Printed copies of this publication, and back issues, can be obtained from:<\/p><\/div>\n
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United Nations Secretariat<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n\n
Division for Palestinian Rights<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n\n
Room S-3362<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n\n
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<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n\n
CONTENTS<\/p><\/div>\n
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\n\n| <\/td>\n | \n Page<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Excerpts from a statement by President Clinton on the Hebron agreement<\/p>\n Washington, D.C., 14 January 1997<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Text of letters from the Presidency of the European Union to the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the Palestinian Authority on the Hebron agreement,<\/p>\n Brussels, 15 January 1997<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Text of the Israeli Cabinet communiqué approving the Hebron protocol and related documents,<\/p>\n Jerusalem, 15 January 1997<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Statement before the Knesset by Prime Minister Netanyahu on the Hebron protocol,<\/p>\n Jerusalem, 16 January 1997<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Text of the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron and related documents,<\/p>\n Jerusalem, 17 January 1997<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Text of a statement on the Middle East peace process by the Council of the European Union,<\/p>\n Brussels, 20 January 1997<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 17<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Text of the Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron,<\/p>\n Jerusalem, 21 January 1997<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 18<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Text of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Temporary International Presence in Hebron<\/p>\n Oslo, 30 January 1997<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 20<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n |
\n| \n Notes<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 24<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n <\/p>\n
\n \n<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Excerpts from a statement by President Clinton on the Hebron agreement<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n Washington, D.C., 14 January 1997<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n \t<\/span>On 14 January 1997, at the White House, the following statement was made by United States President Bill Clinton on the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron:<\/p><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\tA few minutes ago, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat called me to tell me that they have reached agreement on the Israeli redeployment in Hebron. This achievement brings to a successful conclusion the talks that were launched in Washington last September, and it brings us another step closer to a lasting, secure Middle East peace.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tOnce again, the Israelis and the Palestinians have shown they can resolve their differences and help to build a brighter future for their children by finding ways to address each other's concerns. And once again, the forces of peace have prevailed over a history of division.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tIsrael will promptly redeploy its troops. The parties will establish practical security arrangements to strengthen stability and improve cooperation. There will also be an agreed road map for further redeployment by Israel. The Palestinians have reaffirmed their commitments, including their commitment to fight terrorism.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tI thank Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat for their leadership. King Hussein also deserves special recognition and gratitude for his work for peace. I also want to express my appreciation to President Mubarak for his support. Finally, let me thank Secretary Christopher who worked on this all weekend long, and our United States team. And especially let me thank our Special Middle East Coordinator, Dennis Ross, who has worked so hard and so long to help conclude this agreement.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tToday's agreement is not an end in itself. Bringing its words to life will require active and continuous cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian officials. It will demand every effort to stop those who would choose confrontation over cooperation. In short, this is not a time to relax. It is a time to re-enforce our commitment to peace.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThat's why it is so important that the Israelis and the Palestinians have agreed to continue to work on the remaining issues contained in their agreements. As they do, the United States will do all it can to help. We will do everything we can to build a just and durable peace – a peace that will mean a better life for Israelis, for Palestinians, for all the people of the Middle East. 1<\/u><\/i>\/<\/i>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n Text of letters from the Presidency of the European Union to the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the Palestinian Authority on the Hebron agreement<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n Brussels, 15 January 1997<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n \t<\/span>On 15 January 1997, the President of the Council of the European Union addressed letters to Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu and President of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat on the conclusion of the Hebron agreement. The following is the text of the letters:<\/p><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\tDear Mr. Prime Minister\/Dear Mr. President,\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tOn behalf of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, I should like warmly to congratulate you and President Arafat\/Prime Minister Netanyahu on the agreement you have reached today on redeployment in Hebron. This agreement marks an important step on the road towards a just and stable peace in the Middle East, as it can provide the new momentum that is necessary to reinvigorate the peace process. Allow me to express the hope that the Hebron agreement will strengthen the atmosphere of mutual confidence which is indispensable for the further implementation of the Oslo agreements.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tOver the past days the European Special Envoy to the Middle East, Ambassador Moratinos, has been in frequent contact with you, President Arafat\/Prime Minister Netanyahu, and his American colleagues. Let me assure you that collectively and through its Special Envoy the European Union, in close contact and coordination with the United States, will continue to do its utmost to assist you in making progress on the difficult road to a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement. The statesmanship which you have demonstrated in reaching this agreement deserves our admiration and augurs well for the speedy and successful resumption of talks on the other outstanding issues.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n \n\t\t\t\t( Signed<\/u>) Hans van Mierlo\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\tPresident of the Council of Ministers of the European Union,\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n \n\t\t\t\tVice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 2<\/u><\/i>\/<\/i>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n Text of the Israeli Cabinet communiqué approving the Hebron protocol and related documents<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n Jerusalem, 15 January 1997<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n \t<\/span>On 15 January 1997, the Israeli Cabinet adopted a communiqué approving the signing of the Hebron protocol and related documents. The following is the text of the decision, as communicated by the Cabinet Secretariat on 16 January 1997:<\/p><\/div>\n\n Cabinet Communiqué<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tAt a special Cabinet meeting held on Wednesday, 15 January 1997, the Cabinet decided as follows:\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t1. \t<\/span>To approve the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, as well as the Note for the Record and the Agreed Minute, which were initialled by representatives of Israel and the Palestinians on 6 Shevat 5757, 14 January 1997.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. \t<\/span>The Government will act to maintain all the conditions and requirements necessary for the existence, security and consolidation of the Jewish community in Hebron.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t3. \t<\/span>Details of the further stages of the redeployment in Judea and Samaria will be determined by the Government of Israel.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t \t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t4. \t<\/span>The Government will soon begin to discuss the principles of the permanent status arrangements, with the aim of concluding its deliberations prior to the implementation of the second stage of the further redeployment, at the very latest.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t5. \t<\/span>The Government reiterates that a fundamental condition for the continuation of the [peace] process with the Palestinians is the mutual fulfilment of the obligations of both sides, as itemized in the Note for the Record of 14 January 1997.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe Cabinet decision was adopted by a vote of 11 to 7. Upon the adoption of the decision, Minister Benjamin Begin announced his resignation from the Government. 3<\/u><\/i>\/<\/i>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n Statement before the Knesset by Prime Minister Netanyahu on the Hebron protocol<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n Jerusalem, 16 January 1997<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n \t<\/span>Speaking before the Knesset, on 16 January 1997, Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netahyahu explained his Government’s position with respect to the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron. The following is the text of his address:<\/p><\/div>\n\n Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Knesset,<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThese are difficult days. Every step that we take in the city of the patriarchs and the matriarchs is difficult, even when we redeploy in Hebron. We are not leaving Hebron, we are not redeploying from Hebron. In Hebron, we touch on the very basis of our national consciousness, the bedrock of our existence. Everyone whose heart beats with national feeling, with Jewish feeling, cannot help but feel the weight of the responsibility placed on our shoulders, and the supreme obligation to preserve our heritage.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tAt the same time, we cannot ignore reality. I must say to the members of the Knesset and the citizens of Israel, that we inherited a difficult reality. The agreements signed by the previous Governments are binding upon the Government of Israel. We said this in the election campaign, we said this after the election campaign, before the establishment of the Government and afterwards. These agreements which we inherited were framework agreements, full of breaches, and we criticized them – and rightly so – because they did not take into proper account the problem of security; they did not take into account the full significance of the agreements for our national security; they did not demonstrate sufficient concern for the fate of the settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, including the fate of the Jewish community in Hebron.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tWe inherited difficult agreements. This is the reality. One could try to ignore it. We chose not to ignore this reality. These agreements comprised written texts; but worse, was the "oral law". At least part of the previous leadership – I do not wish to include them all – sought to use these agreements to bring about objectives and goals which in my view are dangerous – potentially disastrous for our future. This was true both with regard to Hebron and with regard to the permanent status arrangements.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tWith regard to Hebron, we inherited a framework agreement full of holes. I want to clarify that this is an agreement of two-three pages, which comprises a list of general instructions. This is the "written law". I say that there was also an "oral law", in which at least part of the coalition – an important part – had the courage and the integrity to openly state their intention, their goal – in placards posted on streets and in buses. Part of the coalition did conceal that its intention was to uproot the Jewish community in Hebron, to remove it. Some of the Labour ministers of the previous Government did not conceal that this was their opinion, and the goal of the Government.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tI want to make this clear, not in order to indulge in polemics but to clarify a fundamental point: We are committed to the written agreements. We are not committed to the "oral law". Our viewpoint and our objectives are completely different. We do not want to remove the Jewish community from Hebron. We want to preserve and consolidate it. We do not want to remove ourselves from Hebron; we want to remain in Hebron. From this different objective are derived those items, those paragraphs, those components which were inserted into the agreement as a result of the negotiations. The agreement today is of course much broader, much more detailed.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tBut the major point that I wish to convey to the members of the Knesset with regard to our policy is that it is our different objective, in this case to remain in Hebron, that dictates in the details in the agreement before you. From this different objective, we saw to it that there would be areas of separation, we removed the rifles, we saw to it that there would be an IDF presence in the territories overlooking the Jewish community and the major routes, through joint patrols. We saw to it that the Jewish community would be protected from high Palestinian buildings that could threaten or encroach on Jewish homes. We saw to improved and more numerous security mechanisms between us and the Palestinian security forces in order to make possible a reality of security, a reality of living, a reality of development and consolidation for the Jewish community.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tI can therefore say with confidence that this is an agreement that is better, more secure, more responsible than that which we inherited. But above all, I would like to appeal to the residents of Hebron. I know that you are fearful today, and I would like to say to you, brothers and sisters, that we are concerned for you, that we do not see you as an insignificant appendage. We see you are dear brothers. We are concerned for each and every one of you. We do not see you as 400 insignificant Jews, but as our representatives.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tI do not say today that there are no dangers. I do not say that this is a perfect agreement; it cannot be. We received it in its crude form as a flawed agreement. But neither do I say that we did not act to distance ourselves from dangers and to limit them. This is what we did. But in the last analysis, every agreement is dependent upon the goodwill of the signatories. I call from this podium upon the Palestinians and our Arab neighbours to support the agreement, to fulfil all its provisions, in order that security should be preserved. A better, more secure agreement is important to both sides. An agreement that will not be upheld, security that will founder, will be bad for both sides.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tUntil now, Hebron has been a symbol of division and conflict because of the hostility between Palestinians and Israelis. Now we have an opportunity to prove that Hebron can also serve an opposite example – one of cooperation, of coexistence, a paradigm of peace.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tWith the signing of the Hebron agreement, we are embarking on a fateful course, which will not be simple, whose final goal, on the conclusion of the negotiations on the permanent status arrangements, is to bring peace with security between us and the Palestinians.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tI want to say again to the members of the Knesset: In this agreement, too, under the general framework of Oslo, we inherited an agreement which was not to our liking. The agreement were divided into a written text, which is binding, and an "oral law" whose purpose, at least for part of the leadership, a considerable part, would have produced negative results: withdrawal to the 1967 lines, or almost; the establishment of a Palestinian State; and even the division of Jerusalem.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tWe are committed, of course, to the written agreements. We have demonstrated today that we are fulfilling our commitments. But our goals are different. We are using the time interval in the agreement to achieve our goals: to maintain the unity of Jerusalem, to ensure the security depth necessary for the defence of the State, to insist on the right of Jews to settle in their land, and to propose to the Palestinians a suitable arrangement for self-rule but without the sovereign Powers which pose a threat to the State of Israel.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThis is the mandate which the Government which I head received from the voters. With this, we will go forward. In following this course, not only is our goal different but also the way to achieve this goal, as is the way to move forward, to conduct negotiations.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tWe insisted on three fundamental principles in the course of the negotiations, both on Hebron and on the agreement to follow Hebron.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe first is the principle of reciprocity. We established the principle of reciprocity – in an official document – as a basic principle for the continuation of the process of the permanent status negotiations. This is now an integral part of the agreement. Both sides agreed on a list of mutual undertakings and clarified that the fulfilment of the agreement, the fulfilment of the undertakings of one side, will be dependent upon the fulfilment by the other side. I do not know any other interpretation of the word "agreement". An agreement that obliges only the Israeli side, where only the Israeli side gives and the Palestinian side takes, is not an agreement. An agreement in which both sides accept the mutual commitment to fulfil obligations – this is an agreement. What we have today in the documents before you is the anchoring and formalization of the principle of reciprocity, for the first time since the Oslo agreements.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe second important issue that was clarified in the agreements and documents achieved in the course of these negotiations is that the implementation of the redeployments will be an Israeli decision that will not be a matter for negotiation with the Palestinians. This decision must comply with Israel's security considerations, as Israel sees fit. It is Israel that will define the security zones. But before this, it is Israel that will determine the nature and scope of the three redeployments – not only the first and second, but also the third. This is also the way in which the United States interprets the agreement. And I believe this is a very important distinction. For us, for the entire Knesset, there must be absolute consensus on the supreme importance that Israel will be able to define, accord to its own understanding, the security needs of the State of Israel and to carry out the further redeployments according to this understanding.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe third achievement, beyond the reciprocity and the Israeli definition of the redeployments, is the time frame. I believe that this is not something that stands alone. Rather, it allows us room for manoeuvre, room to test reality, room to test reciprocity in the fulfilment of the agreement.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThese three elements are a significant change, and a change for the better, compared to our situation not long ago, only a few months ago. We were in the midst of an almost uncontrolled dash to the 1967 lines. Nine months from today we might have found ourselves almost at these borders, with the only subject in effect remaining on the agenda – Jerusalem. This situation – I say to both the opposition and the coalition – we have changed completely. We will conduct negotiations with the time, the ability and the freedom for political manoeuvre that we did not enjoy before. We will conduct the negotiations carefully, responsibly, with discretion. I am convinced that our goals of preserving Jerusalem, preserving the security depth, preserving Israel's ability to defend itself, and a suitable arrangement with the Palestinians – I am convinced that these are goals which the large majority of the Israeli people support, and that the large majority of the people support the course which we have set, insisting on reciprocity and security.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tIn practical terms – not in the Hague court, but in the court of international opinion, and not only international opinion – it was until recently self-understood, almost an axiom, that the only item on the agenda was an agreement in which Israel must fulfil all its commitments and in which the other side owes nothing. All its commitments were ignored. What we have today in the international community, signed with an official seal, is an agreement which is binding, in which the principle of reciprocity is clear.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThese agreements contain important improvements as well as the time in which we will be able to bring to completion the goal which we seek to attain, which I believe is shared by all members of the Knesset. I believe that the large majority of the people supports this course. I believe with all my heart that this is the only way to achieve the aspiration which we all share: peace with security, peace for generations and not for one year, peace for our children and also for our grandchildren. After the arguments end, and after the smoke and dust settle, I believe that we will achieve these goals. 4<\/u><\/i>\/<\/i>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n Text of the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron and related documents<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n Jerusalem, 17 January 1997<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n \t<\/span>The following is the text of the “Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron” and related documents agreed upon by Israel and the PLO at Erez checkpoint, Gaza Strip, on 15 January 1997, and signed at Jerusalem on 17 January 1997:<\/p><\/div>\n\n Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\tIn accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and in particular of Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement, both Parties have agreed on this Protocol for the implementation of the redeployment in Hebron.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n \n Security Arrangements Regarding Redeployment in Hebron<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t1. Redeployment in Hebron\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe redeployment of Israeli Military Forces in Hebron will be carried out in accordance with the Interim Agreement and this Protocol. This redeployment will be completed not later than ten days from the signing of this Protocol. During these ten days both sides will exert every possible effort to prevent friction and any action that would prevent the redeployment. This redeployment shall constitute full implementation of the provisions of the Interim Agreement with regard to the City of Hebron unless otherwise provided for in Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. Security Powers and Responsibilities\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. \t<\/span>1. The Palestinian Police will assume responsibilities in Area H-1 similar to those in other cities in the West Bank; and\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. Israel will retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area H-2. In addition, Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for overall security of Israelis.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. In this context – both sides reaffirm their commitment to honour the relevant security provisions of the Interim Agreement, including the provisions regarding – Arrangements for Security and Public Order Article XII of the Interim Agreement); Prevention of Hostile Acts (Article XV of the Interim Agreement); Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence (Article II of Annex I to the Interim Agreement); Guidelines for Hebron (Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement); and Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters (Article XI of Annex I to the Interim Agreement).\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t3. Agreed Security Arrangements\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. With a view to ensuring mutual security and stability in the City of Hebron, special security arrangements will apply adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, in Area H-1, in the area between the Palestinian Police checkpoints delineated on the map attached to this Protocol as Appendix 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the attached map") and the areas under the security responsibility of Israel.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. The purpose of the above-mentioned checkpoints will be to enable the Palestinian Police, exercising their responsibilities under the Interim Agreement, to prevent entry of armed persons and demonstrators or other people threatening security and public order, into the above-mentioned area.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t4. Joint Security Measures\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. The DCO will establish a sub-office in the City of Hebron as indicated on the attached map.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. JMU will operate in Area H-2 to handle incidents that involve Palestinians only. The JMU movement will be detailed on the attached map. The DCO will coordinate the JMU movement and activity.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tc. As part of the security arrangements in the area adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, as defined above, Joint Mobile Units will be operating in this area, with special focus on the following places:\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t1. Abu Sneinah\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. Harat A-Sheikh\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t3. Sha'aba\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t4. The high ground overlooking new Route No. 35.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n \n\t\t\t\td. Two Joint Patrols will function in Area H-1:\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t1. a Joint Patrol which will operate on the road from Ras e-Jura to the north of the Dura junction via E-Salaam Road, as indicated on the attached map; and\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. a Joint Patrol which will operate on existing Route No. 35, including the eastern part of existing Route No. 35, as indicated on the attached map.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\te. The Palestinian and Israeli side of the Joint Mobile Units in the City of Hebron will be armed with equivalent types of weapons (Mini-Ingram submachine guns for the Palestinian side and short M16s for the Israeli side).\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tf. With a view to dealing with the special security situation in the City of Hebron, a Joint Coordination Centre (hereinafter the "JCC"), headed by senior officers of both sides, will be established in the DCO at Har Manoah\/Jebel Manoah. The purpose of the JCC will be to coordinate the joint security measures in the City of Hebron. The JCC will be guided by all the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement, including Annex I and this Protocol. In this context, each side will notify the JCC of demonstrations and actions taken in respect of such demonstrations, and of any security activity, close to the areas under the responsibility of the other side, including in the area defined in Article 3(a) above. The JCC shall be informed of activities in accordance with Article 5(d)(3) of this Protocol.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t5. The Palestinian Police\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. Palestinian police stations or posts will be established in Area H-1, manned by a total of up to 400 policemen, equipped with 20 vehicles and armed with 200 pistols, and 100 rifles for the protection of the police stations.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. Four designated Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) will be established and stationed in Area H-1, one in each of the police stations, as delineated on the attached map. The main task of the RRTs will be to handle special security cases. Each RRT shall be comprised of up to 16 members.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tc. The above-mentioned rifles will be designated for the exclusive use of the RRTs, to handle special cases.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\td. \t\t<\/span>1. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in Area H-1. \n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. Activities of the RRTs armed with rifles in the Agreed Adjacent Area, as defined in Appendix 2, shall require the agreement of the JCC.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t3. The RRTs will use the rifles in the rest of Area H-1 to fulfil their above-mentioned tasks.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\te. The Palestinian Police will ensure that all Palestinian policemen, prior to their deployment in the City of Hebron, will pass a security check in order to verify their suitability for service, taking into account the sensitivity of the area.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t6. Holy Sites\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. Paragraphs 2 and 3(a) of Article 32 of Appendix 1 to Annex III of the Interim Agreement will be applicable to the following Holy Sites in Area H-1:\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t1. The Cave of Othniel Ben Knaz\/El-Khalil;\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. Elonei Mamre\/Haram Er-Rameh;\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t3. Eshel Avraham\/Balotat Ibrahim; and\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t4. Maayan Sarah\/Ein Sarah.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. The Palestinian Police will be responsible for the protection of the above Jewish Holy Sites. Without derogating from the above responsibility of the Palestinian Police, visits to the above Holy Sites by worshippers or other visitors shall be accompanied by a Joint Mobile Unit, which will ensure free, unimpeded and secure access to the Holy Sites, as well as their peaceful use.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t7. Normalization of Life in the Old City\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. Both sides reiterate their commitment to maintain normal life throughout the City of Hebron and to prevent any provocation or friction that may affect the normal life in the city.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. In this context, both sides are committed to take all steps and measures necessary for the normalization of life in Hebron, including:\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t1. The wholesale market – Hasbahe – will be opened as a retail market in which goods will be sold directly to consumers from within the existing shops.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. The movement of vehicles on the Shuhada Road will be gradually returned, within 4 months, to the same situation which existed prior to February 1994.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t8. The Imara\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe Imara will be turned over to the Palestinian side upon the completion of the redeployment and will become the headquarters of the Palestinian Police in the City of Hebron.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t9. City of Hebron\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tBoth sides reiterate their commitment to the unity of the City of Hebron, and their understanding that the division of security responsibility will not divide the city. In this context, and without derogating from the security powers and responsibilities of either side, both sides share the mutual goal that movement of people, goods and vehicles within and in and out of the city will be smooth and normal, without obstacles or barriers.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n \n Civil Arrangements Regarding the Redeployment in Hebron<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t10. Transfer of Civil Powers and Responsibilities\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. The transfer of civil powers and responsibilities that have yet to be transferred to the Palestinian side in the City of Hebron (12 spheres) in accordance with Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement shall be conducted concurrently with the beginning of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. In Area H-2, the civil powers and responsibilities will be transferred to the Palestinian side, except for those relating to Israelis and their property, which shall continue to be exercised by the Israeli Military Government.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t11. Planning, Zoning and Building\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. The two parties are equally committed to preserve and protect the historic character of the city in a way which does not harm or change that character in any part of the city.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. The Palestinian side has informed the Israeli side that in exercising its powers and responsibilities, taking into account the existing municipal regulations, it has undertaken to implement the following provisions:\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t1. Proposed construction of buildings above two floors (6 metres) within 50 metres of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the list attached to this Protocol as Appendix 3 (hereinafter referred to as "the attached list") will be coordinated through the DCL.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t2. Proposed construction of buildings above three floors (9 metres) between 50 and 100 metres of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the attached list will be coordinated through the DCL.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t3. Proposed construction of non-residential, non-commercial buildings within 100 metres of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the attached list that are designed for uses that may adversely affect the environment (such as industrial factories) or buildings and institutions in which more that 50 persons are expected to gather together will be coordinated through the DCL.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t4. Proposed construction of buildings above two floors (6 metres) within 50 metres from each side of the road specified in the attached list will be coordinated through the DCL.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t5. The necessary enforcement measures will be taken to ensure compliance on the ground with the preceding provisions.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t6. This Article does not apply to existing buildings or to new construction or renovation for which fully approved permits were issued by the Municipality prior to 15 January 1997.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t12. Infrastructure\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side, through the DCL, 48 hours in advance of any anticipated activity regarding infrastructure which may disturb the regular flow of traffic on roads in Area H-2 or which may affect infrastructure (such as water, sewage, electricity and communications) serving Area H-2.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. The Israeli side may request, through the DCL, that the Municipality carry out works regarding the roads or other infrastructure required for the well-being of the Israelis in Area H-2. If the Israeli side offers to cover the costs of these works, the Palestinian side will ensure that these works are carried out as a top priority.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tc. The above does not prejudice the provisions of the Interim Agreement regarding the access to infrastructure, facilities and installations located in the city of Hebron, such as the electricity grid.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t13. Transportation\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe Palestinian side shall have the power to determine bus stops, traffic arrangements and traffic signalization in the City of Hebron. Traffic signalization, traffic arrangements and the location of bus stops in Area H-2 will remain as they are on the date of the redeployment in Hebron. Any subsequent change in these arrangements in Area H-2 will be done in cooperation between the two sides in the transportation subcommittee.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t14. Municipal Inspectors\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\ta. In accordance with paragraph 4.c of Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, plainclothes unarmed municipal inspectors will operate in Area H-2. The number of these inspectors shall not exceed 50.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tb. The inspectors shall carry official identification cards with a photograph issued by the Municipality.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tc. The Palestinian side may request the assistance of the Israel Police, through the DCL of Hebron, in order to carry out its enforcement activities in Area H-2.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t15. Location of Offices of the Palestinian Council\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe Palestinian side, when operating new offices in Area H-2, will take into consideration the need to avoid provocation and friction. Where establishing such offices might affect public order or security the two sides will cooperate to find a suitable solution.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t16. Municipal Services\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tIn accordance with paragraph 5 of Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, municipal services shall be provided regularly and continuously to all parts of the city of Hebron, at the same quality and cost. The cost shall be determined by the Palestinian side with respect to work done and materials consumed, without discrimination.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n \n Miscellaneous<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t17. Temporary International Presence\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThere will be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Both sides will agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including the number of its members and its area of operation.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t18. Annex I\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tNothing in this Protocol will derogate from the security powers and responsibilities of either side in accordance with Annex I to the Interim Agreement.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t19. Attached Appendices\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tThe appendices attached to this Protocol shall constitute an integral part hereof.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n |