the percentage of single persons of both sexes declined rapidly after the age of 29 in 1961 and 1967, and after the age of 34 in the 1980s (i.e., some five years delay in their entry into marriage).  This is a result of the difficulties facing males who are required to be ready economically for marriage.  A second factor is the increased percentage of females enrolled in higher education since the establishment of institutes and universities in the West Bank, as well as the greater importance now being attached to education of females.  In addition, recent trends in attitudes toward marriage favour husbands who are well-educated, employed and with a high income.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

110.\t<\/span>Marital status in the Gaza Strip population, by age and sex, shows differences no greater than those of the West Bank in 1967.  They have been influenced by the same dominant factors affecting males and females in the West Bank in the 1980s.  Both areas were still under Israeli occupation, and faced the same set of policies, such as Israeli restrictions on population movement.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

E.\t<\/span><\/strong>Geographical distribution<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

111.\t<\/span>It should be noted that after 1983, the administrative units adopted by the Israeli occupation authorities were quite different from those used by both the Jordanian administration before 1967 and the Israelis in the 1967 census (though the boundaries of subdistricts in 1967 were similar to those in 1961).  For example, the Nablus and Hebron districts lost some 29.5 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, of the total area applicable in 1961 and 1967, while the Jerusalem district gained about 44 per cent.  Nablus subdistrict lost more than 70 per cent; its area declined from 1,584 km2 in 1961 and 1967 to only 472 km2 in 1983, while the Jericho subdistrict gained more than 200 per cent.  The data on geographical distribution in the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip are shown in tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10.  It is clear from the figures in table 3.8 that the great majority (86.4 per cent) of the population of the West Bank prior to the Israeli occupation were concentrated in Jerusalem (44.2 per cent) and Nablus district (42.2 per cent), while the rest (13.6 per cent) were living in Hebron district.  These differences were related to the relative size of the districts.  Jerusalem and Nablus together formed about 81 per cent of the total area of the West Bank, and contained 11 of the 12 urban centres, and a majority of large rural settlements.  Hebron represented about 19 per cent of the total area, and had only one urban centre (Hebron city) and a small number of rural settlements.  In addition, Palestinian refugees fleeing to the West Bank in 1948 were concentrated in Jerusalem and in the Nablus district.  On the eve of Israeli occupation, about 46 per cent of all refugees in the West Bank were living in the Jerusalem district, 33.3 per cent in Nablus, while Hebron contained one-fifth (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 47).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

112.\t<\/span>Table 3.8 shows that this situation changed greatly after June 1967, mainly as a result of the war.  Of the Israeli census total, 45.4 per cent of the West Bank population was living in Nablus district.  In Jerusalem district, the proportion had fallen to about 36.7 per cent.  This was due mainly to the large decline in the population of the Jericho area, one of the Jerusalem subdistricts, which became only 1.6 per cent of the total as against 8.2 per cent in 1961 and 9.3 per cent in May 1967.  The Jericho area made a major contribu-tion to the exodus following the 1967 war.  This is largely related to its location nearest the Jordanian border.  In 1985, the proportion living in Nablus district had fallen to about 41.9 per cent while that of the Jerusalem and Hebron districts had risen to 37.3 per cent and 20.9 per cent, respectively.  These changes in the distribution of the West Bank population are related not only to the high participation of the Jericho area in the 1967 exodus, but to the change in administrative boundaries carried out after 1967 by the Israelis.  Another factor was the voluntary movement between areas of the West Bank.  In addition, the land confiscation that accompanied intensive Israeli settlement in the lower Jordan valley caused the Palestinian population to move to other areas.  The above-mentioned sample survey shows that 8.4 per cent of the refugee camp heads of household who arrived with their families in 1967 and after were forced to live there because of the Israeli occupation and its settlement policy in the West Bank (ibid. p. 117).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

113.\t<\/span>Differences in the geographical distribution of the east Jerusalem population between 1961 and 1967 are difficult to distinguish because of changes in municipal organization carried out by the Israeli authorities on 28 June 1967.  The new municipal area of east Jerusalem which was annexed to Israel included new areas.  If these new areas had been included in the 1961 municipal area of east Jerusalem (table 3.9), then the population of east Jerusalem would have been about 9.3 per cent of the West Bank population in 1961, or 21.8 per cent of the Jerusalem district population.  It is obvious that the distribution of the east Jerusalem population in 1967 was very different from that of 1961.  The population of the Jordanian municipality had fallen by about 26.6 per cent; of these, 81.4 per cent left the old city of Jerusalem, and 18.6 per cent left the surrounding areas.  Moreover, the population of the "new areas" had risen by about 43.3 per cent, resulting from the movement of families from the old city of Jerusalem to the "new areas", which were considered by many to be safer than the town itself, especially in times of conflict.  Another factor was a certain desire of people to be safe from the subsequent impact of the Israeli annexation process.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

114.\t<\/span>Data on the geographical distribution of the Gaza Strip population are presented in table 3.10.  As the table shows, well over half the population was concentrated in the Gaza Strip subdistrict, more than one-third in Khan Yunis, and the remaining 13-16 per cent in the Deir el Balah subdistrict.  One explanation for this is the high concentration of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip and Khan Yunis rather than in Deir el Balah.  United Nations figures on the refugee camp population of the Gaza Strip in 1988, for example, showed that the refugee camps of the Deir el Balah subdistrict were generally small, with an average population of 10,000, about one-third and one-fifth the size of those in Khan Yunis and the Gaza Strip subdistricts, respectively (United Nations, 1989).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

F.\t<\/span><\/strong>Type of locality<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

115.\t<\/span>The terms "fully urban" and "nomads" were defined similarly in both the 1961 and 1967 censuses, but the remainder of the population in the 1967 census was classified as "rural" and "refugee camps".  The latter category is absent from Jordanian sources throughout the period 1950 to 1967.  Like the West Bank, data on the distribution of the Gaza Strip population by type of settlement are absent from Israeli statistics after 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

116.\t<\/span>The 1967 Israeli census of the population recorded a much smaller number of Palestinians in both the West Bank (including east Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.  The, respectively, 661,757 and 354,700 people recorded in that census represented only 77.8 per cent of total West Bankers, and only 80.5 per cent of all Gazans, estimated by the author as of 30 May 1967 (see table 1.2).  Clearly, the Israeli 1967 census was largely affected by the heavy losses of population from both areas, either because people were trapped abroad at the time of the 1967 war, or had emigrated during or immediately after it (see chap. II).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

117.\t<\/span>The figures in table 1.9 show that, between 1961 and 1967, the percentage of people living in towns of the West Bank had risen slightly to 34.1 per cent, although their absolute numbers declined from 284,188 to 226,472, a loss of about 20.3 per cent.  The number of those who lived in villages and camps had fallen from 506,315 to 438,022, or 13.5 per cent.  These Israeli figures seem to suggest a higher participation of urban areas in the 1967 exodus.  Results of the 1967 census indicate that among the West Bank population, urbanites had been the most likely to emigrate during the period before 1967, owing to the higher financial and human capital in these centres compared to villages or camps (E.F. Sabatello, 1983, pp. 25-26, and S.A. Gabriel and E.F. Sabatello, 1986, pp. 248-251).  Lack of employment opportunities for the more qualified persons in the towns of the West Bank pushed certain numbers to emigrate abroad in search of work and\/or better living conditions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

118.\t<\/span>Compared to the 1961 figures, both Jerusalem and Nablus districts in 1967 contained a smaller proportion (52.5 per cent and 30.6 per cent respectively) of the total urban population in the West Bank, while Hebron district contained a higher proportion (16.9 per cent).  In the case of rural and refugee camp populations combined, a higher proportion was recorded in both Nablus and Hebron districts (53.3 per cent and 18.3 per cent), while in Jerusalem the proportion had fallen to about 28.4 per cent.  This was due primarily to the large decline in the population of Jericho, who came mainly from refugee camps.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

119.\t<\/span>At the subdistrict level, figures in table 1.9 show that more than 82.9 per cent of the population in Jenin were concentrated in villages, while Jericho, at about 9.7 per cent, had the lower percentage of population concentrated in villages.  With regard to the urban settlements, it is clear that Jerusalem had the highest percentage of its population living in urban centres (more than 68.8 per cent), while Jenin had the lowest percentage (10.7 per cent).  Some 31.8 per cent of the Jericho population was settled in refugee camps.  Hebron had the lowest percentage of its population living in camps, at about 4.9 per cent.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

120.\t<\/span>Figures for 1981 and 1987 (table 1.9) show that the percentage of people living in towns of the West Bank had risen significantly, to 49 per cent and 40.9 per cent, respectively.  This was owing to the inclusion of the refugee camp population within the urban centres, since these camps are close to towns of the West Bank, and many are now within the municipal boundaries of these towns.  Another factor is the internal migration from villages or camps to the nearby towns of the West Bank.  From 1967 onwards, Israeli occupation policy aimed to suppress economic development in the occupied territory, thereby limiting employment opportunities and causing many to seek employment in Israel, in the occupied territory, or abroad.  In a study of the economic geography of the West Bank (W.R. Ennab, 1979), it was found that between 1961 and 1966 and 1968 and 1974, the average cultivated area in the West Bank declined by 30.8 per cent, accompanied by a fall in agricultural output of about 29 per cent (W.R. Ennab, 1979, p. 321).  By April 1985, the amount of land under the control of the Israeli authorities had reached 52 per cent of the total land area of the West Bank compared with 25 per cent in 1976.  Moreover, there were 104 Israeli settlements in the West Bank (M. Benvenisti, et al.<\/u>, 1986), compared with 63 in March 1978 (M. Abdul Hadi, 1978, pp. 61-91).  Consequently, many villagers were obliged to seek work and accommodation in cities of the West Bank, while many former agricultural workers were obliged to seek employment in Israel or abroad.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

121.\t<\/span>With regard to the Gaza Strip, the figures in table 3.11 show that in 1967 it was mainly inhabited by refugees (49.3 per cent), followed by urban population (42.2 per cent), while villages contained only 8.5 per cent.  Both refugee camps and rural population areas had fallen to 44.9 per cent and 7.7 per cent of the Gaza Strip's total population by 1985, while the urban population was estimated to have risen to 47.4 per cent, due probably to internal migration from refugee camps and villages to the limited number of towns in the Gaza Strip.  During the period covered, well over half the population of the Gaza Strip was concentrated in Gaza town, while the remainder was distributed among the towns of Khan Yunis, Rafah and Deir el Balah.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

G.\t<\/span><\/strong>Household and family size<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

122.\t<\/span>The Israeli statistical definition of a family is identical to that of a household.  Both are defined as a group of persons living in one flat permanently, and generally preparing their meals jointly.  Thus, a household may include one or more persons whether they are related or not (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989, p. XLII).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

123.\t<\/span>Table 3.12, which shows the average family size in the West Bank by type of settlement, reveals an upward trend in the average number of persons in a family in the period 1961 to 1981, increasing from 5.13 in 1961 to 6.9 in 1981, or by 1.77 persons, or 34.5 per cent.  This increase was due to a rapid decline in mortality rates, which fell from 21.8 per 1,000 in 1968 to 9.8 per 1,000 in 1981.  Although the average number of persons per family remained high in the period 1981 to 1988, the trend since 1981 has been downward, decreasing from 6.9 in 1981 to 6.4 in 1988 or by about 7.2 per cent, a result of a slight decline in birth rates, from 42 per 1,000 in 1980 to 40.6 per 1,000 in 1987.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

124.\t<\/span>By contrast, the trend in average family size among the Gaza Strip population during the period 1971-1975 was upward (table 3.13), increasing from 6.1 per 1,000 to 6.8 per 1,000 or by about 11.1 per cent.  Again, this was attributable to the rapid decline in mortality rates, from 20.2 per 1,000 in 1968 to 13.6 per 1,000 in 1975, and to high growth rates.  Thereafter, however, the trend in the Gaza Strip has been downward, decreasing from 6.8 per 1,000 in 1975 to 6.4 per 1,000 in 1988 or by about 5.9 per cent, owing to a slight decline in birth rates, from 49.2 in 1976 to 47.6 per 1,000 in 1987.  These figures indicate that average family size reached its highest point in the mid-1970s in the Gaza Strip, due to the more rapid increase of fertility among the population there.  CDRs, for example, increased by about 6.4 per cent compared with only 2.4 per cent in the West Bank in the period 1971-1976.  Also, the more rapid decline in mortality rates in the Gaza Strip population played a role:  the CDRs declined by about 25.7 per cent in the Gaza Strip compared with 23 per cent in the West Bank over the same period.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

125.\t<\/span>In both areas (tables 3.12 and 3.13), a sizeable majority of families consisted of six or more persons.  In the West Bank, this proportion declined by about 17.5 per cent in the period 1961-1971, owing to the emigration of families in the 1967 exodus.  Ten years later, the proportion had risen by about 17 per cent, but then declined thereafter, reaching about 57.2 per cent in 1988.  In the period 1971-1981, this proportion had risen by about 26 per cent among villagers, but only by 13.3 per cent among the population living in towns.  This disparity occurred because of higher fertility among villagers.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

126.\t<\/span>In the case of the Gaza Strip, the proportion of families of six or more persons had risen to 63.1 per cent of families in the period 1971-1975, but had declined thereafter to 57.3 per cent in 1988.  In the period 1971-1981, this proportion had risen by 22.3 per cent among the population living in towns, but only by 4.7 per cent among the refugee camp population.  By contrast, some 53.3 per cent of all Arab Muslim families and 26.9 per cent of all Arab Christian families in Israel in 1988 consisted of six or more persons, a reflection of higher fertility rates among Muslims compared to Christians; this also reflects higher fertility rates among Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip when compared to that among Palestinian Muslims in Israel.  In 1987, for example, the CBR among the Arab Muslims in Israel was 33.8 per 1,000 compared to 40.6 and 47.6 per 1,000 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1988, p. 103 and pp. 700-702).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.\t<\/span><\/strong>Population density<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Crude density, 1952-1988<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

127.\t<\/span>Table 3.14 shows the crude density of the Palestinian population in the West Bank over the period 1952-1988, and in the Gaza Strip in the period 1967-1988.  In 1967, the crude density in the Gaza Strip was about eight times greater than that of the West Bank, due mainly to the small area of the Gaza Strip (363 km2) compared to the area of the West Bank (5,650 km2).  The crude density of the Gaza Strip was almost nine times greater than that of the West Bank by 1988.  This is largely related to the higher fertility and lower mortality levels of the Gaza Strip population.  In addition, emigration from the West Bank recorded higher rates than the Gaza Strip over the period.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

128.\t<\/span>The effects of the 1967 exodus are seen from figures on population density in subdistricts which constituted the West Bank.  For the West Bank as a whole, the crude density declined by about 15.7 per cent in the period 1961-1967, then increased by about 51.6 per cent in the period 1967-1988.  This percentage increase reached 65.5 per cent in the Gaza Strip for reasons already discussed.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

129.\t<\/span>Israeli figures for September 1967 indicate that there were four subdistricts that recorded lower density levels than those found in 1961.  They include:  Jericho (83 per cent), Nablus (37.4 per cent), Jerusalem (28.1 per cent) and Ramallah (9.2 per cent).  The other four subdistricts, Bethlehem, Tulkarm, Jenin, and Hebron recorded higher densities:  20.4 per cent, 16.5 per cent, 15.4 per cent and 1.5 per cent, respectively.  These figures not only indicate the differences in the participation of subdistricts in the exodus of 1967, they also reflect the large-scale migration from and to these subdistricts.  Five subdistricts recorded a lower population in 1967 than in 1961.  Those living in Hebron in 1967 represented about 99.1 per cent of its 1961 population.  This percentage was 88.1 per cent in Ramallah, 87.8 per cent in Jerusalem, 62.7 per cent in Nablus but only 16.3 per cent in Jericho.  The remaining two subdistricts, Jenin and Bethlehem, increased their population by 11.4 per cent and 17.2 per cent, respectively.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

130.\t<\/span>Changes in the administrative boundaries of subdistricts created by the Israeli authorities after 1983 make it difficult to study systematically the differences in population densities in subdistricts of the West Bank.  In 1980 and 1985, for example, population density in the Nablus subdistrict was about four times greater than in 1967.  Many Nablus villages were included in the administrative boundaries of Tulkarm, Jenin, and Ramallah after 1967 (i.e. the Nablus subdistrict is now restricted to small but more populated areas – Nablus city, its refugee camps and a small number of nearby villages).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Built-up area and density<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

131.\t<\/span>Data on the built-up areas of subdistricts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were not available.  Benvenisti and Khayat (M. Benvenisti and S. Khayat, 1988, pp. 52-116) estimated built-up areas in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1987 (tables 3.15 and 3.16).  For the West Bank in 1961 and 1967, and the Gaza Strip in 1967, estimates of built-up areas have been made by the author under the assumption that these areas were 40 per cent smaller prior to 1987.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

132.\t<\/span>In 1961-1967, the built-up areas in the West Bank were only 3.3 per cent of the total area.  By 1987, they had increased to about 5.5 per cent.  In the Gaza Strip, built-up areas represented some 9.6 per cent of the total area in 1967, but increased to close to 16 per cent by 1987.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

133.\t<\/span>The figures in tables 3.15 and 3.16 indicate a very high population density in the Gaza Strip when compared to the West Bank since 1967.  In 1967, population density in the Gaza Strip was 10,256 persons per km2, compared to 4,582 in the West Bank.  In the latter, the population density had fallen in 1967 to about 77.8 per cent of the 1961 level, a result of the vast emigration following the 1967 war.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

134.\t<\/span>As a result of continuing emigration from both areas, population density in 1985 had not recovered to the 1967 level.  Population density in the West Bank had declined to 70.8 per cent of the 1967 level after 10 years of Israeli occupation, then increased to 84.7 per cent by 1985.  This index was 74.9 per cent in the Gaza Strip in 1979, and reached about 88.7 per cent in 1985.  The significantly higher population density in the mid-1980s is explained by higher rates of natural increase and lower migration rates than those prevailing during the 1970s.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

135.\t<\/span>The tables also show that, in 1961, population density in the subdistricts of the West Bank ranged between 2,891 persons per km2 in Ramallah to 7,495 persons per km2 in Jerusalem.  In 1967, it ranged between 939 per km2 in Jericho subdistrict to 8,349 per km2 in Jenin.  Only two subdistricts recorded higher densities in 1967 than in 1961 (Tulkarm and Jenin).  The other six subdistricts, Jericho, Nablus, Jerusalem and Bethlehem combined, Ramallah and Hebron, recorded lower densities, which fell by 83.7 per cent, 37.3 per cent, 19.7 per cent, 11.9 per cent and 0.9 per cent, respectively.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

136.\t<\/span>In addition to the factors discussed above, Israeli regulations in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip were also a factor.  As already mentioned, 52 per cent of the land in the West Bank was under Israeli control by mid-1985.  In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli authorities controlled over 62 per cent of the total land area by 1984, some 120 km2, or 33.1 per cent of the Gaza Strip was under direct Israeli possession while 104.4 km2, or 28.8 per cent of the Gaza Strip, was subject to severe restrictions (A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 56).  The permitted residential area for Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was only 48 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, of the total land area.  That was in addition to Israeli restrictions against Palestinian residents in both areas, whereby Palestinians were prevented from constructing any housing outside the municipality and village boundaries.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Housing density<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

137.\t<\/span>Housing density more clearly reflects population density in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  It is important to point out that the average area covered by houses in the West Bank was 127.1 m2 in 1987, producing an average of 19.8 m2 per person in the West Bank, compared to 22.6 m2 per person for the Gaza Strip population.  In the Gaza Strip, the average dwelling area covered 144.5 m2, while the average number of persons per household was approximately 6.4 persons (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989, p. 738).  Table 3.17 shows that the average number of rooms (3.4) in houses of the West Bank was consistent over the period, while the average number of rooms in the Gaza Strip had risen from 3.5 in 1975 to 4.3 in 1987.  The larger dwelling area is an important factor in lowering the housing density in the Gaza Strip over time.  The average number of persons per room in the Gaza Strip fell from 1.94 persons in 1975 to 1.51 persons in 1987, a decline of about 22.2 per cent, while density levels in the West Bank had fallen from 1.94 persons in 1975 to 1.91 persons in 1987, or by 1.5 per cent only.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

138.\t<\/span>A significantly higher housing density was recorded in the refugee camps of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, reflecting the very poor housing conditions found in these camps.  In the study of housing conditions in the refugee camps of the West Bank, it was found that the average number of persons per room was 2.26 in 1987, while in the Khan Yunis refugee camp survey of 1985 the average was 2.83.  In the latter, however, the average number of persons in the household was higher (10.2 as compared with 8.22 in the camps of the West Bank), while the average number of rooms was nearly the same at 3.6 (W.R. Ennab, 1989, pp. 99-100; and A. Dahlan, 1987, pp. 318-320).  Further evidence of the great housing problem in the refugee camps is the fact that more than 99 per cent of refugee camp inhabitants in the West Bank share a sleeping room with another person; 92.6 per cent share a sleeping room with two or more persons; some 24 per cent share a sleeping room with five or more persons (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 103).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

139.\t<\/span>Table 3.18 summarizes and presents further evidence of housing density in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and east Jerusalem, compared with that of Arabs in Israel.  These data indicate that, up to 1981, nearly three quarters of the West Bank and Gaza Strip households had a density of two or more persons per room.  Since 1968, the employment of many West Bankers and Gazans in Israel, and the remittances from migrants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have allowed housing improvements to be made; nevertheless, some households still lack improvements.  As table 3.18 shows, some one fifth (18 per cent) of the Christian households in Israel in 1988 had a density of less than one person per room.  The percentage was 14.8 per cent among the Arabs of Jerusalem, and 8.2 per cent among Muslims in Israel, 7.3 per cent in the West Bank, and less than 5.5 per cent in the Gaza Strip.  These figures indicate that almost all Gaza Strip households, followed by those in the West Bank and Jerusalem, live in conditions of high housing density.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

140.\t<\/span>If only households with an average of three or more persons per room are considered to be suffering from inadequate housing (B. Abu Kishk and I. Ghurani, in E.A. Nakhleh (ed.), 1980; B. Abu Kishk, 1983 (in Arabic)), then 35.8 per cent of Gaza Strip households, 33.7 per cent of Jerusalem households, and 31.7 per cent of West Bank households fall in this category.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

141.\t<\/span>Obviously, the housing density of the occupied territory is high.  Israel's confiscation of Palestinian lands, restrictions on the building of houses, combined with the high rates of natural increase and the absence of a national authority to guide and plan, implied that housing conditions in the occupied territory would continue to deteriorate, exacerbating the existing housing shortage there.<\/p><\/div>\n


<\/p>\n

\n

\n<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Chapter IV<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>MIGRATION FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

142.\t<\/span>As suggested in the last chapter, emigration resulting to a large degree from the Arab-Israeli conflict had a profound effect upon population trends in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The study of emigration after 1967 is rendered difficult by a variety of factors.  By far the most important is the lack of appropriate data covering the West Bank and Gaza Strip emigrants, other than those contained in the Israeli census of 1967.  Similar data has been omitted from Israeli statistics since 1967, making it difficult to follow the type of emigration, its directions, duration, causes, and the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of emigrants from both areas.  Most Israeli studies which analyse emigration from the occupied territory, (e.g. E.F. Sabatello, 1983, and S.A. Gabriel and E.F. Sabatello, 1986) have been based mainly on the 1967 Israeli data, and on the census's definition of the term "emigrant".  The Israeli 1967 census asked heads of household to report their sons and daughters living abroad, and thus appears to omit spouses, children of those emigrants and people who did not leave parents or relatives behind who could report on them.  Only few studies depend on non-Israeli sources, and these are completely devoted to the emigration of a particular population group rather than of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip populations as a whole.  The study of demography and population geography of the West Bank refugee camps, for example, focused on the emigration of the camp populations (W.R. Ennab, 1989), and in the case of the Gaza Strip, a sample survey only focused on Gazan employees abroad (A. Dahlan, 1987).  But, to some extent, these can be used to indicate causes of emigration abroad, trends, characteristics of emigrants and the demographic impact of emigration on the bulk of populations remaining in the occupied territory.  Another difficulty arises from the fact that national statistics of current places of residence rarely identify whether the emigrants originated from the West Bank or from the Gaza Strip, a result of their travelling on Jordanian passports and reporting their nationality as Jordanian.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A.\t<\/span><\/strong>Causes of emigration<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

143.\t<\/span>As has been shown in chapter I, emigration from the West Bank in the period before 1967 was almost entirely motivated by economic considerations, i.e. emigrants consisted mainly of males (78 per cent) were unable to find jobs in the West Bank, a majority of whom were 20-39 years of age (66 per cent).  In the case of the Gaza Strip, migratory movements prior to 1967 were modest, the net migration rates were lower by about 29 per cent than those of the West Bank.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

144.\t<\/span>The heaviest emigration losses from the West Bank and Gaza Strip occurred as a result of the June 1967 war and the occupation by Israeli forces of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The primary imperative of the emigrant was to find the nearest place of safety, whether in East Jordan or Egypt.  In the period between the 1967 war in June and the Israeli census conducted in September estimates of the number of persons who had left or been expelled from their homes in the West Bank ranged widely from about 170,000, according to Israeli sources (S.A. Gabriel and E.F. Sabatello, 1986, p. 251), to some 300,000 according to Palestinian researchers (J. Abu-Lughod, 1985; the Arabic Institute for Training and Statistical Research, 1985, p. 670).  Both estimates included emigrants from east Jerusalem, but the latter source included those emigrants who happened to be outside the West Bank during the war, and were prevented from returning.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

145.\t<\/span>In the case of the Gaza Strip, the number of emigrants estimated by the Israelis was about 31,000, but ranged between 25,000 to 40,000 according to Abu Lughod (ibid.).  The author's own estimate suggests a figure of about 189,000 persons displaced from the West Bank, and over 87,000 from the Gaza Strip.  This estimate was obtained by subtracting the Israeli 1967 figures on the population of the West Bank (661,778; including east Jerusalem), and the Gaza Strip (354,700) from the post-war population estimate presented in table 1.2.  With respect to those refugees who were displaced in the 1948 exodus, and who remained in the West Bank until 1967, UNRWA's estimate of displaced persons in the 1967 war show that nearly 150,000 registered refugees fled to East Jordan (United Nations:  n.d.).  Between 63,787 and 70,238 persons or 42.5 per cent to 46.8 per cent of the total number of displaced refugees estimated by UNRWA were forced from refugee camps by the end of August 1967 (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 173).  Most studies on the 1967 exodus concur that it was a massive migration, character-ized by family displacement, and therefore unlike previous emigrations discussed above.  Family movement as well as the movement of selected individuals after the war were caused by socio-economic and political factors.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

146.\t<\/span>Available evidence concerning the emigration of the Palestinian people from the territory during the period of Israeli occupation indicates that, of all emigrants recorded in a 1981 sample survey carried out in the Nablus subdistrict (H. Makboul, 1987, p. 236), some 67.2 per cent moved to obtain employment, while the remaining 32.8 per cent moved to accompany their husbands and fathers, or to further their education.  A more detailed study (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 188) carried out in the refugee camps of the West Bank indicates that, in the period between June 1967 and July 1987, some 44.4 per cent of all emigrants from refugee camps moved to accompany their husbands or fathers (i.e. they consisted of married women and children).  A further 30.5 per cent moved to obtain employment, and a small but significant proportion (2.8 per cent) emigrated to further their education.  The effects of the Israeli occupation are seen in the fact that 13.6 per cent remained outside the West Bank because they lacked "reunion permits" and a further 8.7 per cent for reasons of "security" (ibid.).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

147.\t<\/span>Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, emigrants could return only if they were in possession of a "reunion permit" issued by the Israeli authorities.  Such permits were not available to individuals who had been outside the occupied territory for more than six years.  Those who left before 1967 had no "right" of return and were thus excluded permanently from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Approximately 37.6 per cent of emigrants from the refugee camps of the West Bank recorded in the 1987 sample survey had no reunion permit; of these, 84 per cent reported that they wished to return to the West Bank (ibid., p. 182).  In addition, in 1986, 40 per cent of all emigrants from the West Bank as a whole had no reunion permit (Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee, 1986, quoted in A. Mansour and G. Kossaifi, 1990, p. 842).  It is estimated that 50 per cent of all emigrants left after 1967 (ibid., p. 843).  As a result of these restric-tions, 24.2 per cent of the emigrants recorded in 1987 (W.R. Ennab, 1989, pp. 182-183) had not visited the West Bank since 1980, 30.8 per cent had not visited since 1981, and 65 per cent had not visited since 1985.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

B.\t<\/span><\/strong>Trends<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

148.\t<\/span>The estimate (A. Mansour and G. Kossaifi, 1990, p. 928) of the permanent emigrants from the West Bank during the period 1950-1966 indicates that the trend in their number is consistent, increasing from 900 persons in 1950 to 17,800 in 1966.  Although fluctuations in the number of emigrants can be observed, the annual average number in the period 1950-1959 was nearly one fourth (4,630 persons) that of the period 1960-1966 (18,971 persons).  Of all emigrants in the period 1961-1967, it is estimated that the majority (82.1 per cent) of those from the West Bank had moved to countries outside Jordan, while the remaining (17.9 per cent) had settled in Jordan (G. Kossaifi, 1976, quoted in A. Mansour and G. Kossaifi, 1990, p. 929).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

149.\t<\/span>As already indicated, Israeli data on movement of the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip only describe the total number of people moving and not whether they moved out or in.  Neither do these data distinguish migrants of the West Bank from those of the Gaza Strip, whether they moved eastward through the Damyia and Allenby bridges, or southward through the Rafah cross point.  Israeli data on the movement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population combined, during the period 1967-1986, are presented in table 4.1.  As the table shows, gross migratory movements (i.e. total number of people leaving and entering) were modest in the early years of the Israeli occupation; about 16.5 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population together moved in both directions in 1971.  This had risen gradually over the years and had reached half the population by 1975, increasing to about four fifths (77.5 per cent) by 1981.  After 1982, the trends in gross migratory movements were downward.  One reason for the large movement of population from the occupied territory, particularly the population of the West Bank, is related to socio-economic relationships between the West Bank and Jordan, and with other Arab countries.  Well over nine tenths of the migrants directed their movement across the Damiya and Allenby bridges which connect the East and West Banks of Jordan.  Another factor might be the desire of many people to visit their sons and daughters living abroad.  In addition, pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia also require travel, mainly through Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

150.\t<\/span>Table 4.1 shows that during the period September 1967 to December 1968, some 73,400 people had left or been forced to remain outside the territory permanently.  It has been estimated that 55.1 per cent of registered refugee emigrants in the first 18 months of the Israeli occupation had left or were forced to remain outside the West Bank for "security reasons", or for lack of "reunion permits" (W.R. Ennab, 1989, p. 188).  In the period 1969 to 1971, about 11,777 people had left permanently or were forced to remain outside the territory; of these, 70.5 per cent had left in 1970, most probably for security reasons.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

151.\t<\/span>With the exception of 1973, the net migration rates were negative over the period 1967-1986.  This significant positive net migration rate is owing to the 1973 war, when many persons left Jordan, Syria and Egypt for the occupied territory.  On the whole, negative migration rates were an obvious result of the economic difficulties in the occupied territory experienced since 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

152.\t<\/span>Table 4.1 also indicates fluctuations in the annual net migration rate, which reached its highest points in the period 1974-1981.  Factors at work which created a demand for labour in this period included the development boom sparked off in the Gulf States by the oil price rises following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, reconstruction in Jordan following the 1970 civil war, and the outflow of Lebanese capital to Jordan as a result of civil war in Lebanon which began in 1975.  All these factors increased the demand for Palestinian labourers.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

153.\t<\/span>Thereafter, however, the annual net migration rate fell abruptly, from 18.6 per 1,000 in 1981 to 8.9 per 1,000 in 1982, reaching its lowest point (2.4) in 1986.  This is an obvious result of the economic difficulties in the Gulf States, in particular.  The reduction in oil prices in these countries, and the impact of the Iraq-Iran war on their economies led these countries to cut quotas for foreign employees working in new enterprises.  In addition many universities and institutions of higher education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were established in the late 1970s and thereafter, which provided possibilities for students to pursue their higher education within the occupied territory rather than seeking it elsewhere.  Furthermore, the Jordanian regulation, applied since 1982, in order to stem emigration from the occupied territory, prevented people from spending more than one month in Jordan, thus resulting in discouraging emigration from the occupied territory.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

154.\t<\/span>While both areas showed the same general trends and fluctuations in net migration rates, the figures in table 2.2 indicate significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  In the latter case, significantly higher net migration rates occurred in the period between 1968-1974; thereafter, however, the reverse was true, but these rates increased again in the Gaza Strip in 1986 and 1987.  In terms of absolute number, however, Israeli figures on emigration from the occupied territory showed that during the period 1968-1987, about 246,600 emigrants had left permanently or were forced to leave the West Bank and Gaza Strip (i.e. 12,979 people annually) of these, nearly two thirds originated from the West Bank, while the remaining 38 per cent originated from the Gaza Strip.  Table 2.2 also indicates a rapid decline in the proportion leaving permanently in the period 1969-1971 compared to 1968, a result of an Israeli decision, beginning in July 1968, permitting the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to seek employment inside Israel.  This annual average has risen subsequently, especially in the period 1975-1981.  Of all emigrants who left the West Bank in the period 1968-1987, some 62.1 per cent had left during the period 1975-1981.  In the Gaza Strip the percentage leaving during 1975-1981 was only 32.4 per cent, a reflection of the different circumstances prevailing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which facilitated or restricted the movement of people between these areas and other territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

155.\t<\/span>Of the several factors responsible for emigration from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to neighbouring countries and further afield, the most important has been the search for work, resulting from inadequate employment opportunities in the occupied territory.  The low net migration rates in the Gaza Strip are related to poor socio-economic conditions there.  While this might have otherwise encouraged emigration, the mobility of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip has been constrained by a lack of funds, and by low levels of education, which have restricted their ability to take part fully in the movement to the Gulf States, where demand has concentrated on skilled manpower.  That is, of course, in addition to the relative ease with which the population of the West Bank can move into Jordan and beyond (as nationals of Jordan) as compared with the population of the Gaza Strip, whose refugee status hinders their movement into most States.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

C.\t<\/span><\/strong>Characteristics of the emigrants<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Age-sex structure<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

156.\t<\/span>Table 4.2 presents the age and sex structure of the emigrant population from the West Bank as recorded or estimated by various sources over the period 1961-1987.  A variety of factors responsible for the distorted age-sex structure in 1961 includes in particular the emigration of the economically active age groups seeking work abroad; the preference of single men to emigrate; and the early marriage of females.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

157.\t<\/span>Table 4.2 also shows that 15.5 per cent of all emigrants from the West Bank were below the age of 10 years in 1961, reflecting the impact of the sex-selective emigration in that period (i.e. the preference of male emigrants to leave their wives behind to care for children, and\/or to decrease the economic burden).  The small proportion (3 per cent) of emigrants aged 50 or more is associated both with the high mortality rate for that age group, and the phenomenon of return migration.  Thus, 81.5 per cent of all emigrants, 86.3 per cent of male emigrants, but only 64.1 per cent of females are included in the 15-49 year old age group.  In addition to the impact of females marrying younger than males, there is also the fact the older men who have been married for a long time generally prefer to leave their wives and children behind for reasons mentioned above (economic, child care), while the young, recently married male will most probably emigrate with his wife.  Approximately, 28.6 per cent of all male emigrants and 14.8 per cent of all female emigrants were 35 years old or more in 1961.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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158.\t<\/span>In 1961, the sex-ratio of emigrants from the West Bank reached 351.2 males per 100 females, indicating a greater emigration of males than females.  It reached 110.2 in the 0-10 age group owing to the high sex ratio at birth and the greater care given to male children.  Between the ages of 10 and 49, it rose steadily from 288.3 in the age group 10-19, to 860.9 in age group 40-49, owing to the emigration of more males than females.  Above the age of 50, it declined from 581.8 for emigrants aged 50-59 to 170.7 in those aged 70 or more.  This is explained by the return of males to the West Bank after a period of living abroad, and possibly by visits of some females to their sons and daughters living abroad.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

159.\t<\/span>The age-sex structure of emigrants from the West Bank for the period 1961-1967 (table 4.2) suggests considerable changes, and indicates familial emigration as the main type during that period, unlike the period up to the 1961 census.  This seems to be a result of a subsequent family reunification which occurred in the mid-1960s (S.A. Gabriel and E.F. Sabatello, 1986, p. 249) and is owing to the fact that many married male emigrants prefer their wives and children to follow only after they have settled at work and can economically support their family in the host country.  Table 4.2 shows that 43.2 per cent of all emigrants in the period 1961-1967 were below the age of 15 years, a reflection of the high fertility rate among the West Bank population.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

160.\t<\/span>In the period 1967-1972, 80.6 per cent of all emigrants from the West Bank were below the age of 15 according to table 4.2, a direct result of the 1967 exodus, when many wives and children of the former emigrants left because they feared permanent separation from their husbands and fathers otherwise.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

161.\t<\/span>Although emigration from the West Bank in the period after 1967 was largely familial emigration, there was again sex-selective emigration of educated males of working age.  Some 72.8 per cent of all emigrants from the Nablus subdistrict recorded in the 1981 sample survey were males; 27.2 per cent were females.  Furthermore, nearly 88.8 per cent of all emigrants were in the 20-64 age group; of these, some 93.7 per cent were aged 20-39 years, and some three quarters (74.4 per cent) were males (H. Makboul, 1987, p. 237).  This situation had changed significantly by 1987, owing mainly to the higher migration rate in the period before 1981, and also to the subsequent emigration of wives and children in the years after 1981.  Some 70.2 per cent of all emigrants in 1987 were in the adult age group 15-64 years; of these, nearly 88.3 per cent, or 62 per cent of all emigrants were aged 20 to 44 years.  This significant proportion is largely related to the fact that most of these emigrants (96 per cent) had completed their education or had left school but lacked opportunities to find jobs in the West Bank.  Not surprisingly, about 59.3 per cent of emigrants aged 20-44 years were males, producing a sex ratio of 149, and reflecting the impact of sex-selective emigration on this age group.  The significantly low sex ratio (96.2) of emigrants aged 20-29 years in 1987 is likely to have occurred mainly because of Israeli restrictions on the emigration of males below the age of 26.  Thus, the age-sex structure of emigrants in the periods 1967-1977 and 1967-1982 as a whole (table 4.2) was influenced by the massive emigration of wives and children which occurred during the 1967 exodus.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

162.\t<\/span>The general trend traced above (i.e., the changed pattern from sex-selective to a more familial emigration) is confirmed by figures in table 4.3.  As the table shows, the proportion of emigrants below the age of 15 rose gradually from 19.2 per cent of all Palestinian\/Jordanian emigrants to Kuwait in 1957, to 53.2 per cent in 1975.  Emigrants aged 20 or over fell from 63.3 per cent in 1957 to 39.7 per cent in 1975.  Similar percentages were reported for the Palestinian\/Jordanian emigrants in Saudi Arabia in 1974.  In the United Arab Emirates, however, the figures in table 2.3 show a more selective emigration than in the other two countries:  34.5 per cent of all Palestinians\/Jordanians in the United Arab Emirates in 1975 were below the age of 15, while a sizeable majority (59.5 per cent) were aged 20 years or more.  This reflects the varied circumstances of emigrants in different places of destination.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

163.\t<\/span>It is important also to point out that for many years Israeli policy aimed to facilitate the out-movement of Palestinians from the occupied territory and to make such movement irreversible, thereby reducing their numbers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  From 1967 onwards, the authorities gave all West Bankers and Gazans permission to leave for just one year, after which they must return to renew their exit permits.  If they could not return and the permits expired, they were liable to lose their residency status.  Since the early 1980s, these permits became longer in length (three years).  Also, Israeli regulations introduced changes in the period that a migrant could spend outside the occupied territory depending on his\/her age.  The regulations allowed people 26 years of age and older to return after one day to three years, but prevented people under 26 years from returning to the occupied territory within nine months; many in this age group are students who leave the territory in search of admission to institutions of higher education abroad for the following academic year.  The Israeli regulations led to these students remaining outside the occupied territory for up to nine months, waiting the commencement of the academic year.  That is, of course, if they were able to obtain the aforementioned admission; if not, they were still obliged to spend the period abroad, awaiting permission to return home.  A major reason underlying the Israeli policy was the need to deflect popular resistance to occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in which people of this age group are often involved. <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

    <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

164.\t<\/span>Figures on estimated age-specific emigration rates (ASERs) from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (table 4.4), provide further evidence of changing types of emigration throughout the period.  In the West Bank, table 4.4 shows that ASERs were higher among males below the age of 30 in the period 1961-1966.  This situation changed dramatically during 1966-1971 as a result of the 1967 war, and the ASERs increased considerably for all age groups and for both males and females.  The lowest ASERs were estimated for the 1971-1976 period, particularly among males over 25 years of age; the lowest were for females estimated at age 30 or more.  Due to Israeli restrictions on the emigration of males below the age of 26, and also to the establishment of many institutes and universities in the late 1970s and thereafter, the estimated ASERs for both males and females aged 10-24 in the period 1976-1981 were significantly lower (11 per cent-19 per cent) than those for the period 1961-1966 (24 per cent-28 per cent).  The highest for males (23 per cent and 22 per cent) occurred in age groups 25-29 and 30-34, respectively, and in age group 25-29 for females 32 per cent.  These are emigrants beyond the age of schooling.  The higher ASER among females aged 25-29 years is explained, in part by the emigration of females engaged to males living abroad, and by the preference of young, newly-wed couples to emigrate together.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

165.\t<\/span>ASERs estimated for the Gaza Strip population (table 4.4) were clearly much lower than those estimated for the West Bank population over the years studied, and reflect the fact that emigration, especially in the 1967 exodus, was probably affected by the great distance between the Strip and Egypt, and also by battlefield conditions in the Sinai Peninsula in that year.  The proximity of the West Bank to Jordan, however, made it easier for its population to move eastward.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

166.\t<\/span>The rapid decline in ASERs of the Gaza Strip population after 1967 reflects not only the fact that the Jordanian Government refused entry to people leaving the Gaza Strip after July 1968 (A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 42), but also the fact that, from July 1968, when the Israeli authorities permitted the population of the occupied territory to seek employment inside Israel, the number of Gazan workers employed in Israel increased more rapidly than the number of workers from the West Bank.  The proportion of Gazan workers increased from 28.6 per cent of all workers from both areas combined in 1970 to 47.4 per cent in 1981 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1981 and 1989, p. 732 and p. 721).  This fact is explained by the varying levels of economic conditions in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and also by the restrictions imposed on people leaving the Gaza Strip, as already indicated.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

167.\t<\/span>Significant differences in ASERs between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can be observed (table 4.4), especially in the most recent period indicated, and for females in particular.  The figures in table 4.4 also indicate higher ASERs for females from the West Bank in most age groups.  This seems to suggest a more familial emigration from the West Bank, although there is sex-selective emigration from both areas.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Marital status<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

168.\t<\/span>The marital status of emigrants, which can serve as a good index of emigration type and age-sex structure, is rarely discussed in emigration studies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  One reason for this is the absence of appropriate data from Israeli sources after 1967.  Turning to the very limited surveys conducted in the occupied territory by individual researchers, we find the same problem.  For example, of all refugee camp emigrants aged 15 years or over, some 77.1 per cent were married, 22.7 per cent single, but only 0.2 per cent widowed (W.R. Ennab, 1989, pp. 195-198).  Many male emigrants marry only after they are settled at work, and after they are economically more secure.  These are the two most influential factors delaying the age of marriage for males to 25 years and for females to 21 years (26.4 per cent of male emigrants and 17.5 per cent of female emigrants aged 15 years and over had never married).  Hence, better economic possibilities abroad and the need to feel settled in the societies were the most influential factors in producing a 100 per cent marriage rate among Palestinians by the age of 45 years (i.e., no emigrant was single above the age of 44).  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

169.\t<\/span>Not surprisingly, the survey shows that the proportion of single people rises gradually with the level of education, from 0.9 per cent at the elementary level to 33.6 per cent at the university level.  There were no single people among the illiterate, aged emigrants.  The marital status of migrant workers from the Gaza Strip recorded in 1985 (A. Dahlan, 1987, p. 247) shows that 18.55 per cent were single, 80.9 per cent married, and only 0.55 per cent widowed or divorced.  Of all married workers, 14.2 per cent travelled alone to lighten the economic burden, or because their stays abroad were short.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Educational status<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

170.\t<\/span>Available data on the educational attainment of emigrants from the occupied territory are shown in table 4.5.  The table shows that of all emigrants aged six years or over in 1987, 58.6 per cent had elementary, preparatory and secondary levels of education, while 36.5 per cent were trained at the institute or university level; only 4.9 per cent were illiterate.  The lower percentage of illiterate emigrants is explained by the lower proportion of aged emigrants, on the one hand, and by the preference of countries for emigrants who are educated, on the other.  The higher percentage of emigrants with schooling is explained by children of school age who accompany their parents abroad.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

171.\t<\/span>The data also show that illiteracy is three times higher among female emigrants than among males, reflecting a cultural preference for male over female education.  Male emigrants are characterized by high educational levels.  There is a high proportion of males (25.5 per cent) with a university education, while the proportion with an elementary education is 15.8 per cent.  This does not include the male drop within the secondary level, which is probably related to Israeli restrictions on the movement of emigrants aged 15-19 years (3.5 per cent of all emigrants), and to the fact that economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip compel them to leave school in order to work at an early age.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

172.\t<\/span>The 1987 data, when compared with those from the Jordanian census in 1961 (table 4.5), suggest significant progress in educational achievement among emigrants over the past 26 years.  According to the 1961 census, 27.4 per cent of all emigrants from the West Bank were illiterate, 63.8 per cent had attended school, and only 8.8 per cent had experienced higher education.  The sex differentials were even greater:  47.0 per cent of females were illiterate as against 22.8 per cent of males; 68.4 per cent of males but only 48.3 per cent of females had been to school; only 4.7 per cent of females had achieved higher education compared to 9.8 per cent of males.  A variety of factors lie behind the progress achieved since 1961:  the establishment of institutes and universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; increased family incomes owing largely to employment in Israel; and the greater importance attached to the education of females.  That is, of course, in addition to the preference of receiving countries for emigrants who have achieved higher education levels.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

173.\t<\/span>The relative ease with which emigrants of low education levels could obtain employment in some Arab Gulf States (table 4.5) in the early 1960s and 1970s, compared to the limited opportunities in the 1980s, accounts for the fact that, in the 1970s, the proportion of illiterate people was significantly higher than that of emigrants with higher education, while in the 1980s the reverse was true.  As for the occupational distribution of Gazan migrant workers abroad, it was found that 94 per cent were white-collar workers; only 6 per cent were engaged in blue-collar work.  Thus, highly educated people constituted the main proportion of Gazan migrant workers abroad (ibid.).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

D.\t<\/span><\/strong>Demographic impact<\/u><\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

174.\t<\/span>As suggested above, emigration, resulting to a large degree from the Arab-Israeli conflict has had a profound effect upon population trends in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Age-sex structure<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

175.\t<\/span>The demographic impact of emigration from the occupied territory examined in table 4.6 shows that of the total population aged 0-44 years in 1967, only 68.8 per cent and 70.5 per cent had remained in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively, by 1987.  Migration was responsible for more than 94 per cent of the decline in both areas.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

176.\t<\/span>The demographic impact of the migratory process is likely to be about the same in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip although some significant differences can be observed.  In both areas people who are aged 15-24 years were the most likely to emigrate.  Thus 57.4 per cent of the Gaza Strip population aged 15-24 compared with only 49.3 per cent in the West Bank in the same age group had remained in these areas after 20 years of Israeli occupation.  This was owing to poor employment opportunities in both areas, and to better economic conditions in the West Bank, which allowed people of these ages to further their education abroad.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

177.\t<\/span>In age group 5-34, 63.5 per cent remained in the West Bank and 68.4 per cent remained in the Gaza Strip.  In age groups 0-4 and 35-44, the reverse was true:  some 84 per cent of children remained in the West Bank compared with 77.7 per cent in the Gaza Strip; 71.6 per cent in age group 35-44 remained in the West Bank compared with 67.8 per cent in the Gaza Strip.  These figures suggest that more women and children return, either permanently or temporarily, to the West Bank than to the Gaza Strip, or that more children and women had been left in the West Bank by male relatives who had left for work abroad or for other reasons. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

178.\t<\/span>Table 4.6 reflects the sex-selective emigration from both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and indicates that, by 1987, the movement of men from the West Bank was higher than the movement of men from the Gaza Strip.  As already mentioned, the sex-ratio for age groups 0-44 declined from 97.5 in 1967 to 92.4 in 1987 in the West Bank, and from 93.4 to 91.6 between 1967 and 1987 in the Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

179.\t<\/span>Up to 1977, the proportion of males and females aged 5-44 years who remained in the West Bank was lower than that of the Gaza Strip; this indicates, once again, a more familial emigration from the West Bank.  By 1987, however, changes of some significance in the remaining proportion of males and females occurred.  This was particularly striking in the age group 35-44 for males, and in age groups 0-4 and 35-44 for females.  The figures in table 2.6 suggest differences and changes in attitudes of male emigrants towards the emigration of their wives and children.  Up to 1977, it would appear that male emigrants from the West Bank preferred their wives and children to accompany them; thereafter, male emigrants from the Gaza Strip showed a greater preference for their wives and children to accompany them than did emigrant males from the West Bank.  This probably reflected the longer stay abroad for emigrants from the Gaza Strip.  In both areas, a significantly higher proportion of females remained, particularly females aged 15-24 years.  This reflects, to some extent, the traditional social view of female education among the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations.  With regard to the 1967 exodus, we have already noted that the majority of those who had left the West Bank and Gaza Strip had emigrated to join heads of families abroad.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Marriage<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

180.\t<\/span>The age and sex-selective emigration from the West Bank and Gaza Strip seriously affects the proportion of people of marrying age, the marriage market, and the formation of new family units.  Throughout the period 1967-1986, the number of West Bank women of childbearing age (15-49 years) exceeded that of men in the same age group by 23.3 per cent in 1967, by 7 per cent in 1977, and by 3.9 per cent in 1986.  These figures were significantly higher in the Gaza Strip, reaching 31.4 per cent, 13.4 per cent, and 6.1 per cent, respectively.  In both areas, the only exception was the surplus of males over females in 1987:  by 3 per cent in the West Bank and by 1.7 per cent in the case of the Gaza Strip (Israel Bureau of Statistics, various years).  Israeli restrictions on emigration from the West Bank and Gaza Strip greatly increased at the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

181.\t<\/span>As already indicated (chap. I), the proportion of single females increased from 22 per cent in 1967 in the West Bank to 45.1 per cent in 1981 in the Nablus subdistrict.  It also increased to 36.5 per cent in 1987 in the refugee camps of the West Bank.  This is an obvious result of the emigration of single males of marriageable age.  In addition, Israeli regulations introduced since 1967 have prevented certain categories of emigrants from returning; 37.6 per cent of the emigrants from the refugee camps of the West Bank had no "right" to return to the West Bank as has been discussed above, thereby preventing their marriage to females from the West Bank.  Furthermore, 8.8 per cent of married West Bank refugee emigrants were married to partners from other Arab countries, (13.9 per cent of males and 2.4 per cent of females).  An additional 1.9 per cent of males were married in non-Arab countries (W.R. Ennab, 1989, pp. 198-199).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Educational levels<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

182.\t<\/span>The educational levels of emigrants from the occupied territory were discussed in section C.3.  As pointed out, these levels changed significantly over the years, and the proportion of illiterate people declined from 27.4 per cent in 1961 to only 4.9 per cent in 1987, while the proportion achieving higher educational levels increased from 8.8 per cent to 36.5 per cent during the same period.  The selective emigration of highly educated persons of working age introduced significant differences in the educational levels between emigrants and the bulk of the population in the occupied territory.  The proportion of the West Bank refugee camp population who obtained higher education was only 5.7 per cent in 1961, while the proportion of illiterates reached 22.3 per cent as compared with 36.5 per cent and 4.9 per cent, respectively, in 1987 (ibid. pp. 291-295).  In addition to factors mentioned earlier, it is well known that after the 1948 exodus, the main focus of the educational system of the Palestinian people has been the preparation of Palestinian youth for work in the economies of the Arab countries in general rather than the building of their own society and economy (A. Abdul Rahim, 1975, pp. 57-68).  For the Palestinians, both in exile and under occupation, education had become essential both for survival and as insurance against future insecurity and uncertainty.  It represents a mobile asset that cannot be confiscated by any colonizing force (J.M. Tahir, 1985, pp. 32-53).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>4.\t<\/span>Population growth<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

183.\t<\/span>In terms of population growth, the study of emigration shows significant differences in the annual rate of change in the population of the occupied territory over the entire 22-year period, 1967 to 1988.  Furthermore, high rates of natural increase, only began to outweigh the effect of migration loss by 1979 in the Gaza Strip, and by 1982 in the West Bank.  Since 1967, regulations introduced by the Israeli authorities have played a major role in producing these changes; nearly 89 per cent of all emigrants in 1981 were in the 20-64 age group; of these, some 94 per cent were aged 20-39 years.  In 1987, 62 per cent of all emigrants were aged 20-44 years, i.e., the most fertile portion of the population.<\/p><\/div>\n


<\/p>\n

\n

\n<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Chapter V<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>CONCLUSION:<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>MAJOR DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, FACTORS AFFECTING THEM AND<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span> SOME IMMEDIATE IMPLICA-TIONS<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

184.\t<\/span>The analysis of demographic trends among the Palestinian population in the occupied territory revealed trends that had remained largely unchanged since 1961.  The age structure of the Palestinian population in the occupied territory is very young with nearly half the population below the age of 15, itself a reflection of high fertility rates, which raises the crude dependency ratio to well over two dependants for every person of working age.  In the West Bank, the proportion of children to total population was about 45 per cent in 1961, 48 per cent in 1967 and 47 per cent in 1987.  In the case of the Gaza Strip, this proportion increased from 48 per cent in 1967 to 49 per cent in 1987.  Accordingly, the productive population of the Gaza Strip was expected to support a heavier burden of dependants than those of the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

185.\t<\/span>In both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, fertility remained high with very little change over the years studied.  In both areas, the CBR has remained well above 40 per 1,000, and the TFR remained high at seven or more children per woman.  Between 1976 and 1985, the percentage decline in CBR was nearly 12.5 per cent in the West Bank, and 9.3 per cent in the Gaza Strip.  In the West Bank, the TFR declined by only 6.4 per cent between 1961-1986.  Natality can remain high despite the slow decreases in fertility, a trend which is expected to continue in the West Bank and Gaza Strip through the end of the century.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

186.\t<\/span>Mortality rates appear to have fallen more rapidly than those of fertility.  According to Israeli sources, the CDRs in both areas declined by about 71 per cent between 1968-1987 (from 20 per 1,000 to 6 per 1,000), and the IMR's are estimated to have fallen from 150 per 1,000 before 1967 to 70 per 1,000 in the early 1980s, or by 53 per cent.  The reported IMR in 1982, however, showed a decline of only 24 per cent below the 1968 level.  As already indicated, higher mortality rates have been estimated or recorded by other researchers.  The IMR, as a critical factor in overall mortality and an indicator of health status, is still very high.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

187.\t<\/span>Over the entire 20-year period, 1967 to 1987, the natural increase of the Palestinians was very high, averaging around 34.7 per 1,000 in the Gaza Strip, and 30.4 per 1,000 in the West Bank.  The trend in the rates of natural increase was upward, increasing in the Gaza Strip from 23.4 per 1,000 in 1968 to 41.7 per 1,000 in 1987, and from 22.3 per 1,000 to 34.2 per 1,000 in the West Bank between these same years.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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188.\t<\/span>At the same time, the net migration rate from the occupied territory declined in the last few years, and is expected to decline throughout the 1990s, because of the impact of the Gulf-crisis and subsequent developments on the emigration and employment of Palestinians abroad.  In short, the growth of the population is expected to be close to the rate of natural increase.  Thus, the annual growth rate may increase in the near future from 3.39 (calculated by the author for the period 1982-1987, to 4.0 in the Gaza Strip, and from 2.89 to 3.5 in the case of the West Bank.  Accordingly, the population of the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip could number between 1,252,600 to 1,324,800, 191,400 to 203,400 and 877,700 to 932,900, respectively, by the year 2000.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

189.\t<\/span>Of the several factors affecting the demographic trends in the occupied territory, the most important is likely to be the limited changes in socio-econo-mic conditions.  To date, changes in these conditions have been insufficient to produce any significant fertility decline, for example. Religious, cultural and socio-economic factors (mentioned in chapter II) have acted as a brake on the decline of fertility rates.  In addition, the demographic conflict with Israel's settlement policies since 1967 has delayed fertility decline among the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Furthermore, selective emigration of well-educated people, a group that has lower than average fertility and mortality, has played a role in maintaining high rates of fertility and mortality overall.  The poor economic situation in the occupied territory is another factor contributing to high levels of fertility and mortality, and to emigration.  This study has also shown that the major variable of population change in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been migration.  The analysis of population growth in the occupied territory has revealed that unsettled political circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have influenced the population growth rate.  The political events in pre-1948 Palestine yielded substantial population flows from the interior of Palestine to and from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Economic conditions in these two areas and in destination regions forced people to seek employment abroad either during the pre-1967 period or after.  In the 1967 context, these flows were composed of high proportions of women, youth, and the elderly.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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190.\t<\/span>The study has also shown that the only source of population growth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is natural increase.  Developments in the socio-economic conditions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations have been very limited and insufficient to produce any significant decline in fertility. Moreover, political and religious factors paralyse any future reduction in fertility rates, and thwart efforts at family planning.  The fact that the social structure of the population has not changed significantly means that for women, as for the family, high fertility and rapid growth are still a source of power.  Hence, the large family persists and the transition to small family size may be a long, much delayed process.  The recent fall in fertility has occurred among younger women only.  Demographic and socio-economic conditions in the occupied territory are major factors maintaining high mortality levels.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

191.\t<\/span>The short- and long-term implications of these demographic trends in the occupied territory are indeed great.  From the economic perspective, larger numbers of young males and females will seek employment.  According to the author's estimate of the occupied territory population for the years 1995 and 2000, and assuming that the proportion of the economically active population and the proportion of unemployed will remain constant at 1985 levels (and that some 2 per cent of the economically active population will leave the labour force), then the number of new employment opportunities required in the West Bank would be about 35,440 by 1995 and 64,230 by the year 2000.  In the Gaza Strip, 22,590 new jobs would be needed in 1995 and 42,980 in 2000. Demographically, as more people become available for marriage, the natality of the population can be expected to rise.  As mentioned above, the size of the West Bank population in the year 2000 will be 48 per cent higher than in 1988, 51.7 per cent higher in east Jerusalem, and 58.4 per cent greater in the Gaza Strip.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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192.\t<\/span>It is evident from the findings presented here that the unstable conditions of Israeli occupation have not allowed for significant changes in the demographic characteristics of the population.  The problems can be alleviated by improving the socio-economic status of the population, by adopting a master plan and a successful national population policy, particularly related to employment, health, housing and public services, all of which would encourage people to reduce high rates of natural increase through a reduction in births.  Undoubtedly, the future of these areas and their populations has a direct bearing on future social and economic development in the Middle East.  <\/p><\/div>\n


<\/p>\n

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\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>LIST OF TABLES<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 1.1.<\/strong>\t<\/span>The Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1948-1967<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.2.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.3.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Crude birth rate, crude death rate, gross reproduction rate, life expectancies at birth in Jordan (1950-1965) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.4<\/strong>.\t<\/span>Distribution of population of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by district, 1952 and 1961<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.5.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Emigration from the West Bank towards the East Bank, 1962-1\/5\/1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 1.6.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Distribution of the Gaza Strip population 1958 and 1966<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.7.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Emigrants from the West Bank living outside the Kingdom of Jordan, by place of origin and destination areas, 1961<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.8.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Emigrants from the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1952 – 30 May 1967<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.9.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Population of the West Bank by type of settlement (1961, 1967) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.10.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Age and sex distribution of the West Bank and Jerusalem district population, 1961<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.11.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Distribution of West Bank population, by age groups and district, 1961<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 1.12.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Sex ratio of men to women in the West Bank, by type of residence and district, 1961<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 2.1.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Palestinian population of the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip 1967-1988<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 2.2.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Population growth rates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1968-1987<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 2.3.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Age specific fertility rate and total fertility rate in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, various years<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.1.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Age and sex distribution of Palestinian population, 1987 and 1988 <\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.2.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Distribution of the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip population, by major age groups, various years<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 3.3.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Age dependency ratio for the occupied territory, 1967, 1987<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 3.4.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Age specific sex ratio in the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.5.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Population of occupied Palestinian territory by religion, 1961, 1967<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.6.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Marital status in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1961, 1967, 1981 and 1987<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 3.7.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Marital status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population, by age and sex, various years  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 3.8.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Distribution of the West Bank population by subdistrict, various years<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Table 3.9.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Distribution of the east Jerusalem population, 1961 and 1967<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.10.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Distribution of the Gaza Strip population by subdistrict, various years<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.11.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Population of the Gaza Strip, by type of settlement<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.12.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Families in the West Bank, by size of family and type of settlement, various years<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.13.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Families in the Gaza Strip, by size of family and type of settle-ment, various years<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.14.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Population density in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, various years<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.15.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Built-up areas and population density in the West Bank<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.16.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Built-up areas and population density in the Gaza Strip<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.17.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Housing density in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, various years<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 3.18.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Housing density in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, east Jerusalem and among Palestinian Arabs in Israel, various years <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 4.1.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Movement of West Bank and Gaza Strip population, 1968-1986<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 4.2.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Age-sex composition of emigrants from the West Bank<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 4.3.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Estimated age-sex composition of Palestinians\/Jordanians in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 4.4.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Estimated age specific emigration rate for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1961-1982)<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 4.5.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Educational level of emigrants from the West Bank and of Palestinians\/Jordanians in some Arab Gulf states<\/p><\/div>\n

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Table 4.6.<\/strong>\t<\/span>Estimated "Remaining Population" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, by age and sex, 1977 and 1987<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Double-click on the following icons to see the tables:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Tables 1.1 – 2.3\t<\/span><\/span>[Link<\/a>]<\/p><\/div>\n

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Tables 3.1 – 3.18\t<\/span><\/span>[Link<\/a>]<\/p><\/div>\n

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Tables 4.1 – 4.6\t<\/span><\/span>[Link<\/a>]<\/p><\/div>\n


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REFERENCES<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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Abdul Hadi, M., 1978  The Israeli Settlements in Occupied Jerusalem and the West Bank 1967-1977<\/u>, Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

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Issa, N., 1979, Demographic Situation of the Palestinian People<\/u>, ECWA, Beirut. quoted in Dahlan, A. 1987.<\/p><\/div>\n

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—–<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Distr. General UNCTAD\/ECDC\/SEU\/1 28 June 1994 ENGLISH ONLY POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP UNTIL 1990 Study prepared by Dr. Wael R. Ennab, UNCTAD consultant*           *  This study constitutes Part one of the contribution made by Dr. Wael R. Ennab (Al-Najah University, the West Bank) to the intersectoral project of […]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"country":[],"document-category":[2765],"document-source":[2353],"committee-meeting":[],"document-subject":[3273,1937,3589],"entity":[1729],"document-language":[6542],"class_list":["post-209820","document","type-document","status-publish","hentry","document-category-study","document-source-united-nations-conference-on-trade-and-development-unctad","document-subject-demographic-issues","document-subject-economic-issues","document-subject-population","entity-united-nations-system","document-language-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/209820","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/document"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/209820\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=209820"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=209820"},{"taxonomy":"document-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-category?post=209820"},{"taxonomy":"document-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-source?post=209820"},{"taxonomy":"committee-meeting","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/committee-meeting?post=209820"},{"taxonomy":"document-subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-subject?post=209820"},{"taxonomy":"entity","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/entity?post=209820"},{"taxonomy":"document-language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-language?post=209820"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}