{"id":203513,"date":"1971-12-31T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T18:35:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=203513"},"modified":"2019-03-12T18:35:28","modified_gmt":"2019-03-12T18:35:28","slug":"auto-insert-203513","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-203513\/","title":{"rendered":"Yearbook of the United Nations 1971 (excerpts)"},"content":{"rendered":"
YEARBOOK<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n OF THE<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n UNITED<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n NATIONS<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 1971<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Office of Public Information<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n United Nations, New York<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n \n<\/p><\/div>\n The situation in the Middle East<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n During 1971, efforts continued in the search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem. The Secretary-General reported on the activities of his Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring–in particular, Ambassador Jarring's renewed efforts to carry out the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council in its resolution of 22 November 1967. 1<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>At its twenty-sixth session, which opened on 21 September 1971, the General Assembly again discussed the situation in the Middle East, and on 13 December adopted a resolution sponsored by 21 States. By this, the Assembly among other things reaffirmed the principle that the acquisition of territories by force was inadmissible and that territories thus occupied must be restored. It also reaffirmed that the establishment of peace in the Middle East should include application of the following two principles–which had been set forth in the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967–namely: (a<\/i>) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; and (b<\/i>) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Assembly also asked the Secretary-General to take measures to reactivate Ambassador Jarring's mission and invited the parties to the conflict to co-operate with the Special Representative in working out practical measures to: guarantee freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; achieve a just settlement of the refugee problem; and guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area. The Security Council was asked to consider, if necessary, making arrangements under the relevant Articles of the United Nations Charter with regard to the implementation of its resolution of 22 November 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Also during 1971, communications and reports concerning the status of the cease-fire between Israel on the one hand, and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic on the other, were received by the Security Council which, owing to the relative quiet in the area, was not convened to consider that aspect of the question.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Council did, however, meet to consider charges by Jordan that Israel was adopting measures to change the character and status of the City of Jerusalem. On 25 September, the Council adopted a resolution by which among other things it urgently called on Israel to rescind all previous measures and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem tending to change the status of the City or prejudicing the rights of its inhabitants or the interests of the international community.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The question of the treatment of the civilian population of the Arab territories occupied by Israel was again considered by the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, both of which took decisions based on the findings of the three-member Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Details of these and other related matters are described in the sections that follow.<\/p><\/div>\n Search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Reports by Secretary-General<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In a report dated 30 November 1971, the Secretary-General gave a comprehensive review of the activities of his Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, since January 1971.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Special Representative, the report stated, had resumed his discussions with the parties early in January and had received memoranda from them elaborating their positions. Israel had presented papers containing its views on the "essentials of peace," and Egypt and Jordan had subsequently presented papers containing their views on the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. 2<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Secretary-General said he had noted with growing concern that each side had been insisting that the other make certain commitments before the formulation of provisions for a peace settlement. Israel had insisted that Egypt should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement and to make various undertakings within the framework of the resolution of 22 November 1967. When agreement was reached on those points, it would then be possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Egypt, the Secretary-General said, had continued to regard the resolution of 22 November 1967 as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties, and for its part had once again expressed its readiness to carry out its obligations under the resolution, provided that Israel did likewise. Egypt had held, however, that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore, according to Egypt, Israel had not committed itself to implementing the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement of the refugee problem.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Secretary-General added that the papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan relating to peace between those two countries showed a similar divergence of views. Israel had stressed that Jordan should enter into a peace agreement specifying each party's direct and reciprocal obligations; Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and held that an Israeli commitment to evacuate all occupied territories was an essential first step towards peace.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>At that stage of the talks, the Secretary-General said, his Special Representative had reached the conclusion, which he shared, that the only possibility of breaking the deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and Egypt as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments that seemed to be the inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement. It should thereafter be possible to formulate at once the terms of a peace agreement, not only for those topics covered by the commitments but with equal priority for other topics, in particular the refugee problem.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Thus, in identical aides-memoires to Egypt and Israel on 8 February, Ambassador Jarring requested them to make certain prior commitments. His initiative was presented on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem. Israel would commit itself to withdraw its forces from occupied Egyptian territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. Egypt would commit itself to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly and indirectly from the Security Councils resolution adopted on 22 November 1967. On 15 February, Egypt indicated that it would accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly or indirectly from the resolution. It would also be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel if Israel would give commitments covering its own obligations under the resolution, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 17 February, the Special Representative informed Israel of Egypt's reply to his aide memoire. On 26 February, Israel, without specific reference to the commitments which the Special Representative had sought from that Government, stated that it viewed favourably Egypt's expression of readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement. Israel considered that both parties, having presented their basic positions, should now pursue detailed and concrete negotiations without prior conditions.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On the question of withdrawal, on which the Special Representative had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israeli position was that it would give an undertaking to withdraw from the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire line to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; it would not withdraw to the lines existing prior to June 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed Egypt of the contents of the Israeli communication. Egypt held that it was improper for the Israeli authorities to have responded to Egypt's reply, which had been addressed to Ambassador Jarring and which would have full effect only if the Israeli authorities gave the commitment requested of them by Ambassador Jarring.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Secretary-General reported that he had then stated that the problems to be settled had been more clearly identified and that on some points there was general agreement. He had also noted with satisfaction the positive reply given by Egypt to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, Israel had not so far responded to the request of the Special Representative that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of Egypt. In view of that, the Secretary-General had appealed to Israel to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. He also appealed to the parties to withhold fire and maintain the quiet which had prevailed in the area since August 1970. Israel had then indicated its to continue to observe the cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity. However, the President of Egypt had declared on 7 March that his Government was no longer committed to a cease-fire.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Secretary-General said that on 11 March Israel had informed Ambassador Jarring that it was awaiting Egypt's reaction to Israel's invitation to enter into detailed and concrete discussions. Egypt maintained that it was still awaiting an Israeli reply to Ambassador Jarring's aide-memoire.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Subsequently, the Secretary-General reported, the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices had lapsed. He had therefore resumed his post as Ambassador of Sweden to the USSR on 25 March. Although he returned to Headquarters from 5 to 12 May and from 21 September to 27 October and had held certain consultations elsewhere, he had found himself faced with the same deadlock and with no possibility of actively pursuing his mission.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>During much of this time, the Secretary-General noted, the promotion of agreement between the parties was the object of two separate initiatives–first, an effort by the United States to promote an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal, which had not, so far, achieved any positive results. The second initiative was a mission of inquiry being conducted by certain African Heads of State on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Both initiatives were described by the sponsors as designed to facilitate the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission. While they were being pursued, they obviously constituted an additional reason for him not to take personal initiatives.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General said that if the impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East persisted, there could be little doubt that new fighting would break out sooner or later. The parties had taken advantage of the current lull to strengthen considerably their military capabilities and any new round of fighting would be more violent and dangerous than previous ones. There was always the danger, he added, that it might not be possible to limit it to the present antagonists and to the confines of the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Secretary-General believed that the only way to forestall such a disastrous eventuality was to intensify the search for a peaceful and agreed settlement. The Security Council's cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 3<\/u>\/ and its resolution of 22 November 1967, if implemented simultaneously and fully, should provide the framework for achieving such a settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>He went on to say that Ambassador Jarring had clearly defined the minimum conditions required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions were met, it was hard to see what else he could do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions were met had to be taken by the parties concerned and, failing that, by the Security Council itself or by the States Members of the United Nations–particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and their influence on the parties concerned.<\/p><\/div>\n Communications from Israel and Egypt relating to OAU proposals<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 9 December 1971, Israel transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of Israel's reply to proposals made by the Committee of Ten African Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Israel stated that it agreed: (a<\/i>) to resume negotiations without prior conditions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring within the terms of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967; (b<\/i>) to work out a Suez Canal agreement, the details of which would be negotiated and agreed; (c<\/i>) that secure and recognized boundaries should be determined by negotiations between the parties and embodied in the peace agreement; (d<\/i>) that in addition to the determination of agreed, secure and recognized boundaries, further arrangements for ensuring security could be negotiated; (e<\/i>) that the terms of withdrawal to the boundaries negotiated and agreed should be embodied in the peace treaty; and (f<\/i>) that the question of Sharm el Sheikh would be included in the peace negotiations as specified in point (c<\/i>) above. In accordance with the Security Council's resolution, free navigation in all international waterways, such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, for all ships and cargoes, including those of Israel, would be provided for in the peace agreement.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 10 December 1971, Egypt transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a memorandum submitted to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee of four African Heads of State in response to the proposals submitted by the OAU Committee of Ten. The memorandum stated that Egypt:<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>(1)\t<\/span>agreed to hold indirect negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 in all its parts;<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>(2)\t<\/span>was ready to undertake the required arrangements for reopening the Suez Canal in return for the first stage of Israeli withdrawal on condition that Israel responded positively to Ambassador Jarring's aide-memoire of 8 February;<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>(3)\t<\/span>agreed that secure and recognized boundaries should be embodied in the peace agreement, based on the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines of 5 June 1967 and in conformity with the borders specified in Ambassador Jarring's initiative, which underlined the necessity of the withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt's international borders;<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>(4)\t<\/span>accepted as guarantees for peace: (a<\/i>) United Nations guarantees; (b<\/i>) establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders; and (c<\/i>) stationing of international forces at some strategic points; and<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>(5)\t<\/span>accepted the stationing of international forces in Sharm el Sheikh to guarantee the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Consideration by General Assembly<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 25 September 1971, the General Assembly included the item "The situation in the Middle East" in its agenda and discussed it at plenary meetings held between 3 and 14 December.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Opening the debate, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt stated that his Government asked the General Assembly to consider Israel's continued aggression and expansionist policy–the emergence of a colonial power invoking military conquest as a means of territorial expansion. The expulsion of inhabitants of the occupied territories, the destruction of villages, houses and refugee camps and the establishment of Israeli colonies were examples of such policy.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 4<\/u>\/ had, he said, clearly emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. That principle–which was based on the United Nations Charter–should apply fully to all the occupied territories and could not be fragmented. Israel had not only refused to implement the resolution but had also attempted to distort its provisions. Thus, it had selected a particular phrase referring to "secure and recognized boundaries" and used the words to try to justify its policy of territorial expansion. But, he stressed the resolution referred to all States in the area and not only to Israel. Security could rest only on respect for territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty. It could be reinforced by a system of guarantees under the auspices of the Security Council, but Israel had rejected all proposals on security measures.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Outlining the initiatives and endeavours of the past four years to carry out the peaceful settlement embodied in the Security Council's resolution including the mission of the African Heads of State, the Egyptian Foreign Minister declared that Israel had employed manoeuvres, delaying tactics and slogans to undermine every opportunity for a peaceful settlement. The latest of such tactics was its declaration that it was ready to resume talks with Ambassador Jarring without pre-conditions. Were there any pre-conditions in the Jarring memorandum of 8 February 1971? If Israel considered itself bound by the Charter, by the Security Council's resolution, by the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force, and by the rules and norms of international legal order, then there were no pre-conditions whatsoever in the memorandum.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Egyptian Foreign Minister went on to say that opposition to Israel's colonial policy was universal. However, in the case of the United States there was a basic contradiction between that country's declared commitment to support the territorial integrity of all the States in the Middle East and its policy of providing military and economic aid to Israel. Nothing had enabled Israel to evade its obligations more than its reliance on United States support. By its aggression against three Arab States and by its failure to meet its obligations under the resolution of 22 November 1967, Israel had violated the United Nations Charter. The enforcement measures of Chapter VII of the Charter 5<\/u>\/ were specifically envisaged to meet such a situation.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel said that the urgent task was to strengthen the cease-fire, to begin detailed and concrete negotiations, and to show directions in which a final peace could be approached. The Middle East was in turmoil largely because the Arab Governments had never had a true perception of Israel's purpose or identity. Contrary to Egypt's assertion that Israel was an expansionist, imperialist country imposing its power on the Arab world, his country, the Foreign Minister said, was a small nation fighting for its own peace, freedom and security. Since the war of June 1967, Egypt had refused to meet Israel at the conference table and had declined all negotiations except on condition that its terms be accepted in advance. Israel, on the other hand, had sought negotiation, agreement and peace with Egypt. Maintenance of the cease-fire was the essential condition for progress towards peace.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>He went on to say that Egypt had refused to co-operate with the United States in seeking a Suez Canal agreement, although the opening of the Canal, with a withdrawal of Israeli forces to an agreed distance from the cease-fire lines, would carry tangible advantages to Egypt and would weaken Israel's position strategically. Israel was prepared to make those concessions, provided that compensating conditions for its security were ensured. Israel would undertake that the Canal agreement would not affect or annul the agreement of August 1970, by which Israel and Egypt would hold discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in conformity with his mandate under the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 to promote agreement on a final settlement. When agreement on a final boundary had been reached in the peace settlement, Israeli forces would withdraw to it. Israel's position was fully in accordance with international law, with the established precedents of peace-making and with the Security Council's resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Israeli Foreign Minister said that, with regard to Ambassador Jarring's aide-memoire of 8 February 1971, the assertion that Egypt had made a positive response while Israel had given a negative reply, or none at all, was not true. Egypt had replied to nearly all the points in Ambassador Jarring's aide-memoire not with a straightforward acceptance but with a counter-proposal. The Egyptian reply differed from the Jarring memorandum on many positions. Israel had also replied to Ambassador Jarring's proposals, sometimes in general acceptance and in some cases with counter-proposals. Its reply was in full accord with the Charter and with the Security Council's resolution. Each party was within its right in stating its basic position in its reply. Now that the parties had done that, they should pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner, without prior conditions and with a view to concluding a peace agreement.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Israel, he said, had also welcomed the initiative taken by the African Heads of State and had replied positively to their proposals aimed at resolving the deadlock without prior surrender of its position by either party. The main virtue of the proposals was that they placed the renewal of Ambassador Jarring's mission strictly within the terms of the resolution of 22 November 1967 and did not attempt to specify the conclusions which the negotiations should reach.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal said that the purpose of the OAU mission had been to establish contacts with the parties in order to help towards the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission. The main concern of OAU was the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>At the talks with the parties, he said, some positive elements had emerged: Egypt had accepted the resumption of negotiations under Ambassador Jarring and it had maintained its proposal for an interim Suez Canal agreement to enable the Special Representative to establish a timetable for implementing the resolution. Israel, for its part, had confirmed its acceptance of the resolution and, although it preferred direct negotiations, was prepared to undertake indirect negotiations through Ambassador Jarring. Israel had also agreed to the conclusion of an interim agreement on the reopening of the Suez Canal, provided that such agreement was not linked to the resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The remaining obstacles, the Foreign Minister of Senegal said, were the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the concept of secure and recognized boundaries, which Israel based on security considerations. He pointed out that no State could invoke security reasons to seize or annex territories of other States. That principle, he added, should be reaffirmed in order to enable Ambassador Jarring to resume his mission.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The representative of China said that the essence of the Middle East question was the aggression of Israeli zionism against the Palestinians and other Arab peoples, with the support of the United States. It was because of the arms provided by the United States to Israel that the Palestinian people and other Arab countries had failed in their efforts to recover the lost territories.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Under the control and manipulation of the super-powers, he said, the United Nations had also ignored the just demands of the Palestinians and other Arab peoples and had adopted resolutions that were unjust to the Arabs and in contravention of the Charter. Also, the two super-powers were taking advantage of the temporary difficulties facing the Palestinians and other Arab peoples to make political deals in their contention for important strategic points and oil resources and the division of spheres of influence in the Middle East at the expense of the national rights and territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Arab peoples. That was why the question had remained unsolved for so long.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The theory of so-called secure boundaries advanced by Israel, he said, was only an excuse to perpetuate the occupation of the territories seized; to accept it would be tantamount to recognizing as legal the aggression and expansion of Israeli zionism.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>China maintained that Israel must withdraw from the Arab territories it had occupied and that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to return to their homeland and to national existence must be restored.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The USSR representative maintained that the key to the restoration of peace in the Middle East was the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories. The United Nations had taken a definite stand against Israeli occupation by the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, by the General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security 6<\/u>\/ and by the Assembly's resolution of 4 November 1970 on the situation in the Middle East, 7<\/u>\/ Israel had defied those decisions and, with the support of the United States, had paralysed Ambassador Jarring's mission.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Moreover, he went on to say, the United States had blocked the work of the consultative meetings of the permanent members of the Security Council on the Middle East, making it impossible to reach any agreed decision. It had instead undertaken a one-sided uncalled-for mediation that had proved a total fiasco. It was time to return to the collective diplomacy of the United Nations through the Jarring mission, with consultations by the permanent members and the participation of the Security Council and the General Assembly in a Middle East settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The USSR believed that the General Assembly could effectively contribute to a solution of the problem if it displayed determination to curb the aggressor and called upon the United States not to play the role of mediator. The USSR was prepared to participate, together with other States, in establishing international guarantees for a political settlement and for security in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The United States representative said his country had supported all United Nations efforts to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict; it favoured a peaceful settlement based on agreement among the parties within the framework of the provisions and principles of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. Unfortunately, efforts towards an over-all peace settlement had not produced the results which had been hoped for.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The most promising avenue of progress since February 1971, he said, had been the possibility of an agreement on interim measures, involving partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and a reopening of the Suez Canal as a step towards final peace. Both Egypt and Israel, on their own initiative, had expressed interest in that concept and both had asked the United States to assist them in pursuing negotiations towards that end. However, a major difficulty had been that the parties had sought to introduce into the context of an interim agreement concepts which logically belonged in an over-all settlement. The merits of an interim agreement were precisely that it offered a prospect for practical on-the-ground progress, while leaving some of the most difficult problems for further negotiations at a subsequent stage.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The United States spokesman added that although the negotiations on an interim agreement were in suspense–temporarily, he believed–his Government would review the situation after the General Assembly's debate had been concluded. Both sides had put forward positive ideas; both sides held firmly to key points; both sides would be required to make adjustments if an interim agreement was indeed to be achieved.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The basic problem, he stressed, was to find ways to help both sides overcome the deep suspicion and distrust they felt towards each other.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The United States representative commended the mission undertaken by the OAU Committee of Ten to promote a narrowing of the differences between the parties.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The spokesman for the United Kingdom said that virtually all Member States, including the main parties to the conflict, agreed that any Middle East settlement should be based on the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967; disagreement arose as to the means to achieve that end. His Government had wholeheartedly supported the three main attempts made over the past year to bring about a settlement in accordance with the Council's resolution. It believed that an interim agreement on the reopening of the Suez Canal, if successfully concluded, would result in a certain deconfrontation that might pave the way for a comprehensive settlement. The OAU mission was also a valuable initiative, as it was intended to move the Jarring mission out of the present impasse. Finally, the most important development in Ambassador Jarring's mission had been his initiative of 8 February.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In this connexion, the United Kingdom representative noted that Israel, in its response, had clearly indicated that its main concern was not with territory but with security. If Israel were able, in the context of the correspondence with Ambassador Jarring, to say that it had no desire to incorporate any Egyptian territory into the State of Israel, that might constitute the response which Ambassador Jarring needed to resume the search for a peaceful settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The United Kingdom, he said, believed that dialogue must supplant confrontation; he hoped that, at an early stage after the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission, it would be possible to arrange some closer form of contact between the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to agree on the basis of a settlement. A similar procedure might then be followed in the case of the other parties concerned.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The representative of France said that the first obstacle to peace in the Middle East resulted from the scope and multiplicity of problems which could be resolved only in the framework of an over-all settlement. That was the essence of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967: peace could be lastingly established only if the settlement dealt with all the problems and applied to all the countries concerned.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>A second obstacle, he said, resulted from the interpretation of the concept of withdrawal in relation to commitments to peace, a question that must be settled in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Since the right of conquest was excluded, he added, borders must coincide–except for minor, agreed-upon rectifications–with the borders and lines existing prior to the 1967 conflict. Respect for those borders, ensured by the peace agreement would be strengthened by political and military measures taken by the parties, as well as by international guarantees.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The third obstacle, according to the French representative, resulted from deep divergences concerning the solution to the painful problem of the Palestinian people. Without a solution to that problem, any settlement negotiated by the States concerned might, in the long run, be jeopardized.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>France, he concluded, believed that the General Assembly could make a useful contribution to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East by reaffirming the necessary principles, by inviting the parties 51ÁÔÆæ them, and by supporting the efforts of Ambassador Jarring and encouraging him to pursue his task.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Representatives of Arab States said that the moral aspects and legal implications of the Middle East problem had been debated exhaustively in the United Nations and many resolutions had been adopted; but the time had come for the General Assembly to take concrete action to end Israel's occupation of Arab territories and to ensure respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinians.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Several Arab Members, in particular Algeria, Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, maintained that any political solution to the problem of Palestine that was based on the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 would not be practical; that resolution had addressed itself only to the situation created by the Israeli aggression of June 1967. The Algerian representative said that the alleged equilibrium of the resolution rested, above all, on a flagrant injustice to the Palestinians and constituted a vexing and dangerous precedent for future aggression.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Saudi Arabia stated that even if the conflict between Israel and the three Arab neighbouring States were to be solved, the core of the problem would remain. Israel was a foreign body in the region and the zionists were usurping colonialists. Peace could be achieved only if Israel's domination ceased and a democratic State established in which both Jews and Arabs could live together.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Many Arab spokesmen deplored United States military assistance to Israel which, they believed, had helped Israel in its aggression and its continued defiance of United Nations decisions.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The majority of speakers, including representatives from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe, shared the view that the General Assembly should demand a positive and definitive answer from Israel to Ambassador Jarring's aide-memoire of 8 February 1971 concerning the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Many Members praised the OAU mission for its conciliation efforts and felt that the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 provided the basis for a political solution. They felt that Ambassador Jarring's mission should be reactivated and that the parties should co-operate in good faith to seek a peaceful settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 13 December, the General Assembly adopted–by a recorded vote of 79 to 7, with 36 abstentions–a draft resolution sponsored by the following 21 Members: Afghanistan, Cameroon, the Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Spain, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia. It was revised by the sponsors during the course of the debate to take into account amendments by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By the preambular part of this text, the General Assembly among other things expressed its deep concern at the continuation of the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East, particularly since the conflict of June 1967, which constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. The Assembly said it was convinced that the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 should be implemented immediately in all its parts in order to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area could live in security. It expressed grave concern at the continuation of Israel's occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By the operative part of the text, the Assembly:<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>(1)
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