{"id":197914,"date":"1976-12-31T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T17:30:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=197914"},"modified":"2019-03-12T17:30:15","modified_gmt":"2019-03-12T17:30:15","slug":"auto-insert-197914","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-197914\/","title":{"rendered":"Yearbook of the United Nations 1976 (excerpts)"},"content":{"rendered":"
YEARBOOK<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n OF THE<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n UNITED<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n NATIONS<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 1976<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Volume 30<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n \n<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n The search for a peaceful settlement<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n The Middle East problem<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n including the Palestinian question<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Communication (9 January 1976)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By a letter dated 9 January 1976, the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in connexion with General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 1<\/u>\/ which concerned an invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East. The Foreign Minister said his Government had consistently advocated the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and believed that the only reliable way of reaching a fundamental settlement of that problem was through joint collective efforts by all the parties directly concerned, including the Arab people of Palestine represented by PLO. He added that on 9 November the USSR had proposed to the United States that, as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, they should take a joint initiative for its resumption. His Government continued to hold the firm view that that Conference was the most appropriate forum for working out fundamental decisions on a Middle East settlement based on the relevant United Nations resolutions and resolutely advocated its speediest possible resumption with the full and equal participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Consideration by Security<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n Council (12-26 January 1976)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By the resolution it adopted on 30 November 1975, 2<\/u>\/ by which it extended the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the Security Council also decided that it would reconvene on 12 January 1976 to continue the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions. It was also the understanding of the majority of the Security Council – in accordance with an agreement reached following consultations between members – that, when it reconvened, the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization would be invited to participate in the debate. 3<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>When the Security Council convened on 12 January 1976, the Council President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At subsequent meetings, the representatives of Algeria, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Poland, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen and Yugoslavia were also invited at their request to participate without the right to vote.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The President then proposed that the representative of PL0 be invited to participate in the debate, pointing out that his proposal was not being put forward under rule 37 4<\/u>\/ or rule 39 5<\/u>\/ of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure; if adopted by the Council, the invitation to PLO to participate would confer upon it the same rights of participation as were conferred when a Member State was invited to participate under rule 37.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Recalling that he had objected to the same proposal when it was made on 4 December 1975, 6<\/u>\/ the representative of the United States again objected, stating that rule 37 made allowance for Members of the Organization that were not Council members to participate in the Council's debates. The Organization did not have Members which were not States. The Palestine Liberation Organization was not a State; it did not claim to be a State; it did not administer a defined territory. A decision to invite PLO to participate not under existing rules but as if it were a Member State with the same rights as a Member State would open a veritable Pandora's box of future difficulties, he said. There were groups in all parts of the world that could seek to participate in the Council's proceedings as if they were Member States.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Moreover, he went on to say, PLO, which did not recognize the right of the State of Israel, which was a Member State, to exist, also refused to acknowledge the authority of the Security Council, which, by its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 7<\/u>\/ and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 8<\/u>\/ had undertaken to uphold the rights of the States of the Middle East. Resolution 242 (1967) for years had served and continued to serve as the only agreed basis for serious negotiations. Consequently, he said, the United States was not prepared to go along with an action which would also undermine the negotiation process, the only process that could lead to peace. He urged the Council not to repeat its mistaken ad hoc<\/i> decision of 4 December 1975.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the USSR spoke in favour of the proposal to invite the representatives of PLO.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The United Kingdom representative said it was still his Government's view that the proposal constituted an undesirable and unnecessary departure from established Council practice. However,, a majority of members of the Council as it was composed in November 1975 took the view that PLO representatives should be invited to participate in the debate; in those circumstances, the United Kingdom did not think it right to press procedural objections to the point of voting against the proposal.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The proposal was then put to a vote and received 11 votes in favour, 1 against (United States) and 3 abstentions (France, Italy, United Kingdom), and was therefore adopted.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>France and Italy explained that their reservations concerned the terms under which the invitation to PLO was to be extended. Contrary to its rules of procedure, the Council attempted to confer upon PLO the status of a State, which it was not and did not claim to be.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The PLO representative welcomed the Council's decision to invite PLO to participate in its discussion. He noted Israel's deliberate absence and suggested that its pretext for boycotting the Council's session was simply because representatives of the people Palestine were present. He then retraced the history of the Palestine question since 1947 and pointed out that it was only to put an end to injustice and aggression that the Palestinian people had resorted to armed struggle. In 1967, after Israel had occupied what remained of Palestine, as well as Sinai and the Golan Heights, the Council met to study the Middle East crisis but ignored the heart and essence of the conflict: the question of Palestine. Resolution 242 (1967) addressed itself to the so-called Middle East crisis but dealt neither with the Palestine question nor with the national rights of the Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty. Since then, he said, it had become commonplace to speak of the "Middle East crisis," with the intent of camouflaging, obscuring and evading the essential question, which was the question of Palestine. That had been the reason for the Palestinian people's rejection of resolution 242 (1967), for its rejection of the cease-fire and for its determination to carry out its armed struggle.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Similarly, he went on to say, resolution 338 (1973), subsequently adopted by the Council, was devoid of any reference to the question of Palestine and ignored the national rights of the Palestinian people. Again the Palestinian people had had to reject it.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In the aftermath of the October 1973 war, he said, PLO moved politically to rectify the mistaken view of the identity of the conflict in the Middle East. Thus, it requested inclusion of the question of Palestine as an independent item on the agenda of the twenty-ninth (1974) session of the General Assembly, a request that was supported by the overwhelming majority of Member States. The international community then came to recognize: first, that the question of Palestine was the central issue in the Middle East conflict; second, that peace in the Middle East was contingent upon the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, beginning with their rights to return, to self-determination and to sovereignty on their national soil; third, that the 1967 war was not in reality a conflict over regional frontiers between the Arab States and Israel, but one of the inevitable results of the continued Israeli usurpation of Palestinian land and violation of Palestinian rights; and fourth, that PLO had been decisively confirmed as the representative of the Palestinian people.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In conclusion, the PLO representative pointed out that PLO's struggle was not directed against the Jews but against the Zionist movement, its racist doctrines and its expansionist practices, which had led to the exile and homelessness of the Palestinian people, who expected the Security Council to adopt a resolution ending their tragedy and offering them a path to return to their homeland. Their aim was the establishment of an independent sovereign State on their national soil.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Spokesmen for Arab countries supported the views expressed by the PLO representative. The representative of the Libyan Arab Republic insisted that no international conference had the right to discuss the question of Palestine in the absence of PLO and that any resolution which ignored the national rights of the Palestinian people was to be rejected. He and others also maintained that the unjust and unlimited commitment of the United States to the Zionist cause constituted the main obstacle to the formulation of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The representative of Egypt regretted that Israel – the party responsible for the occupation of Arab land and denial of the Palestinian people's national rights – should have found it fitting to declare its contempt of the Council and the international community by boycotting the Council's debate. He asked that the Geneva Peace Conference be reconvened -in the near future, with PLO invited to attend on an equal footing with the other parties.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic pointed out that, inasmuch as the Zionist aggression against the Arab people did not start on 5 June 1967, the solution of the conflict could not be based on resolutions or solutions that took into account only what had happened since that date. That explained the inadequacy of resolution 242 (1967), which was intended to deal with the immediate consequences of Israeli aggression and totally ignored the Palestine question and the Palestinian people. By adopting resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975, 9<\/u>\/ he said, the Council had taken an important step towards fulfilling its responsibilities.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The spokesman for Jordan also deplored the "wilful and deliberate" absence of Israel – the party which had always proclaimed its desire for peace and its belief in dialogue. He went on to say that the endeavours of Israeli authorities to consolidate their occupation of the Arab territories was a process of national and cultural replacement much more fearful and radical than the traditionally known violations of human rights of people under conventional occupation. The Council could build peace if its programme involved a time-table for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and an endorsement of the Palestinian right to national self-determination. He added that the Palestinian reality, ignored in earlier Council resolutions, had to be recognized as an essential component of such a peace. A just settlement had to include national self-determination for the Palestinian people, their ingathering and the right of return for those who had been expelled from their homes.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Similar views were expressed by spokesmen for other Arab Member States, including the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The French representative said the Council should see to it that a just settlement of the Palestinian problem was brought about at the same time as recognition of secure and guaranteed frontiers for all the States of the area. Arab territories occupied as a result of the war of 1967 had to be evacuated and the rights of the Palestinian people to an independent homeland had to be recognized. However, it was not for the Council to determine for the interested parties the nature and status of the Palestinian homeland, which they themselves should determine in the light of the opportunities offered by life in the area. The procedure to be followed in seeking a settlement, he said, was established by resolution 338 (1973), which remained entirely valid. A settlement could emerge only from negotiations among the parties and France favoured a Palestinian expression of views during those negotiations. It was for the Council to follow developments in the negotiating process, to endorse results and to determine the necessary international guarantees.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>According to the USSR representative, Israeli troops had to withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine had to he fully satisfied, including their inalienable right to create their own State. The USSR, he said, appealed for a comprehensive solution of the radical problems of a peace settlement within the Geneva Conference. It was firmly convinced that without the full participation of the Arab people of Palestine it would be impossible and pointless to attempt to settle the Middle East problem; the question of the participation of their representatives in the work of the Geneva Conference was directly related to the very substance of a settlement. Anyone who took a stand against the equal participation of the PLO representatives in the work of the Conference was against a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, the USSR representative stated.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The representative of the United Kingdom said that a settlement should be based on three main requirements. The first was Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories; the second, respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Those two basic principles were laid down in resolution 242 (1967) and brought into effect as provided in resolution 338 (1973), and the United Kingdom would oppose any unilateral attempt to alter those resolutions or detract from them. The third requirement, not expressed in resolution 242(1967), was that the right of the Palestinian people to the expression of their national identity had to be recognized. How their rights were to be further defined was a matter for negotiation between the parties, but it had to be done in a way consistent with the right of all States in the area, including Israel, to exist within secure and recognized boundaries.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The principle of Israel's existence was supported by the great majority of Member States, he observed, and those who did not recognize that fact – most of all, those Palestinians who did not do so – had to come to recognize it and begin the task of considering how they could live at peace with Israel. On the other side, Israel had to accept that Palestinian nationalist sentiment would have to be taken into account and, more important, Israel would have to do something about it. It was not enough, he said, simply to express willingness to find a solution.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Chinese representative said it was mainly the two super-powers which were responsible for the situation in the Middle East. Although each of them had put forward this or that kind of proposal – for a comprehensive solution or a "step-by-step" solution – in fact neither of them had any intention or sincere desire to bring about a real settlement. The Chinese Government and people, he said, had always supported the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle to regain their national rights and recover their lost territories, and firmly condemned Israeli Zionist aggression. In China's view, the Council had to affirm the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and Israel had to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The United States representative said that one of the Security Council's greatest contributions had been to establish a framework within which contact between the parties to the problem could take place and the negotiating process maintained. Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and the will to apply them, had been the foundation for the progress that had been made; they continued to provide hope for the future. But, he said, when all parties had agreed to a framework, all of them had to agree to any changes in it. The Council should not adopt resolutions leaving no commonly accepted basis for further negotiation. However, the United States believed there was enough leeway in the existing arrangements to achieve progress, if there was the will to use them; matters of procedure, such as the question of additional participants, and of substance could and should be addressed at Geneva or at a preparatory conference. The Council should not seek to prejudge the work of the Geneva Conference.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The United States, he said, was prepared to co-operate with all the States involved on all the issues. It was aware that there could be no durable solution without every effort being made to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace based on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and respect for the right to independent existence of all States in the area.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 26 January, the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution, sponsored also by Benin, Guyana, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, according to the preamble of which the Security Council would, among other things, express its conviction that the question of Palestine was the core of the conflict in the Middle East and its concern over the continuing deterioration of the situation there. It would deeply deplore Israel's persistence in its occupation of Arab territories and its refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions, and reaffirm the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by the threat or use of force. Also by the preamble to the draft text, the Council would reaffirm further the necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By the operative part of the six-power text, the Council would affirm: (a<\/i>) that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine in accordance with the Charter; (b<\/i>) the right of Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours to do so and the right of those choosing not to return to receive compensation for their property; (c<\/i>) that Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967; and (d<\/i>) that appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee, in accordance with the Charter, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Council would, further by this text: decide that the above provisions should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; request the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps as soon as possible for the implementation of the provisions of this resolution and to report to the Security Council on the progress achieved; and decide to convene within six months to consider that report and in order to pursue the Council's responsibilities regarding such implementation.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The representative of the United Kingdom said his Government attached great importance to maintaining the principles and the provisions of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) as an essential element in the draft if the resolution was to provide a real contribution towards the progress of negotiations. He therefore submitted an amendment in the form of a new operative paragraph by which the Council would reaffirm the principles and provisions of those resolutions and declare that nothing in the provisions of the current resolution superseded them.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In the view of the United States representative, the draft resolution, far from preserving the framework for negotiations established in the 1967 and 1973 resolutions, would in fact begin its destructions inasmuch as it proposed a fundamental and irremediable diminishment of the circumstances of one of the parties, fundamental rights were elided, entitlements impaired and expectations put in doubt. It would be incompatible for the same document both to alter those rights, entitlements and expectations – which were incorporated in the two resolutions – and, at the same time, to seek to reaffirm them. Therefore he would abstain on the United Kingdom amendment.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The representative of France, pointing out that the object of the Council's debate was to complement and complete the 1967 and 1973 resolutions, said he would vote in favour of the amendment since in France's view there was no contradiction between the draft resolution and the United Kingdom proposal, which shed light on the context in which the Council's work had to be done. Italy also supported the United Kingdom's proposal.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The USSR said it could not support the amendment as it would introduce ambiguity and confusion into the substance of the draft resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Libyan Arab Republic opposed the United Kingdom's amendment, reiterating its view that the two resolutions in question had been bypassed by events and developments both inside and outside the United Nations and were irrelevant as a framework for any just and lasting solution of the Middle East question.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Pakistan said it could not support the proposed amendment, not because of its substance but because it was not relevant.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The United Republic of Tanzania said that to accept the proposed amendment would create unnecessary difficulties for many that had been able to accept the draft resolution as it stood. The sponsors believed their draft to be an improvement on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) because it was clearer and because it addressed itself seriously to the Palestinian question.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The amendment proposed by the United Kingdom was put to a vote and received 4 votes in favour (France, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom), 2 against (China, Libyan Arab Republic) and 9 abstentions, and was therefore not adopted.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>China's representative said his Government would not participate in the voting on the draft resolution. It considered that the most urgent task was to secure Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories. However, the draft resolution called for arrangements to guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; that, according to China, could be used by Israeli Zionism to create pretexts for its policy of aggression and expansion and by the super-powers to continue to maintain the situation of "no war, no peace" which was single-handedly created by them.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The draft resolution was put to a vote and received 9 votes in favour, 1 against (United States) and 3 abstentions (Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom). China and the Libyan Arab Republic did not participate in the vote. The resolution was not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Secretary-General observed that the Security Council's debate had highlighted both the main elements of the Middle East problem and the extreme difficulty of reconciling those elements. It had in particular emphasized the Palestinian dimension of the problem; at the same time, there had been a reaffirmation of the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. He said he felt it his duty to express the general and growing anxiety of the international community at large at the great difficulties being experienced in making progress towards a settlement and he appealed to all of the parties concerned to persist in their efforts so that further constructive steps could quickly follow the Council's debate.<\/p><\/div>\n \t<\/span>Speaking in explanation of the vote, the representative of the United States said that, even if it stood alone, the United States felt the need to preserve the framework for negotiations established in resolution 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The negative vote of the United States was not based on antipathy to the aspirations of the Palestinians but rather on the conviction that passage of the draft resolution would not ameliorate the condition of the Palestinians or be the most effective way of addressing the long-neglected problem of their future in the context of an over-all settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>France deplored the fact that the draft resolution, which was the product of lengthy consultation and which it termed realistic and equitable, had not been adopted. France did not believe, however, that the debate had been in vain, because the framework for a just and stable solution for the Middle East had become clearer.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>A similar view was expressed by the representative of Japan, who said that the fact that many members had agreed on a formula aimed at solving the Middle East problem was in itself a point of departure for future discussions.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The USSR representative said there was general recognition that genuine peace was impossible unless the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine were respected and unless Israeli troops withdrew from all the occupied Arab territories. He noted that many speakers, having recognized that the Council could not work out a peace treaty on a Middle East settlement, had called for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, with the participation of PLO. Israel and its supporters were now completely isolated internationally, he stated.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The PLO representative said that the majority of Council members had converged on the following basic concepts and conclusions: that PLO was the representative of the people of Palestine, who were entitled to national self-determination and independence in their Palestinian homeland, and that no peace and hence no just and durable solution of the Middle East crisis was feasible without PLO consent and participation. Finally, he said, Council resolution 242 (1967) was inadequate, since it failed to deal with either the question of Palestine or the national rights of the Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty. The United States, he added, which had chosen to demonstrate its prejudiced and unwavering support of Israel at the cost of impairing the effectiveness of the Council, could no longer claim that its step-by-step diplomacy would yield any productive results.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Communications (January-May 1976)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By a letter dated 9 January 1976, the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a statement setting forth the views of the USSR regarding the situation in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In a letter dated 10 January, the representative of Mexico considered the Middle East situation to be the most serious potential threat to world peace and that a comprehensive solution to the problem was necessary within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. Mexico also believed that the permanent members of the Security Council should demonstrate by action that they wished those resolutions implemented.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By a letter dated 14 January, the representative of Israel transmitted the text of a newspaper article containing a commentary on the "Palestinian Covenant (1968)". He also commented on the PLO political programme and various statements made by its leaders which, he said, demonstrated that the principles and purposes of that organization were incompatible with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 27 January 1976, the Secretary-General, in maintaining contact with the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, sent identical letters to them in which he inquired about their thinking on ways of making progress towards a solution of the Middle East problem. The representatives of the USSR and of the United States transmitted the replies of their Governments on 17 and 20 February.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR stated that Israel's continuing occupation of the Arab territories and its disregard of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine perpetuated the danger of a new military explosion. The efforts of Israel and those who supported it to keep the settlement of the Middle East problem deadlocked, as demonstrated by the results of the recent debate in the Security Council, was a subject of concern. Because of the position of one of its permanent members, the Council had not been able to reach a decision, although the overwhelming majority of its members had spoken in favour of specific measures to achieve a comprehensive settlement. With few exceptions, Members of the United Nations had expressed, in the General Assembly and the Security Council, the view that genuine peace in the Middle East was impossible unless Israel withdrew its troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and unless the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine were safeguarded and the right of all States of the region to independent existence was guaranteed.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The USSR Foreign Minister went on to say that it had become evident that the only reliable way to achieve agreement on all the questions involved in a settlement was to resume, after careful preparation, the work of the Geneva Peace Conference, with the participation of all those directly concerned, including PLO and the Co-Chairmen of the Conference. Without the participation of the Palestinians, the Geneva Conference would be not a forum for business-like negotiations but a camouflage aimed at creating a semblance of negotiations, the Foreign Minister said.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In his reply, the Secretary of State of the United States said that he shared the Secretary-General's sense of urgency in pursuing the goal of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. He said he had just concluded discussions with Israel's Prime Minister, and the United States was determined to continue its efforts towards meaningful negotiations. However, it believed that there would be no chance of further progress if the negotiating framework, erected around Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), 10<\/u>\/ were disrupted. It continued to believe that that framework was sufficiently flexible to provide the basis for working out fair and durable solutions to all the issues involved. Furthermore, the United States had repeatedly affirmed that there would be no permanent peace unless it included arrangements that took into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Secretary of State agreed that a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, after careful preparation, would serve the goal of achieving progress, and said that the United States had proposed as a practical way of proceeding – a preparatory conference of those who had participated thus far in the negotiations. The United States, he said, was also prepared to consider holding bilateral consultations with the USSR in advance of such a preparatory conference.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By a letter dated 29 April, the representative of the USSR transmitted a statement by his Government dated 28 April, calling for an over-all political settlement of the problem of the Middle East based on: the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories; the satisfaction of the legitimate national demands of the Arab people of Palestine, including their inalienable right to establish their own State; and international guarantees for the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all Middle Eastern States. It favoured the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, with the participation of PLO, possibly in two stages, so that in the initial stage all organizational questions might be solved and appropriate working bodies established. The USSR was prepared to appoint its representatives to such meetings without delay. In the statement, it was stressed that the previous years separate arrangements concerning some minor segments of the Israeli-occupied territories, by side- stepping the key questions in any Middle East settlement, had not only failed to alleviate the situation but had even further aggravated it.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>On 19 May, the representative of Bulgaria transmitted the text of a statement his Government dated 11 May concerning the new initiative of the USSR for a political settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. The Government of Bulgaria expressed its full agreement with the USSR statement of 28 April and endorsed the proposals for the solution of the Middle East conflict contained therein.<\/p><\/div>\n Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>By a note dated 29 May 1976, the Secretary-General, as he had been requested to do by the General Assembly on 10 November 1975, 11<\/u>\/ transmitted to the Security Council the report of the Assembly's 20-member Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. By that resolution, Committee had been asked to submit its report and recommendations no later than 1 June 1976; the Security Council, in turn, was asked to consider as soon as possible after that date the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized by the Assembly -in its resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974. 12<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In the first part of its report, the Committee gave a summary of its deliberations on: the nature of the question of Palestine, the role of the Committee, the right of return, the right to self-determination and to national independence and sovereignty, the status of Jerusalem, a programme of implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinians, proposals concerning steps to ensure implementation of that programme, and the interrelationship between the question of Palestine and the Middle East problem.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The second part of the report contained the Committees recommendations, beginning with what it termed basic considerations and guidelines. It noted first of all that the question of Palestine was at the heart of the Middle East problem and stressed that, consequently, no solution in the Middle East could be envisaged that did not fully take into account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Next, the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and property and to achieve self-determination, national independence and sovereignty were endorsed by the Committee in the conviction of those rights would contribute decisively to a comprehensive and final settlement of the Middle East crisis.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In the view of the Committee, the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) 13<\/u>\/ and 3375 (XXX), 14<\/u>\/ was indispensable in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East held under the auspices of the United Nations.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Committee then recalled the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and stressed the consequent obligation for complete and speedy evacuation of any territory so occupied.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Committee considered it the duty and the responsibility of all concerned to enable the Palestinians to exercise their inalienable rights.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Next, the Committee recommended an expanded and more influential role by the United Nations and its organs, particularly the Security Council, in promoting a just solution to the question of Palestine and in the implementation of such a solution.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Committee, then, in endorsing the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes, went on to propose a two-phase programme to implement the exercise of that right.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The first phase involved the return of Palestinians displaced as a result of the war of June 1967. The Committee recommended that the Security Council request the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 15<\/u>\/ and that such implementation should not be related to any other condition. It also recommended that the resources of the International Committee of the Red Cross and\/or of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East might be employed to assist in the solution of any logistical problems involved in the resettlement of Palestinians returning to their homes. Those agencies could also assist, in co-operation with the host countries and PLO, in the identification of the displaced Palestinians.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>For the second phase, involving the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967, the Committee recommended that, while the first phase was being implemented, the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved -and PLO as the interim representative of the Palestinian entity, should make the necessary arrangements to enable those Palestinians to exercise their right to return to their homes and property, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 November 1948. 16<\/u>\/ Palestinians not choosing to return to their homes should be paid just and equitable compensation as provided for in that resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>In order to implement the inherent right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, the Committee recommended that a time-table be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal – no later than 1 June 1977 – of Israeli occupation forces from the areas occupied in 1967. If necessary, temporary peace-keeping forces should be provided by the Council to facilitate the process of withdrawal.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Committee also recommended that the Security Council request Israel to desist from the establishment of new settlements and to withdraw during this period from settlements established in the occupied territories since 1967. Israel should also be requested to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to declare, pending its speedy withdrawal from those territories, its recognition of the applicability of that Convention. The evacuated territories, with all property and services intact, should be taken over by the United Nations, with the co-operation of the League of Arab States, and subsequently handed over to PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The United Nations should, if necessary, assist in establishing communications between Gaza and the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>The Committee recommended that, as soon as the independent Palestinian entity had been established, the United Nations, in co-operation with that entity and the States directly involved, should make further arrangements, taking into account General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), for the full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the resolution of outstanding problems and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, in accordance with all relevant United Nations resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \t<\/span>Finally, the Committee recommended that the United Nations should provide the economic and technical assistance necessary for the consolidation of the Palestinian entity.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n
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