{"id":208165,"date":"2009-07-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T19:31:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=208165"},"modified":"2019-03-12T19:31:21","modified_gmt":"2019-03-12T19:31:21","slug":"auto-insert-208165","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-208165\/","title":{"rendered":"Global security – Israel and the OPT – House of Commons Foreign Affairs Cttee report (Session 2008-09)\/Non-UN document"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Terms of Reference<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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The Foreign Affairs Committee<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies. <\/p><\/div>\n

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Current membership<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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Mike Gapes (Labour, Ilford South<\/i>), Chairman <\/p><\/div>\n

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Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat, North East Fife<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Mr Fabian Hamilton (Labour, Leeds North East<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Rt Hon Mr David Heathcoat-Amory (Conservative, Wells<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Mr John Horam (Conservative, Orpington<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Mr Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Mr Paul Keetch (Liberal Democrat, Hereford<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Andrew Mackinlay (Labour, Thurrock<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Mr Malcolm Moss (Conservative, North East Cambridgeshire<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Sandra Osborne (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Mr Greg Pope (Labour, Hyndburn<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Mr Ken Purchase (Labour, Wolverhampton North East<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Ms Gisela Stuart (Labour, Birmingham Edgbaston<\/i>) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Powers<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via <\/span>www.parliament.uk<\/u> <\/u><\/a>. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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Publication<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at <\/span>www.parliament.uk\/parliamentary_committees\/foreign_affairs_committee.cfm<\/u> <\/u><\/a>. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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Committee staff<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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The current staff of the Committee are Dr Robin James (Clerk), Dr Edward Waller (Second Clerk), Ms Adèle Brown (Committee Specialist), Dr Brigid Fowler (Committee Specialist), Miss Elisabeth Partridge (Group Manager), Miss Jennifer Kelly (Committee Assistant), Mrs Catherine Close (Committee Assistant) and Mr Alex Paterson (Media Officer). <\/p><\/div>\n

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Contacts<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerks of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6394; the Committee's email address is <\/span>foraffcom@parliament.uk<\/u><\/a><\/p><\/div>\n

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Conclusions and recommendations<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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The December 2008\/January 2009 Gaza conflict<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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1.  <\/strong>We conclude that the Government took speedier and more robust diplomatic action to try to halt the conflict in Gaza than it did in the case of the war in Lebanon in 2006. We further conclude that this development is to be welcomed, particularly as it appears that the Government may have drawn on the 2006 experience in making policy during the Gaza conflict, in line with criticisms which we made of its earlier policy at the time. (Paragraph 24) <\/p><\/div>\n

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2.  <\/strong>In light of the FCO's official conflict prevention goals, we conclude that the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza constitutes a disappointment, although we welcome the fact that the Government has acknowledged publicly that it underestimated the risk of the situation escalating into full-scale conflict. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the steps that it is taking to reduce the risk of such a miscalculation occurring again and to work with others to increase prospects of being able to prevent another outbreak of full-scale conflict in Gaza. (Paragraph 29) <\/p><\/div>\n

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3.  <\/strong>We conclude that the conflict in Gaza has confirmed our previously expressed view that it is not appropriate for the FCO to have quantified performance targets in fields such as conflict prevention where the causes of the prospective conflict are likely to be wholly or largely beyond the Government's control. (Paragraph 30) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Humanitarian aftermath and Gaza access<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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4.  <\/strong>We conclude that rocket fire from Gaza by Hamas and other Palestinian groups on civilian targets in Israel is unacceptable. It generates the risk of a renewed escalation in violence, and constitutes a central obstacle in the way of Israeli willingness to move forward towards a two-state settlement. We therefore conclude that the British Government is correct to support Israel's goal of bringing rocket fire from Gaza to an end. However, we are not persuaded that the maintenance of the current regime of restrictions at the official crossings between Israel and Gaza is likely to achieve this. Rather, we conclude that the restrictions at the official crossings help to sustain the system of smuggling under the Egyptian border which itself contributes to the presence of illicit weaponry in Gaza. We recommend that, in its response to this report, the Government should update us on the steps being taken and the results being achieved as part of the international effort against smuggling into Gaza, and in particular on the British contribution. We further recommend that the Government should update us on any discussions which are underway on a possible international monitoring presence at the crossings between Israel and Gaza. (Paragraph 47) <\/p><\/div>\n

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5.  <\/strong>After two years in which we and others have consistently been highlighting the poor humanitarian situation in Gaza, and six months after the end of a damaging conflict, we conclude that Gaza's continued lack of free access to humanitarian and reconstruction supplies is a matter of distress and frustration. We conclude that it is unacceptable that Israel continues to deny unrestricted access for humanitarian assistance to Gaza. We further conclude that there are indications that Israel is seeking to use its control over the transfer of humanitarian and other supplies into Gaza partly for political objectives. (Paragraph 48) <\/p><\/div>\n

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6.  <\/strong>We conclude that the obstacles to legitimate economic activity and the increased role of unofficial economic transactions in Gaza may have a damaging long-term effect on the territory, which could make more difficult the creation of an integrated Palestinian state including both Gaza and the West Bank. (Paragraph 49) <\/p><\/div>\n

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7.  <\/strong>We recommend that the FCO should press the Israeli government to compensate the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) for the costs of repairing the damage to the CWGC cemetery in Gaza which was sustained during the latest conflict there, as Israel did in 2008 for the costs of repairing damage sustained on a previous occasion. We further recommend that the Government should provide an update on this issue in its response to this Report. (Paragraph 53) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Regional diplomatic follow-up<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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8.  <\/strong>We are dismayed that, six months after the end of the conflict in Gaza, there remains no ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas and no united Palestinian government. There also appears to have been little underlying change regarding several of the key issues which contributed to the outbreak of the conflict, such as Hamas's control of Gaza, weapons smuggling into the territory, and the lack of access through the Gaza border crossings. We conclude that this situation makes for an ongoing risk of insecurity and a renewed escalation of violence. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government should set out what support it has offered to the conclusion of a new ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, and its assessment of the prospect that such an agreement will be reached. (Paragraph 60) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Possible violations of the laws of war<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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9.  <\/strong>We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO should state whether it considers that violations of the laws of war were committed during the December 2008\/January 2009 conflict in Gaza and southern Israel. (Paragraph 73) <\/p><\/div>\n

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10.  <\/strong>We are deeply concerned about the high number of casualties, the extent of the damage sustained and allegations of violations of international law during the conflict in Gaza. We conclude that Hamas targets civilians in its armed actions, and that Israel's military action in Gaza was disproportionate. We welcome the establishment of the UN Human Rights Council's inquiry into the conflict under Judge Goldstone, and the fact that it will investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed during the conflict, by either side. We recommend that the Government should give the Goldstone inquiry its full support and press Israel to cooperate with it fully. (Paragraph 77) <\/p><\/div>\n

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British arms exports to Israel<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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11.  <\/strong>We welcome the Government's investigation into Israel's use of UK-sourced military items during its campaign in Gaza. We conclude that it is regrettable that components supplied by the UK were "almost certainly" used in a variety of ways by Israeli forces during the most recent conflict in Gaza, and that this constitutes a failure of past Government arms export control policy. We recommend that the Government should continue to do everything possible to ensure that this does not happen again. We welcome the Government's decision to revoke some arms export licences to Israel for components for Saar 4.5 naval vessels. We further recommend that the Government should provide its assessment of the impact on the UK-US defence relationship of its decision since 2006 to cease licensing the export of components for incorporation into F-16s and Apache helicopters in the US; and specify any end-use restrictions which it places on exports of components for unmanned aerial vehicles for incorporation in Israel for onward export. (Paragraph 90) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Policy towards Hamas<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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12.  <\/strong>We recognise that success in the Quartet's strategy—of encouraging Hamas to reject violence and accept Israel's existence, by bolstering the position of the Palestinian forces which have already done so, and rejecting contact with Hamas itself—could be realised only gradually and over time. However, two years after we advocated a shift to engagement with moderate elements within Hamas, we conclude that there continue to be few signs that the current policy of non-engagement is achieving the Quartet's stated objectives. We further conclude that the credible peace process for which the Quartet hopes, as part of its strategy for undercutting Hamas, is likely to be difficult to achieve without greater co-operation from Hamas itself. We are concerned that the Quartet is continuing to fail to provide Hamas with greater incentives to change its position. We therefore reiterate our recommendation from 2007, that "the Government should urgently consider ways of engaging politically with moderate elements within Hamas as a way of encouraging it to meet the three Quartet principles." We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the specific indicators, if any, that would trigger a shift of British Government policy towards engagement with Hamas. We further recommend that the Government should set out the relevant differences between the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas that lead it to conclude that engagement with moderate elements within Hamas is not currently worth attempting. (Paragraph 103) <\/p><\/div>\n

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West Bank development<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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13.  <\/strong>We conclude that some progress has been made on Palestinian economic and institutional development on the West Bank, and that this is to be welcomed. We conclude that the Palestinian Authority government under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad has shown improved capacity to deliver increased security and manage the Authority's economy and public finances. We further conclude that international assistance to the Palestinian security sector, including the EU police mission, is fulfilling an important role. (Paragraph 111) <\/p><\/div>\n

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14.  <\/strong>We conclude that Quartet Representative Tony Blair is making an important contribution to Palestinian economic and institutional development which will be helpful to a future Palestinian state. However, we further conclude that movement, access and administrative restrictions on the West Bank continue to represent a major obstacle to further Palestinian economic development. We recommend that the Quartet Representative should seek to use the Israeli government's stated wish to further economic development on the West Bank as a lever to press for further and significant relaxation in the administrative and security regime which it operates there. (Paragraph 117) <\/p><\/div>\n

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15.  <\/strong>We conclude that Israel's failure to allow the full implementation of the EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement is placing significant obstacles in the way of EU-Palestinian trade and thereby damaging both Palestinian and EU businesses. We further conclude that the EU is correct to make the future nature of its relations with Israel, under the terms of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, partly conditional on Israel's cooperation with implementation of the EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement. We recommend that the Quartet Representative should also press Israel on implementation of the EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement as part of his work on Palestinian economic development. (Paragraph 120) <\/p><\/div>\n

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16.  <\/strong>We recommend that the Government should continue to do all it can to further the development of plans for a fixed transport link including a road element between Gaza and the West Bank. (Paragraph 125) <\/p><\/div>\n

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17.  <\/strong>We conclude that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must now be understood as essentially a three-way situation, comprising Israel, the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority, and Gaza and Hamas. We further conclude that the continued split in political authority between the West Bank and Gaza represents a central obstacle to progress towards a two-state solution—because of the way in which it weakens the willingness and ability of both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides to make deliverable commitments in peace negotiations, and because of the divergent paths of institutional and economic development on which it sets Gaza and the West Bank. We therefore recommend that the UK Government and the Quartet should reject any idea of a 'West Bank first' approach, and make the ending of the West Bank-Gaza split an explicit and urgent objective and work more actively to achieve it. (Paragraph 127) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Palestinian elections<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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18.  <\/strong>We conclude that the current contested constitutional situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories creates an obstacle to the development there of a united and democratic state. We therefore conclude that the holding of free and fair elections according to procedures accepted by all parties presents an important potential opportunity for Palestinian state-building, with the possible prospect of bringing the West Bank and Gaza back under a single political authority. However, the elections could also become a source of further political division and institutional break-up. We recommend that the Quartet should do everything possible to facilitate the holding of polls which are accepted by all parties, and should make careful preparations for them so that its stance in light of the results furthers its stated two-state goal. (Paragraph 132) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Administration of the West Bank and East Jerusalem<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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19.  <\/strong>We recommend that the Government should continue to do its utmost to prevent further changes with respect to East Jerusalem, such as its physical separation from the West Bank, and Palestinian housing evictions, that prejudice the prospects of it becoming the capital of a future Palestinian state. (Paragraph 139) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Settlement policy<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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20.  <\/strong>We conclude that expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank prejudices prospects for a two-state outcome, and that, as such, continued settlement activity must call Israel's commitment to such an outcome into doubt. We further conclude that a settlement freeze is a previous commitment of the kind that Israel calls on the Palestinian side to fulfil, and that there are fewer security-related obstacles to Israel's fulfilment of its commitment on settlements than there are to progress on some other issues. We therefore support the British Government in its call on Israel to freeze settlement activity. We welcome the new willingness of the US under President Obama to call on Israel publicly to cease activities which appear unhelpful to a negotiated two-state solution. (Paragraph 146) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Quartet policy towards Israel<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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21.  <\/strong>We conclude that efforts at diplomatic persuasion have to date been ineffective in securing Israeli compliance with a number of Quartet demands. We further conclude that the apparent shift in the US approach to Israel under President Obama constitutes an important and potentially effective change in the external pressures facing the country. We further conclude that it is appropriate and potentially effective for the EU to make the planned "upgrade" of its relations with Israel conditional on Israel halting practices which are prejudicial to the achievement of a two-state solution. This could be through a settlement freeze and an easing of Israeli restrictions on access into Gaza. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should specify the conditions that the EU is setting for Israel for securing the "upgrade" in relations. (Paragraph 151) <\/p><\/div>\n

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22.  <\/strong>We conclude that flourishing ties between the UK and Israel are welcome and are in the interests of the people of both states. (Paragraph 153) <\/p><\/div>\n

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23.  <\/strong>We conclude that the Government is to be commended for seeking ways of giving concrete expression to its position that Israeli settlements violate international law. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update us on its work on the issue of the labelling of settlement produce and the enforcement of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and provide an assessment of the impact of this work on UK-Israeli relations. (Paragraph 158) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Iran<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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24.  <\/strong>We conclude that a realignment is underway in the Arab world against Iran which gives some Sunni Arab states and Palestinians some shared interests with Israel, and which therefore has significant implications for the dynamics of Middle East peace-making. We recommend that the Government should not allow the urgency of addressing Iran's nuclear programme and regional role to diminish efforts to tackle pressing Israeli-Palestinian issues. (Paragraph 172) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Lebanon<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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25.  <\/strong>We recommend that in light of Israel's provision of relevant maps, and the concerns that have been raised about a funding shortfall, the Government should in its response to this Report provide an update on the progress of—and prospects for—the de-mining operation in southern Lebanon, including information on the UK's contribution. (Paragraph 176) <\/p><\/div>\n

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26.  <\/strong>We welcome the Government's decision to open contacts with the political wing of Hezbollah, in line with the recommendation which we made in 2007. (Paragraph 179) <\/p><\/div>\n

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27.  <\/strong>We welcome the fact that Lebanon's general election has passed off peacefully and yielded results which appear to be accepted by all parties. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide its assessment of the impact of the election results on Syria's position vis-à-vis Hezbollah and Lebanon. (Paragraph 180) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Obama Administration<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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28.  <\/strong>We conclude that the Government is correct to continue to regard a two-state solution as the only outcome which holds out the prospect of sustained peace between Israel and the Palestinians. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should set out the progress that has been made towards a peace settlement on this basis that has arisen from the Gaza conflict and the change of Administration in the United States. (Paragraph 192) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Arab League Initiative<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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29.  <\/strong>We conclude that the reinvigoration of the Arab Peace Initiative, and the Initiative's promotion by members of the Quartet, are greatly to be welcomed. We further conclude that the Government is correct to support the Initiative. (Paragraph 200) <\/p><\/div>\n

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Israeli position<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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30.  <\/strong>We conclude that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's acceptance of the prospect of a Palestinian state is a necessary condition of any two-state settlement under his government and, as such, is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to press him on other issues vital to progress towards a two-state outcome, such as those concerning a freeze on settlements as a first step. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should inform us of any discussions it has had about possible international involvement in providing security assurances to Israel in connection with the conclusion of a two-state settlement. (Paragraph 206)<\/p><\/div>\n

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1<\/strong>  <\/strong>Introduction<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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1. The Foreign Affairs Committee has taken a consistent interest in the Middle East, and has visited and reported on the region regularly, in this and previous Parliaments. In 2007, we published a Report on <\/span>Global Security: The Middle East<\/i><\/span>.[<\/span>1<\/u><\/a>] This was the first in our ongoing series of Reports under the "Global Security" heading.[<\/span>2<\/u><\/a>] In early 2009 we decided to conduct a follow-up inquiry, focused on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). We were prompted to do this primarily by the conflict in Gaza in December 2008\/January 2009, and also by the advent of new governments in Israel and the United States. (In what follows we refer to our previous Report on the region as "our 2007 Report".) <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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2. As this was an exercise of limited scope, we did not issue detailed terms of reference or a call for evidence. We nevertheless received a number of written submissions, which we print with this Report. We held three oral evidence sessions. Two of these, with academics and analysts in February, and with the then FCO Minister of State Bill Rammell MP in early March, were held soon after the end of the Gaza conflict and before we made a visit to the region. After our visit, we decided to take evidence from the Representative of the Middle East Quartet, Rt Hon Tony Blair, and did so at the beginning of June. We would like to thank all those who gave evidence. A list of our witnesses is provided at the end of this Report. <\/p><\/div>\n

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3. Our visit to Israel and the OPTs was made in mid-March 2009, exactly two years after our previous visit to the region. Some Members were able to visit Gaza, as the Committee had last been able to do in late 2005, and also visited Sderot in southern Israel. Another sub-group of the Committee spent a day in the West Bank, meeting Palestinians and Israeli settlers; and another toured Israel's Lebanese and Syrian borders (including the Golan Heights) and the Jordanian border in northern Israel and the West Bank. We held meetings in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv, at a time when the new Israeli government was being formed and negotiations continued between Fatah and Hamas on the possible formation of a new Palestinian national unity government. Our interlocutors included Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Foreign Minister Riad Malki. We would like to thank all our interlocutors, and staff at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv and Consulate-General in Jerusalem, for facilitating our visit.[<\/span>3<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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4. Our responsibility is to examine the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). In considering foreign policy issues, our focus must be on matters for which the UK, and therefore the FCO, has direct responsibility or over which it can exercise some degree of influence. In relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the UK plays a role not only through its bilateral relationships with key actors in the region, but also through its participation, as an EU member state, in the Middle East Quartet. We reflect this in our Report, in which we consider not only direct UK actions but also the policies which the Quartet has pursued towards Israel and the OPTs. The Middle East Quartet comprises the EU, Russia, the UN and the US, and was established in 2002 to support the Middle East peace process. The Quartet's Representative, Tony Blair, told us that the UK "plays a part in two ways: on its own account and through the EU".[<\/span>4<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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5. The Quartet supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—that is, the creation of a Palestinian state from Gaza and the West Bank, the current OPTs, which would exist alongside Israel "in peace and security".[<\/span>5<\/u><\/a>] Mr Blair told us that that a two-state solution was "the only solution that works", and that he did not know of any alternative.[<\/span>6<\/u><\/a>] However, in February, the Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon David Miliband MP, said that the world was having "to peer into the abyss of the idea of a two-state solution disappearing".[<\/span>7<\/u><\/a>] In assessing recent developments and policies in this Report, our underlying concern was to do so in terms of their implications for the achievability of the Government's stated two-state objective. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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6. The structure of this Report is as follows. In our first substantive chapter, Chapter 2, we discuss the December 2008\/January 2009 conflict in Gaza, including its diplomatic and humanitarian aftermath and the issue of possible violations of the laws of war. In Chapter 3, we consider the question of British arms exports to Israel. In Chapters 4 and 5 we discuss developments on the Israeli and Palestinian sides, respectively, and relevant Quartet, EU and British Government policies. In Chapter 6 we briefly consider the roles of some further Middle Eastern states. Finally, in Chapter 7 we consider the prospects for the two-state solution.<\/p><\/div>\n

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Map (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)<\/p><\/div>\n

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Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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2<\/strong>  <\/strong>The 2008\/09 Gaza conflict<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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The December 2008\/January 2009 Gaza conflict<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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7. Gaza is one of the territories taken and subsequently occupied by Israel as a result of its victory over Arab states in the 1967 Six Day War. Of those territories, those which remain under Israeli control are the Golan Heights (from Syria), Gaza (from Egypt), and the West Bank and East Jerusalem (from Jordan) (see map). Gaza and the West Bank are commonly referred to as the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). Under the 1993 Oslo Accords, the OPTs gained a measure of self-government, under a new Palestinian Authority with an elected President and Legislative Council. The Oslo Accords were reached after the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) under Yasser Arafat, dominated by Mr Arafat's Fatah party, renounced violence and accepted the existence of Israel. In 2005, after Mr Arafat's death, Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas was elected Palestinian Authority President. In the same year, Israel left the Palestinian Authority in charge of Gaza internally when it withdrew its forces and settlers from the territory, while retaining control of Gaza's airspace, sea border and land border with Israel. <\/p><\/div>\n

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8. The immediate background to the 2008\/09 Gaza conflict can be traced to the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Hamas is not a member of the PLO, and does not—under the terms of its Charter—accept the existence of Israel on any of its current territory; it is an armed movement engaged in attacks on Israel and proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the UK, EU and US. For a year from March 2006, a Hamas-nominated Palestinian Authority government co-existed with Fatah's President Abbas. In March 2007, under the Saudi-brokered Mecca agreement, Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a national unity government under Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh; this also included independents such as Finance Minister Salam Fayyad. However, violence between Hamas and Fatah escalated, especially in Gaza, and in June 2007 Hamas took sole control of Gaza by force, denying control of the territory to the Palestinian Authority. President Abbas dissolved the national unity government and formed an emergency non-party Palestinian Authority administration—without both Hamas and Fatah—under Mr Fayyad, which effectively had control only over the West Bank. Mr Haniyeh disputes the legality of his dismissal and continues to regard himself as Prime Minister.[<\/span>8<\/u><\/a>] From June 2007, therefore, the two Occupied Palestinian Territories were under the effective control of two separate political authorities, with fundamentally different stances towards Israel and the peace process. The Hamas takeover of Gaza was the last major development in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of which we were able to take account in our 2007 Report on <\/span>Global Security: The Middle East<\/i><\/span>.[<\/span>9<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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9. With Hamas in sole control of Gaza, there was an increase in rocket attacks from the territory on southern Israel: according to the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), rocket launchings from Gaza numbered 1,276 in 2007 and 1,785 in 2008 (prior to the start of Israel's December 2008 military operation in Gaza, Operation Cast Lead). This rocket fire killed two Israelis in 2007 and four in 2008 (again, prior to Operation Cast Lead).[<\/span>10<\/u><\/a>] Meanwhile, after the Hamas takeover of Gaza, Israel imposed a blockade on the territory through its control of the Israel-Gaza crossing points, keeping the crossings largely closed and restricting the range of goods that could be transported through them. Sporadic Israeli incursions into Gaza in pursuit of terrorist targets, and other forms of clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinians in and around the territory, continued. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the OPTs (OCHA), 301 Palestinians were killed in Gaza in 2007 and 389 in the first ten months of 2008 as a direct result of the conflict with Israel.[<\/span>11<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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10. In June 2008, Egypt—which maintains relations with both Israel and Hamas—brokered a six-month ceasefire agreement between them. The ceasefire brought a reduction in rocket fire from Gaza, although not a complete halt.[<\/span>12<\/u><\/a>] The progressive breakdown of the ceasefire, and Hamas's ultimate decision not to extend the truce, paved the way for the outbreak of the conflict in December 2008. The two sides dispute bitterly each other's responsibility for the breakdown of the ceasefire, with Israel blaming Hamas for failing to halt rocket fire, and Hamas blaming Israel for failing to implement what it says were commitments in the ceasefire agreement to provide greater access through Gaza's border crossings.[<\/span>13<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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11. On 27 December 2008, Israel launched an air campaign against targets in the Gaza Strip. On 3 January 2009, this campaign was expanded into a ground offensive. The operation was codenamed "Cast Lead". During the conflict, Israeli troops came under fire from Palestinian fighters in the Gaza Strip, and civilian targets in southern Israel continued to be hit by rockets fired from the territory. The conflict continued for 22 days. Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire on 17 January, saying that it had achieved its military objectives, and Hamas—the principal combatant organisation on the Palestinian side of the conflict—followed suit the following day. Israel withdrew all its forces from Gaza by 21 January. <\/p><\/div>\n

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12. Thirteen Israelis were killed during the conflict: three civilians in southern Israel, and ten soldiers (four as a result of "friendly fire").[<\/span>14<\/u><\/a>] According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 770 injured Israeli civilians had to be evacuated in southern Israel during the conflict, including four severely wounded.[<\/span>15<\/u><\/a>] Palestinian casualty figures remain disputed. Those cited most often are those given by the UN, sourced from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, which are for 1,440 dead, including 114 women and 431 children, and 5,380 injured, including 800 women and 1,872 children.[<\/span>16<\/u><\/a>] The Israeli military has been reported as putting the Palestinian death toll at 1,166.[<\/span>17<\/u><\/a>] The most contentious point is the ratio of civilian to combatant casualties: the Israeli military reportedly gives respective figures of 295 civilian and 709 combatant fatalities, with 162 unidentified, whereas the Palestinian Center for Human Rights in Gaza reportedly puts the ratio at 926 civilians to 236 combatants killed.[<\/span>18<\/u><\/a>] Whatever the breakdown of casualties between civilians and combatants (something which is inherently difficult to establish in a conflict involving an armed non-state group in an urban area), Dr Albasoos of the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Conflict Resolution and Governance stressed to us the imbalance of power between Israeli and Palestinian forces which the overall casualty figures suggest.[<\/span>19<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

13. Dr Bregman of King's College London told us that, in launching Operation Cast Lead, Israel wanted to bring an end to the rocket fire out of Gaza and to weapons smuggling through the tunnels into it from Egypt, and to undermine Gazans' support for Hamas.[<\/span>20<\/u><\/a>] He also suggested that Israel wanted to send a wider regional message, to Hezbollah in Lebanon and to Iran as well as to Hamas, about the consequences of provoking it.[<\/span>21<\/u><\/a>] Dr Bregman and Dr Albasoos also reminded us that Israel had been in the midst of an election campaign when it launched its operation in Gaza, although Dr Bregman said that this had not been the decisive factor in Israel's decision to take military action.[<\/span>22<\/u><\/a>] For his part, Mr Blair told us that for Israel the position was "very simple […]. If it is subject to rocket attacks on its civilians over a prolonged period of time, it will respond at some point."[<\/span>23<\/u><\/a>] He stressed the role that Israel's status as a democracy played in its decision to take action: "in circumstances where you have rocket attacks on innocent Israeli civilians, believe me, there is no democratic Government […] that will not act."[<\/span>24<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

14. The British Government opposed the Israeli military action in Gaza. Giving evidence to us in March, the then FCO Minister of State Bill Rammell MP said that the Israeli campaign had been "wrong and counter-productive".[<\/span>25<\/u><\/a>] He said that the Government had opposed the Israeli action because it risked strengthening Hamas.[<\/span>26<\/u><\/a>] However, Mr Rammell acknowledged that the rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza were "a fundamental problem that had to be addressed", and that the military campaign had had broad popular support in Israel.[<\/span>27<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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15. Leading figures in the UK Government—including the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary—called for a ceasefire from the outset of the Gaza conflict.[<\/span>28<\/u><\/a>] In her evidence to us, the independent foreign policy adviser on Middle Eastern affairs Nomi Bar-Yaacov argued that the international diplomatic response to the Gaza crisis came "very late", owing to the timing of Israel's action (over the Western Christmas and New Year holiday); and that Israel interpreted this as "a massive green light."[<\/span>29<\/u><\/a>] The EU response, in particular, appeared somewhat confused because of the concurrent handover from the French to the Czech Presidency of the Council. Some differences were also evident among Quartet members and between EU member states regarding the relative apportionment of responsibility between Israel and Hamas for the conflict, and regarding the extent to which Israel was said to be acting in legitimate self-defence. However, by 30 December, the Quartet, the EU, the UN Security Council (in a statement) and the US had all made statements calling for a halt to the fighting.[<\/span>30<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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16. The British Government tabled the text which became UN Security Council Resolution 1860 on the conflict. The negotiations at the UN were also shaped by an alternative text put forward by the Arab League. Approved on 8 January 2009, UNSCR 1860 called for a "durable" ceasefire, as well as for the unimpeded provision of humanitarian aid in Gaza; it also condemned acts of terrorism and all violence directed against civilians.[<\/span>31<\/u><\/a>] Although the two sides did not implement ceasefires until 17-18 January, Mr Rammell judged that UNSCR 1860 probably secured an end to hostilities earlier than would otherwise have been the case.[<\/span>32<\/u><\/a>] Ms Bar-Yaacov believed that the British Government and Security Council efforts at this stage were to be commended.[<\/span>33<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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17. It was initially reported that the US opposed a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, on the grounds that Hamas would not accede to such a demand.[<\/span>34<\/u><\/a>] However, the US then participated in the negotiations on the resolution, before declining to vote for it at the last minute and abstaining instead. Giving evidence after the US Administration had changed, Mr Rammell openly admitted the British Government's disappointment at this outcome,[<\/span>35<\/u><\/a>] which he said was the result of "a dialogue between the Israeli Government and the US Administration".[<\/span>36<\/u><\/a>] It was reported in the press that the US abstention followed telephone calls from the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to then-President George W. Bush, and from Mr Bush to then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who was conducting the negotiations at the UN.[<\/span>37<\/u><\/a>] However, Mr Rammell stressed that Dr Rice had made it clear publicly that "she supported the broad thrust" of UNSCR 1860, and he pointed out that the US did not veto the resolution, as it might have done or threatened to do "in previous situations and circumstances".[<\/span>38<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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18. Our witnesses were uniformly of the view that the conflict had changed little "on the ground" in Gaza. They all said that Hamas remained in control of the territory;[<\/span>39<\/u><\/a>] Mr Blair told us that "militarily, Hamas [had] a complete grip" on it.[<\/span>40<\/u><\/a>] If anything, some of our witnesses judged that the conflict had strengthened Hamas—as the Government had expected that it would. Ms Bar-Yaacov drew our attention to opinion polling among Palestinians which suggested that, following the conflict, support for President Abbas and negotiations with Israel had fallen, and support for Hamas and violent resistance had increased. According to the polling, conducted by the Jerusalem office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center among around 1,200 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, trust in Hamas had risen to 27.7% by the end of January compared to 16.6% in October\/November, belief in the efficacy of rocket fire had risen from 39.3% to 50.8%, and opposition to peace negotiations had risen from 34.7% to 50.7%. In the West Bank alone, trust in Hamas had risen from 12.8% to 26.5%.[<\/span>41<\/u><\/a>] "The rise in popularity of Hamas leaders in government and the decline and unpopularity of Fatah are an important direct outcome of this war", concluded Ms Bar-Yaacov.[<\/span>42<\/u><\/a>] However, Mr Blair suggested that political support for Hamas in Gaza was not as strong as is sometimes thought, and that Gazans might hold Hamas, as well as Israel, responsible for their plight.[<\/span>43<\/u><\/a>] We return to intra-Palestinian issues in Chapter 4. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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19. As regards Israel, Dr Bregman thought that in the wake of the conflict Hamas might be more careful about provoking it, especially given the make-up of the new Israeli government (see paragraphs 134-135).[<\/span>44<\/u><\/a>] According to the Israel Security Agency, the number of rocket firings in February-June 2009 ranged between four and 50 a month, compared to over 100 in each of the non-ceasefire months in 2008.[<\/span>45<\/u><\/a>] By June 2009, Mr Blair noted that Hamas was "now saying that it will actively stop people who are engaged in trying to fire rockets".[<\/span>46<\/u><\/a>] However, Ms Bar-Yaacov felt that international public support had "turned sharply" against Israel as a result of the conflict. On this basis, she judged that, even if Israel had won greater international support on the issues of rocket fire from—and smuggling into—Gaza, these gains for Israel were outweighed by costs.[<\/span>47<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

LESSONS FROM THE 2006 LEBANON WAR <\/p><\/div>\n

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20. In summer 2006, Israel launched a military campaign in Lebanon against the militia of Hezbollah, after the latter had killed and captured Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid. In Israel, the Lebanon campaign is largely held to have been a failure: to investigate Israel's conduct of the conflict, the government established the Winograd Commission, which concluded that the campaign "ended without [Israel's] clear military victory".[<\/span>48<\/u><\/a>] In our 2007 Report, we noted that, following the conflict, Hezbollah appeared to be at least as strong militarily, and probably stronger politically, than it had been previously.[<\/span>49<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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21. Some of our witnesses indicated that the 2006 Lebanon war formed a key part of the context for Israel's decision-making on its Gaza campaign, in particular as regards the scale of the military action.[<\/span>50<\/u><\/a>] Dr Bregman told us that "the memory of what happened in 2006 in Lebanon […] explains why the move into Gaza involved massive firepower";[<\/span>51<\/u><\/a>] and Nomi Bar-Yaacov said that the scale of the operation was "100%" attributable to Israel's experience in Lebanon two years earlier. She told us that the Gaza operation had been planned on the basis of "direct" lessons that Israel had drawn from the Lebanon conflict.[<\/span>52<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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22. In our 2007 Report, we criticised the failure of the British Government at the time to call for an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon in 2006 until after the UN Security Council had done so, a month after the conflict broke out. The Government's position at the time was in line with that of the US. We concluded that the Government's position had "done significant damage to the UK's reputation in much of the world".[<\/span>53<\/u><\/a>] At the time, the Government rejected our conclusion.[<\/span>54<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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23. In a report on the Gaza crisis published in early January 2009, the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested that "some world actors appear to have learned a useful lesson from the Lebanon war. There is more activism now." The ICG noted "signs that important actors—European in particular—have learned from bitter experience that time is of the essence" as regards pressing for a ceasefire.[<\/span>55<\/u><\/a>] Giving evidence to us, Bill Rammell rejected the idea that Israel had been emboldened to take action in Gaza in 2008 by the West's arguably weak reaction to the war in Lebanon two years earlier. However, he stressed that, both before and after the outbreak of hostilities in Gaza, the stance of the UK and EU towards the conflict had differed from that seen in 2006 regarding the war in Lebanon. Mr Rammell implied that the Government had learned from the 2006 experience: when we asked him directly whether the Government had taken anything from its experience in 2006, Mr Rammell said: "If you are serious about government and foreign affairs, you always learn from experience."[<\/span>56<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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24. We conclude that the Government took speedier and more robust diplomatic action to try to halt the conflict in Gaza than it did in the case of the war in Lebanon in 2006. We further conclude that this development is to be welcomed, particularly as it appears that the Government may have drawn on the 2006 experience in making policy during the Gaza conflict, in line with criticisms which we made of its earlier policy at the time. <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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FCO CONFLICT PREVENTION OBJECTIVES <\/p><\/div>\n

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25. Under the 2008-11 Comprehensive Spending Review settlement, the FCO has a Departmental Strategic Objective (DSO) to "prevent and resolve conflict" (DSO 6).[<\/span>57<\/u><\/a>] The FCO is also the lead Department for the delivery of the cross-Government Public Service Agreement (PSA) 30, to "reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts". This PSA target is measured in terms of the number of conflicts, including in the Middle East; the impact of conflicts, including in the Middle East; and the ability of international institutions and the British Government to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.[<\/span>58<\/u><\/a>] We recommended, in our 2007 Report, that the indicators to be used to measure the FCO's performance against its conflict prevention targets should include specific references to the Middle East, and the FCO accepted our recommendation.[<\/span>59<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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26. Mr Rammell effectively acknowledged that the Government had miscalculated the risk of the situation in Gaza and southern Israel escalating into all-out conflict. He told us that because the rocket attacks on Israel and the Israeli incursions into Gaza prior to December 2008 had been "relatively low scale, there was a view that the situation was containable. With hindsight, that was clearly the wrong view."[<\/span>60<\/u><\/a>] Mr Rammell also noted that Israel had launched its military campaign despite the UK and other European states having "made it very clear" that they were opposed to it doing so.[<\/span>61<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

27. In correspondence with us following the publication of its 2008 Autumn Performance Report, the FCO said that: <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The recent upsurge in violence in Gaza demonstrates the challenge of achieving the desired outcomes of both PSA 30 and DSO 6. As the Middle East is one of the priority regions cited in both documents, this will naturally be reflected in our assessments.[<\/span>62<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

In its <\/span>2008-09 Departmental Annual Report<\/i><\/span>, published at the end of June 2009, the FCO duly reported a worsened performance on some indicators for PSA 30 compared to the Autumn Performance Report, and said that—combined with the conflict in Georgia in August 2008—"the upsurge of violence in Gaza suggest[s] that achieving a downward trend over the course of the PSA [in the number of conflicts globally] is unlikely."[<\/span>63<\/u><\/a>] The FCO judged Georgia and Gaza to have represented "high-profile failures for conflict prevention" in 2008.[<\/span>64<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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28. We have consistently expressed reservations as to whether it is appropriate for the FCO to have performance targets, assessed in terms of quantified indicators, in policy areas which are to subject to a very large number of influences beyond the Department's control. For example, in our Report on the FCO's 2004-05 Annual Report, we "question[ed] whether such targets always provide an appropriate mechanism for measuring the FCO's performance."[<\/span>65<\/u><\/a>] We have raised such concerns in particular in connection with targets for conflict prevention. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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29. In light of the FCO's official conflict prevention goals, we conclude that the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza constitutes a disappointment, although we welcome the fact that the Government has acknowledged publicly that it underestimated the risk of the situation escalating into full-scale conflict. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the steps that it is taking to reduce the risk of such a miscalculation occurring again and to work with others to increase prospects of being able to prevent another outbreak of full-scale conflict in Gaza.<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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30. We conclude that the conflict in Gaza has confirmed our previously expressed view that it is not appropriate for the FCO to have quantified performance targets in fields such as conflict prevention where the causes of the prospective conflict are likely to be wholly or largely beyond the Government's control.<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Humanitarian aftermath and Gaza access<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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31. In our 2007 Report, in the wake of the Hamas takeover of Gaza and the imposition of the Israeli blockade, we already assessed the territory as suffering a "profound" humanitarian crisis. We urged the Government to press Israel to ensure full humanitarian access.[<\/span>66<\/u><\/a>] Humanitarian and economic development issues in the OPTs are scrutinised in the House of Commons primarily by the International Development Committee (IDC), as British Government assistance is delivered through the Department for International Development (DFID). In its most recent Report on the subject, published in July 2008, the IDC outlined a humanitarian situation in Gaza which it described as "acute".[<\/span>67<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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32. Giving evidence to us in early March 2009, six weeks after the end of the Gaza conflict, Bill Rammell described the humanitarian situation in the territory as a "genuine crisis". He said that: <\/p><\/div>\n

\n

there are scheduled power cuts of six to eight hours each day; 50,000 people are without running water; a further 100,000 receive running water in their homes only once every seven to ten days; 90% of people are partially dependent on food aid compared to 76% before the conflict; during the conflict 58 facilities were either destroyed or damaged; more than 4,000 homes were destroyed and almost 12,000 partially destroyed.[<\/span>68<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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We saw for ourselves during our visit to Gaza later in March the destruction of homes, businesses and infrastructure which had taken place there during the conflict, and the human suffering and economic dislocation which was the result. <\/p><\/div>\n

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33. At the time of completion of this Report, in early July 2009, the humanitarian situation in Gaza did not appear to have improved significantly. In its monthly "Humanitarian Monitor" report covering April 2009, for example, OCHA described the needs which had arisen out of the conflict as "still hardly addressed". It judged that "the entire population of Gaza remains affected by a severe crisis of human dignity."[<\/span>69<\/u><\/a>] At the beginning of May, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, said that the situation "herald[ed] the fall of almost an entire society into dependency". At that point, he said that around 75% of the population of Gaza continued to require assistance.[<\/span>70<\/u><\/a>] The UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Robert Serry, confirmed that "time is passing and there is no real progress".[<\/span>71<\/u><\/a>] On 17 June, a group of over 30 international NGOs and UN agencies, marking the second anniversary of the Gaza blockade, said that "while Gazans are being kept alive through humanitarian aid, ordinary civilians have lost all quality of life as they fight to survive".[<\/span>72<\/u><\/a>] On 29 June, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) released a report to mark six months since the end of the conflict, in which it stated that "Gazans still cannot rebuild their lives" and that most "struggle to make ends meet".[<\/span>73<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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34. The serious humanitarian situation in Gaza persists despite the fact that, at a post-conflict conference at Sharm El Sheikh in Egypt at the beginning of March, international donors pledged a further $4.5 billion in aid for the Palestinian economy, for purposes including humanitarian relief and reconstruction in Gaza.[<\/span>74<\/u><\/a>] The British Government pledged £20 million in new funding, to add to relief and economic development assistance already announced.[<\/span>75<\/u><\/a>] Mr Blair told us that "there are billions of dollars waiting to go into Gaza, but they can only go in and do some good if people are allowed in".[<\/span>76<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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Map:  Access and movement to and from the Gaza Strip<\/p><\/div>\n

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Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA-oPt)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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35. The most significant immediate obstacle to an improvement of the humanitarian situation in Gaza is Israel's continuing blockade of the territory. There are five access points between Israel and Gaza: Erez, the only crossing point for people; Karni and the much smaller Kerem Shalom and Sufa for goods; and Nahal Oz for fuel (see map). Mr Blair told us at the beginning of June that Gaza was "still very much in a situation of general lockdown".[<\/span>77<\/u><\/a>] Mr Serry, Mr Holmes and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon have all described the satisfactory delivery of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as "impossible" without improved access.[<\/span>78<\/u><\/a>] In its "Humanitarian Monitor" report covering May, for example, OCHA reported on the continued ban on imports of baby formula, benzene, construction materials, diesel, tea, several types of canned food and jam. The overall number of truckloads entering Gaza in May 2009 was less than 25% of the monthly average for January-May 2007, before the blockade. According to OCHA, six truckloads carrying construction materials were permitted entry to Gaza in January-May 2009, compared to over 39,000 in January-May 2007.[<\/span>79<\/u><\/a>] Mr Blair highlighted the shortage of physical cash in Gaza, which is further holding back efforts to launch reconstruction and economic revitalisation;[<\/span>80<\/u><\/a>] we also heard about this issue during our visit. Import restrictions are creating a shortage of cooking gas, which is contributing to a poor diet for children, 30% of whom are reported to have anaemia.[<\/span>81<\/u><\/a>] The poor quality of Gaza's water, which has been exacerbated by the effects of the conflict and the limitations on the import of items needed for infrastructure reconstruction, is also causing health problems.[<\/span>82<\/u><\/a>] In late May, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the main aid agency in the OPTs, reported that around 40 medical items were being allowed to cross into Gaza each day, compared to around 4,000 before the conflict;[<\/span>83<\/u><\/a>] OCHA reported that the number of drugs unavailable in Gaza had risen to 82 in May from 52 in March.[<\/span>84<\/u><\/a>] The closure of the border crossings is also placing severe obstacles in the way of Gazans needing to leave the territory for medical treatment.[<\/span>85<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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36. Israel's control of access to Gaza by water is also affecting efforts by international activists to deliver aid to the territory by ship. At the end of June, Israel impounded an aid ship of the Free Gaza Movement, the "Spirit of Humanity", reportedly after it continued to sail towards or into Gazan waters despite warnings not to do so.[<\/span>86<\/u><\/a>] Israel detained the ship's 21 passengers and crew, who included six Britons. As we completed this Report, the Britons were reported to have been released and deported, but four of the ship's passengers—two Irish citizens, one Dane and one Yemeni—were reported still to be in Israeli custody.[<\/span>87<\/u><\/a>] FCO Minister Ivan Lewis told the House on 7 July that the Foreign Secretary had raised the issue with Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and asked for clarification as to whether Israel had apprehended the ship in international waters.[<\/span>88<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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37. The Quartet, and its members including the British Government, have continued to call on Israel to allow unrestricted access into Gaza for humanitarian supplies, and to relax the restrictions on other imports that are hampering reconstruction efforts.[<\/span>89<\/u><\/a>] In a Parliamentary answer on 8 June, DFID noted that "although the Israeli Government announced on 25 March that all humanitarian food items would be allowed into Gaza, this has not yet been implemented".[<\/span>90<\/u><\/a>] In its latest <\/span>Annual Report on Human Rights<\/i><\/span>, published in March 2009, the FCO confirmed that it regards Israel as continuing to have international legal obligations towards Gaza as an occupying power, under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The FCO said that "the Fourth Geneva Convention is clear that an occupying power must cooperate in facilitating the passage and distribution of relief consignments".[<\/span>91<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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38. Mr Blair suggested that, from Israel's perspective, there were two reasons for continuing to restrict the transfer of goods into Gaza. One was a genuine security concern that materials allowed into the territory for civilian purposes might be used in rocket attacks. The second was the concern that any easing of access conditions would be seen as a victory for Hamas and thus benefit it politically. Mr Blair did not think that either of these concerns was sufficiently well-founded.[<\/span>92<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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39. Mr Blair's view, that Israel was reluctant to grant greater access through the Gaza border crossings partly for fear of benefiting Hamas, suggested that Israel's policy on the transit of goods into the territory was being driven partly by political considerations. Dr Bregman told us that Israel "used control over the crossings in to the Gaza Strip to put pressure on Hamas and to drive a wedge between the people of the Gaza Strip and the leadership".[<\/span>93<\/u><\/a>] For his part, Mr Rammell told us that it was "difficult not to conclude that some of [the Israeli restrictions were] arbitrary".[<\/span>94<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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40. One of the official crossings into Gaza, at Rafah, is on the territory's border with Egypt rather than Israel (see map). Following Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, and under the terms of the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) reached between Israel and the Palestinian Authority that November, Israel handed control of the Gaza side of the crossing to the Palestinian Authority, with an EU monitoring mission at the crossing as an integral part of the deal. The mission is known as EUBAM Rafah. We saw the new EU mission at work during our visit to Gaza in late 2005. However, the mission has been withdrawn from Rafah since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007, as the mission's official purpose is to support the Agreement on Movement and Access, which specifies Palestinian Authority control of the crossing. The mission retains its operational readiness and the EU has stressed consistently that it is willing to redeploy it as soon as circumstances allow.[<\/span>95<\/u><\/a>] Since the Hamas takeover, Egypt has largely kept the Rafah crossing closed, as part of its own policy towards Hamas and Gaza (see paragraphs 173-174). Rafah is a crossing for people rather than goods. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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41. The lack of free transit for goods through the crossings between Gaza and Israel has highlighted the role of the system of tunnels between Gaza and Egypt, under Gaza's southern border around Rafah. Dr Bregman told us that there were around 400 such tunnels prior to the Gaza conflict, of which Israel had destroyed perhaps 50% during Operation Cast Lead.[<\/span>96<\/u><\/a>] He told us that Gazans registered their tunnels with Hamas.[<\/span>97<\/u><\/a>] Our witnesses disagreed on the extent to which the tunnels were used for the smuggling of weapons for Hamas as opposed to civilian goods: Dr Albasoos told us that only around 5% of the tunnels were used for weapons smuggling, and that the tunnels served primarily as Gazans' only means of access to civilian goods barred at the official crossings, whereas Dr Bregman and Ms Bar-Yaacov thought that weapons smuggling was a more significant element in the underground traffic.[<\/span>98<\/u><\/a>] In June, the Foreign Secretary said that the "majority" of smuggling through the tunnels was of commercial goods and that this constituted a "major part of the Gazan economy", as a result of the continuing Israeli restrictions at the official crossings. However, the Foreign Secretary also said that weapons smuggling continued, although "recent actions [had] disrupted this to some extent".[<\/span>99<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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42. Israel has made the halting of weapons smuggling into Gaza a key demand, linking progress on this issue to its willingness to accede to Palestinian and international demands for the opening of the border crossings. Ms Bar-Yaacov told us that weapons were the "key concern" for Israel.[<\/span>100<\/u><\/a>] This nexus of issues has in turn been central to the effort to achieve a longer-term ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, which we outline in the next section. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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43. Especially given Israel's linkage of the smuggling issue to that of access through the official crossings into Gaza, the international community has become engaged in the effort to prevent the illicit weapons traffic. Addressing the House immediately after the end of the fighting in mid-January, the Foreign Secretary identified the two "immediate challenges" as being "stopping the flow of arms and starting the flow of aid".[<\/span>101<\/u><\/a>] On 16 January, seeking to bring an end to the Gaza conflict, the US agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding with Egypt to provide technical and intelligence cooperation and logistical support to support Cairo's efforts in the Sinai desert, next to Gaza, to prevent illicit arms transfers into the territory.[<\/span>102<\/u><\/a>] The US and the UK are both involved in the Gaza Counter-Arms Smuggling Initiative (GCASI), along with Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. At a conference in London in March, GCASI agreed a programme of action aimed at developing "an effective framework for international cooperation, supplementary to measures taken by regional states to prevent and interdict the illicit flow of arms, ammunition, and weapons components, to Gaza."[<\/span>103<\/u><\/a>] A follow-up meeting at official level was held in Ottawa on 10-11 June. FCO Minister Ivan Lewis said that the Government would "continue to work closely with the EU, US and regional partners to establish how best our expertise, including naval resources, can be used."[<\/span>104<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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44. Dr Albasoos told us that the tunnels into Gaza would be closed, as being unnecessary, if Israel opened the official crossing points.[<\/span>105<\/u><\/a>] As regards Israel's fears about the use that might be made of materials transferred through the official crossings into Gaza, Mr Blair commented that "you can get materials in there that are used for the purposes for which they are supposed to be used",[<\/span>106<\/u><\/a>] although Dr Bregman warned that Hamas would probably always have weapons with which to attack Israel, manufacturing them itself if necessary, because of the movement's <\/span>raison d'être<\/i><\/span> as a "liberation movement".[<\/span>107<\/u><\/a>] As regards Israel's fears about benefiting Hamas politically if it were to ease access conditions, Mr Blair argued that the operation of the tunnels was already to Hamas's benefit, while the current situation simultaneously penalised Gazans wishing to operate legitimate businesses.[<\/span>108<\/u><\/a>] Mr Blair argued that the "separate, illegitimate economy […] over time displaces the legitimate economy".[<\/span>109<\/u><\/a>] For example, OCHA has reported that the Ministry of Agriculture in Gaza told farmers in April not to plant export crops, because of the prospect that they would lose money as a consequence of being unable to export their produce.[<\/span>110<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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45. Given the international community's demands for Israel to open the crossings into Gaza, and Israel's concerns about the use which might be made of imported goods, the possibility has been discussed of some form of international monitoring role at the crossings. In January, the EU said that it was: <\/p><\/div>\n

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examining options and intends to support the sustainability of the ceasefire including through assistance on border management. […] the Council expresses the European Union's readiness to reactivate the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah), as soon as conditions allow, and to examine the possibility of extending its assistance to other crossing points as part of the overall EU engagement in the region.[<\/span>111<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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Ms Bar-Yaacov told us that "the EU could serve a very constructive role […] in monitoring. One needs enhanced monitoring, verification and compliance."[<\/span>112<\/u><\/a>] Mr Blair said that plans had been drawn up for the international community to take a role at the crossings into Gaza, but that "a change in policy will be required first".[<\/span>113<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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46. In addition to the difficulties for aid delivery caused by the Israeli blockade, there have been some instances in which humanitarian agencies could not deliver aid to its intended recipients in Gaza because it was appropriated by Hamas or other Palestinian groups. In early February, UNRWA temporarily suspended aid deliveries into Gaza after Hamas stole a second delivery.[<\/span>114<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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47. We conclude that rocket fire from Gaza by Hamas and other Palestinian groups on civilian targets in Israel is unacceptable. It generates the risk of a renewed escalation in violence, and constitutes a central obstacle in the way of Israeli willingness to move forward towards a two-state settlement. We therefore conclude that the British Government is correct to support Israel's goal of bringing rocket fire from Gaza to an end. However, we are not persuaded that the maintenance of the current regime of restrictions at the official crossings between Israel and Gaza is likely to achieve this. Rather, we conclude that the restrictions at the official crossings help to sustain the system of smuggling under the Egyptian border which itself contributes to the presence of illicit weaponry in Gaza. We recommend that, in its response to this report, the Government should update us on the steps being taken and the results being achieved as part of the international effort against smuggling into Gaza, and in particular on the British contribution. We further recommend that the Government should update us on any discussions which are underway on a possible international monitoring presence at the crossings between Israel and Gaza. <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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48. After two years in which we and others have consistently been highlighting the poor humanitarian situation in Gaza, and six months after the end of a damaging conflict, we conclude that Gaza's continued lack of free access to humanitarian and reconstruction supplies is a matter of distress and frustration. We conclude that it is unacceptable that Israel continues to deny unrestricted access for humanitarian assistance to Gaza. We further conclude that there are indications that Israel is seeking to use its control over the transfer of humanitarian and other supplies into Gaza partly for political objectives. <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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49. We conclude that the obstacles to legitimate economic activity and the increased role of unofficial economic transactions in Gaza may have a damaging long-term effect on the territory, which could make more difficult the creation of an integrated Palestinian state including both Gaza and the West Bank. <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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GAZA COMMONWEALTH WAR GRAVES CEMETERY <\/p><\/div>\n

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50. The reporting of the BBC's Mark Urban drew our attention to the impact of the conflict in Gaza on one of the two Commonwealth war graves cemeteries in the territory.[<\/span>115<\/u><\/a>] We visited the cemetery during our visit in March in order to be able to see for ourselves the damage that it had sustained. Richard Kellaway, Director General of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC), told us that 363 of the 3,690 headstones in the cemetery would need to be replaced as a result of the effects of Israeli shelling, and that the total cost of the post-conflict restoration work required in the cemetery had been assessed at £83,936. Mr Kellaway told us that the CWGC was seeking to recover these costs from the Israeli government. Mr Kellaway said that he suspected that "the process may be lengthy", although he noted that in 2008 Israel had paid compensation to the CWGC for damage which the cemetery had sustained on a previous occasion.[<\/span>116<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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51. Despite the damage which the cemetery sustained in the most recent conflict, we were impressed on our visit by the condition in which the local CWGC staff were nevertheless maintaining it. We would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to their work. <\/p><\/div>\n

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52. Mr Kellaway and Mr Paul Price, the local CWGC supervisor, confirmed that between taking up the post in January 2008 and March 2009, Mr Price had been unable to visit the two CWGC cemeteries in Gaza, on the basis of security advice. However, we were pleased to learn from Mr Kellaway that the CWGC Vice-Chairman, Admiral Sir Ian Garnett, had been able to visit the cemeteries, together with Mr Price, in April.[<\/span>117<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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53. We recommend that the FCO should press the Israeli government to compensate the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) for the costs of repairing the damage to the CWGC cemetery in Gaza which was sustained during the latest conflict there, as Israel did in 2008 for the costs of repairing damage sustained on a previous occasion. We further recommend that the Government should provide an update on this issue in its response to this Report. <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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Regional diplomatic follow-up<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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54. Following the Gaza conflict, two sets of negotiations got underway. One set, between Hamas and Israel, was aimed at reaching a new longer-term ceasefire agreement to replace that which broke down in December 2008. The second set of talks, between Hamas and Fatah, was aimed at the establishment of a new Palestinian national unity government, thereby bringing Gaza and the West Bank back under a single political authority and in that respect restoring the pre-June 2007 situation. Both sets of negotiations were mediated by Egypt. <\/p><\/div>\n

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55. In early March, Mr Rammell told us that the Government supported the conclusion of a new Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement. UN Security Council resolution 1860 had called on member states to support efforts in this direction.[<\/span>118<\/u><\/a>] However, the Egypt-mediated talks broke down in mid-March. One issue had been the opening of the crossings into Gaza by Israel in exchange for a halt to rocket fire out of it and reassurances on the smuggling of arms, as we outlined above. The deal-breaker in the talks appeared to be the decision of outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to link the conclusion of a new ceasefire agreement to agreement on a prisoner exchange, allowing the release of the Israeli soldier Corporal Gilad Shalit in exchange for the release of Hamas prisoners held by Israel. The release of Corporal Shalit has been an Israeli demand since he was kidnapped by Hamas in a cross-border raid in 2006, and Mr Olmert was reported to be keen to secure his release before leaving office, but Israel and Hamas could not agree on the list of Hamas prisoners to be released.[<\/span>119<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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56. As regards the Hamas-Fatah talks, Mr Rammell told us that the Government supported the formation of a new Palestinian national unity government.[<\/span>120<\/u><\/a>] The UN Security Council has also called for intra-Palestinian reconciliation.[<\/span>121<\/u><\/a>] The Quartet's present support for a Palestinian unity government, involving Hamas in some way, contrasts with what we heard during both our 2007 inquiry and our present inquiry, namely that there had been US opposition to the formation of a national unity government in 2006-07.[<\/span>122<\/u><\/a>] In our 2007 Report we called for the formation of a new national unity government.[<\/span>123<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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57. In March, Salam Fayyad submitted his resignation as Palestinian Authority Prime Minister, in order to facilitate the formation of a new government, possibly under an alternative premier. However, as of early July, after six rounds of Cairo-based talks, no agreement had been reached. It was reported that Hamas would not accede to Fatah's demand that, at least for the purposes of the new government's programme, it should accept the three conditions which the Quartet set for any Palestinian Authority government with which it was to deal, namely a renunciation of violence, acceptance of the existence of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements reached between the PLO and Israel. The two sides could also not reach agreement on a number of further issues, including, reportedly, arrests by the security forces of each side of people affiliated with the other, and the terms for holding the Palestinian elections due by 2010 (see paragraphs 128-132).[<\/span>124<\/u><\/a>] Nomi Bar-Yaacov had told us in February that Hamas was opposed to the formation of a national unity government on the basis of a commitment to negotiations with Israel because it felt so strengthened by the conflict in Gaza.[<\/span>125<\/u><\/a>] She told us at that stage that "Hamas and Fatah are hardly talking to one another",[<\/span>126<\/u><\/a>] and Dr Albasoos confirmed that the rift between the two parties was "wider than before".[<\/span>127<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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58. Having warned us, prophetically, in February 2007 that there could be a return to violence in the OPTs "very quickly",[<\/span>128<\/u><\/a>] Ms Bar-Yaacov told us in February 2009 that there could yet be "another civil war".[<\/span>129<\/u><\/a>] She suggested that the arms that Hamas were continuing to smuggle into Gaza could be targeted at Fatah, as much as Israel.[<\/span>130<\/u><\/a>] Since the end of the Gaza conflict, there have been reports of reprisals there by Hamas against individuals believed to have collaborated with Fatah or Israel, and of reprisals against Hamas figures in return.[<\/span>131<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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59. On 19 May, shortly before his first meeting with President Obama in Washington, President Abbas re-appointed Mr Fayyad to head a new government, which this time includes eight Fatah ministers rather than comprising only non-party figures.[<\/span>132<\/u><\/a>] Many elements within Fatah continue to be discontented with their party's representation in the Palestinian Authority government, and the government's continued leadership by a non-Fatah figure.[<\/span>133<\/u><\/a>] Some Fatah figures also did not want to see the apparent abandonment of the effort to form a government with Hamas, although as of early July the unity talks had not been formally called off and a further round of negotiations was scheduled for later in the month. There have been reports that Egypt has set the two parties a deadline of the end of July.[<\/span>134<\/u><\/a>] We take up the issues of relations between Fatah and Hamas and international policy towards the Palestinian side of the conflict in Chapter 4. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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60. We are dismayed that, six months after the end of the conflict in Gaza, there remains no ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas and no united Palestinian government. There also appears to have been little underlying change regarding several of the key issues which contributed to the outbreak of the conflict, such as Hamas's control of Gaza, weapons smuggling into the territory, and the lack of access through the Gaza border crossings. We conclude that this situation makes for an ongoing risk of insecurity and a renewed escalation of violence. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government should set out what support it has offered to the conclusion of a new ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, and its assessment of the prospect that such an agreement will be reached. <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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Possible violations of the laws of war<\/strong> <\/p><\/div>\n

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61. International human rights NGOs and other observers have alleged that the conflict in Gaza in December 2008\/January 2009 saw violations of the laws of war, by both sides.[<\/span>135<\/u><\/a>] The prominence of this issue led us to take evidence from Professor Iain Scobbie, Sir Joseph Hotung Research Professor in Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in the Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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62. Professor Scobbie explained that Israel is not a Party to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which are the main instruments establishing the international laws of war—including, in the case of Additional Protocol I, with respect to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination".[<\/span>136<\/u><\/a>] Professor Scobbie also noted that "there can be differences in the implementation" of the laws of war between state and non-state actors.[<\/span>137<\/u><\/a>] However, he said that many of the provisions of Additional Protocol I form part of customary international law, and that overall the "basic rules" of international law relating to armed conflict applied to the conflict in Gaza.[<\/span>138<\/u><\/a>] In a memorandum, the FCO also made clear that it regards several of the principles regarding the targeting of civilians which are set out in Additional Protocol I as being part of customary international law and therefore as applying to Israel and Hamas.[<\/span>139<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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63. One of the most prominent allegations made against Israel was that its military action in Gaza was disproportionate. The Foreign Secretary described the Israeli operation in these terms.[<\/span>140<\/u><\/a>] Mr Blair told us that there had been "no conception of proportionality" in the Israeli action.[<\/span>141<\/u><\/a>] We note the Foreign Secretary's terminology in particular in light of our criticism, in our 2007 Report, of the Government's decision not to use the term "disproportionate" of Israel's military action in Lebanon in 2006.[<\/span>142<\/u><\/a>] Professor Scobbie explained that the term "disproportionate" had a specific legal significance—namely, that in order to avoid disproportionality "damage done to civilian property and civilians must not be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated by a given attack".[<\/span>143<\/u><\/a>] He stressed that the requirement to avoid disproportionate military action was not, therefore, a requirement to avoid civilian casualties altogether.[<\/span>144<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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64. International human rights NGOs charged Israel with violating the requirement to discriminate adequately between combatants and non-combatants during its Gaza action. Additional Protocol I requires that only military targets may be attacked; that all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid or at least minimise civilian harm; and that indiscriminate attacks are not permissible, where the lack of discrimination may arise from either the choice of target or the choice of weapon.[<\/span>145<\/u><\/a>] <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

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65. Allegations that Israel violated the requirement to discriminate adequately between combatants and non-combatants in the Gaza conflict were made with respect to both its targeting and the weapons types it used. As regards targeting, a number of allegations were made:<\/p><\/div>\n

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 <\/p><\/div>\n