1. In recent years, many discussions and administrative work were held on the issue of a Bill to amend Section 12 of the Evidence Ordinance, inclusive of the exclusion of evidence obtained through torture. Extensive internal deliberations were raised regarding different aspects of the proposed amendments. The various proposals are still examined by the relevant bodies, following a decision to allow the judgment in C.A. 5121\/98, Prv. Yisascharov v. The Head Military Prosecutor et al<\/i>. (4.5.06) a certain time to take root in the courts, prior to its implementation in legislation. <\/p><\/div>\n
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2. During the term of the 17th Knesset's Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, during its deliberations regarding the right to life and the integrity of the body with regards to the consensual-based constitution, a discussion was held regarding prohibition of torture. Among the various views and opinions heard in the committee's deliberations there was also the opinion that a future constitution should explicitly forbid torture, even though this prohibition can also be interpreted from other rights to be found in the constitution, such as the right to life, dignity, integrity of the body and privacy. Discussions on this issue are expected to continue during the term of the new Knesset.<\/span> <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/p>\n
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Article 2<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n
\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Reply to the issues raised in paragraph 2 of the list of issues<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n
3.\t<\/span>The Supreme Court, in H.C.J. 5100\/94 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel determined that:<\/p><\/div>\n\n
[A] reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture, free of cruel, inhuman treatment of the subject and free of any degrading handling whatsoever. There is a prohibition on the use of ‘brutal or inhuman means’ in the course of an investigation. Human dignity also includes the dignity of the suspect being interrogated … These prohibitions are ‘absolute’. There are no exceptions to them and there is no room for balancing. Indeed, violence directed at a suspect’s body or spirit does not constitute a reasonable investigation practice.<\/span> <\/span>Paragraph 23 of the Supreme Court decision, p. 17 of the English translation (see Annex 1).<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n\n
4.\t<\/span>Furthermore, in its decision, the Supreme Court held: <\/p><\/div>\n\n
\t<\/span>That the “necessity” exception is likely to arise in instances of “ticking time bombs”, and that the immediate need (“necessary in an immediate manner” for the preservation of human life) refers to the imminent nature of the act rather than that of the danger. Hence, the imminence criteria is satisfied even if the bomb is set to explode in a few days, or perhaps even after a few weeks, provided the danger is certain to materialize and there is no alternative means of preventing its materialization. In other words, there exists a concrete level of imminent danger of the explosion’s occurrence.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
5.\t<\/span>The ISA operates according to the above and fully adheres to the Supreme Court ruling. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
6.\t<\/span>Although the Court was ready to assume that the “necessity defense” could arise in instances of “ticking bombs,” the “necessity defense”, as such did not constitute a source of authority to utilize physical means. The Court held that any future directives governing the use of those means during interrogations had to be anchored in an authorization prescribed by law, and not in defenses to criminal liability. To date no such directives were introduced. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Reply to the issues raised in paragraph 3 of the list of issues <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n
7.\t<\/span>Israel's position on the inapplicability of CAT beyond its territory has been presented at length to the Committee on previous occasions and remains unchanged. Nevertheless, and in the interest of constructive dialogue with the Committee, efforts were made to respond to the Committee's List of Issues. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
8.\t<\/span>Hence, it is noteworthy that the authority to arrest under administrative detention order in the West Bank is lawful and anchored in Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides the legal basis for the action of the Military Commander in Judea and Samaria. Currently, there are only 530 administrative detainees.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
9.\t<\/span>Note that a person is held in administrative detention solely on the grounds of imperative reasons of security stemming personally from him\/her, to the security of the area. Furthermore, no administrative detainees are held by Israel to exert pressure on Hamas to release Gilad Shalit. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
The Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law 5762-2002<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n\n
10.\t<\/span>Section 1 of the Law reads:<\/p><\/div>\n\n
\t<\/span>This Law is intended to regulate the incarceration of unlawful combatants not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in a manner conforming with the obligations of the State of Israel under the provisions of international humanitarian law<\/strong>. (emphasis added)<\/p><\/div>\n\n
11.\t<\/span>The Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, establishes in domestic Israeli legislation the inherent right of a State under international Law of Armed Conflict to detain persons who take part in hostilities and endanger the security of the State, while not being entitled to Prisoner of War status (as accorded by Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949)). This incarceration is consistent with the administrative detention provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention, and has long been recognized by many authors in the field of international law, and remains a vital tool in the struggle against terrorist organizations, which tend to operate in blatant disregard of the Law of Armed Conflict (as exemplified by their persistent violation of the duty to distinguish themselves from the civilian population). <\/p><\/div>\n\n
12.\t<\/span>According to Section 5, a prisoner shall be brought before a judge of the District Court no later than 14 days after the date of granting the incarceration order. The authorities' procedure is to reduce this time frame to the minimum and prisoners are usually brought before a judge following shorter periods. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
13.\t<\/span>At present, 14 persons are incarcerated under this Law, all of whom are residents of the Gaza Strip. Periodical judicial review of the incarceration takes place in a civil District Court every 6 months, as required by the Law, and the decision may be appealed before the Supreme Court. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
14.\t<\/span>Recently, in June 2008, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal submitted by two of the detainees. Here, the Supreme Court addressed the substantial legal aspects of unlawful combatant incarceration, for the first time since the Law was enacted (Cr.A. 6659\/06 Anonymous v. The State of Israel). <\/p><\/div>\n\n
15.\t<\/span>While reaffirming the legality of the specific incarceration orders, the Supreme Court held that the Law meets the standards of both Israeli Constitutional Law and International Humanitarian Law (which it found to be applicable to the Israeli fight against the various Palestinian terrorist groups) – noting that the Law as a whole does not infringe the right to liberty in a disproportional manner and finding it to be consistent with the administrative detention provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). In addition, the Supreme Court interpreted the principal Sections of the Law as intended to strike a delicate balance between generally accepted Human Rights standards and the legitimate security needs the Law was designed to address.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
16.\t<\/span>It is Israel's position that in light of the current security situation facing Israel, the use of this method is obligatory, and is essential in preventing terrorist activity. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
\t<\/span>4.\t<\/span>Reply to the issues raised in paragraph 4 of the list of issues<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n
Access to legal counsel<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n
17.\t<\/span>In a recent decision by the Supreme Court, the Court held that “there is no dispute as to the high standing and central position of the right to legal counsel in Israel's legal system.” (C.A. 5121\/98, Prv. Yisascharov v. The Head Military Prosecutor et al.<\/i> (4.5.06)) Here, the Court adopted a relative exclusion doctrine, according to which the court may rule on the inadmissibility of a confession due to the interrogator's failure to notify the soldier of his right to legal counsel.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
Criminal Offences<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n\n
Detainees<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n\n
18.\t<\/span>Section 34 of the Criminal Procedure (Powers of Enforcement – Arrests) Law, states that a detainee is entitled to meet and consult with a lawyer. Following a detainee's request to meet with an attorney or the request of an attorney to meet a detainee, the person in charge of the investigation shall enable the meeting without a delay, unless as stipulated in the following. This meeting can be delayed if, in the opinion of the police officer in charge, such a meeting necessitates terminating or suspending an investigation or other measures regarding the investigation, or substantially puts the investigation at risk. The officer in charge shall provide a written reasoned decision to postpone the meeting for the time needed to complete the investigation, provided this deferment does not exceed several hours. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
19.\t<\/span>The officer in charge can further delay this meeting if he\/she issues a sufficiently reasoned decision that such a meeting may thwart or obstruct the arrest of additional suspects in the same matter, prevent the disclosure of evidence, or the capture of an object regarding the same offence. Such additional delay shall not exceed 24 hours from the time of arrest. An additional 24 hours deferment (to a total of 48 hours) can be granted, if the officer in charge provides an elaborated written decision that he\/she is convinced that such postponement is necessary for safeguarding human life, thwarting a crime. However, such a detainee shall be given a reasonable opportunity to meet or consult with a legal counsel prior to the arraignment before a court of law. Data indicates that this additional extension is seldom used.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
20.\t<\/span>In Israel, Section 11 of the Criminal Procedure (Powers of Enforcement – Arrests)(Terms of Detention) Regulations, 5757 – 1997, stipulates that the date of a detainee's meeting with an attorney shall be coordinated in advance, and that the commander of the detention facility shall enable the first meeting of a detainee with an attorney, at their request, even during extraordinary hours. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
Prisoners<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n\n
21.\t<\/span>A 2005 Amendment to the Prisons Ordinance, 1971, further stipulates the conditions for a prisoner meeting with an attorney for professional service. According to section 45, this meeting shall be held in private and in conditions allowing for the confidentiality of the matters and documents exchanged, and in such a manner that enables supervision of the prisoner's movements. Following the prisoner's request to meet with an attorney for professional service, or the request of an attorney to meet a prisoner, the director of the prison shall facilitate the meeting in the prison during regular hours and without delay. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
22.\t<\/span>Section 45A of the Prisons Ordinance relates to all prisoners, except for detainees who have yet to be indicted. This section authorizes the Israel Prisons Service (IPS) Commissioner and the director of the prison to postpone or stop such a meeting for a set period of time if there is a substantial suspicion that meeting with a particular lawyer will enable the commission of an offence risking the security of a person, public security, State security or the prison security, or a prison offence substantially damaging to the prison discipline and that brings about a severe disruption of the prison procedures and administration. The director of the prison may delay such a meeting for no longer than 24 hours, and the IPS Commissioner may order an additional five days delay, with the agreement of the District Attorney. Such a reasoned order shall be given to the prisoner in writing, unless the IPS Commissioner specifically orders it shall be given orally. The reasoning may be withheld under certain limited provisions. Decisions rendered according to section 45A may be appealed to the relevant District Court.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
23.\t<\/span>The District Court may further extend the above time-periods up to 21 days, following an application of the representative of the Attorney General, based on one of the grounds specified above. The maximum delay shall not exceed three months. Such a decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court. A Supreme Court judge may further extend these periods based on one of the grounds specified above.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
Security Related Offences<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n\n
24.\t<\/span>In exceptional cases, the Law allows postponing a meeting with legal counsel for specific grounds.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
25.\t<\/span>In Cr.C 1144\/06 Abu-Hashish Zyad v. The State of Israel<\/i> (9.2.06), the defendant, a resident of the Gaza Strip, was arrested while illegally staying in Israel for reasons of activity in a terrorist organization, contact with a foreign agent and illegal entry to Israel. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
26.\t<\/span>The Court asserted that preventing a detainee from meeting his attorney constitutes grave harm to his rights. Such harm can be tolerated only when such prevention is necessary due to security reasons and for the sake of the interrogation. The Court added that the duration set by law for prevention of a detainee from meeting with his lawyer is the maximal period of time, and that the relevant authorities, when considering imposing such a restriction, should set this period to the minimal number of days required for the interrogation and whilst considering the interrogation's progress. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
Arraignment before a judge<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n
Criminal Offences<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n\n
27.\t<\/span>Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure (Powers of Enforcement – Arrests) Law, specifies that a person arrested without a warrant must be brought before a judge as soon as possible, and no later than 24 hours following the arrest, with a special provision regarding weekends and holidays. Following the completion of the above measures, the detainee shall be brought promptly before a judge, or released from custody. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
28.\t<\/span>Section 30 allows for an additional 24-hour extension based on the need to perform an urgent interrogation, which cannot be performed unless the detainee is in custody, and cannot be postponed following his arraignment; or if an urgent action must be taken regarding an investigation in a security-related offence. Following the completion of the above measures, the detainee shall be brought before a judge swiftly, or released from custody. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
29.\t<\/span>The Criminal Procedure (Powers of Enforcement – Arrests) (Arrangements for Holding Court Hearings according to Section 29 to the Law) Regulations, 5757 – 1997 provides special arrangements concerning the arraignment of detainees on weekends and holidays in order to properly balance respect for the holidays with the individual rights of the detainee.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
Security Related Offences<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n\n
30.\t<\/span>The Criminal Procedure (Detainee Suspected of Security Offence) (Temporary Provision) Law, 2006, regulates the powers required for the enforcement authorities in order to investigate a detainee suspected of terrorism or security offences. Such investigations necessitate special enforcement powers due to the special characteristics of both the offences and the perpetrators. The main provisions of the law result from the exceptional circumstances of such a security offence. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
31.\t<\/span>Section 3 of the Law stipulates that the appointed officer may delay the arraignment before a judge to a maximum of 48 hours from the arrest, if the officer is convinced that the cessation of the investigation would truly jeopardize the investigation. The officer may decide to delay the arraignment for another 24 hours if he is convinced that the cessation of the investigation would truly jeopardize the investigation or may harm the possibility to prevent harming human lives.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
32.\t<\/span>The officer may delay the arraignment for additional 24 hours for the same reason, provided that he explains his decision in writing and obtains the approval of the relevant approving authority. A delay of over 72 hours also requires the approval of the Head of Investigations Department of the Israel Security Agency (ISA), or his deputy. In any case, the maximum delay would not exceed 96 hours from the time of the arrest.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
33.\t<\/span>The initial stage of the investigation of a detainee suspected of terrorist and security offence is critical for the investigation in many ways, such as the possibility to use the information obtained during the investigation to prevent imminent terrorist attacks. Therefore the legislator asserted that the provision concerning this delay in arraignment is properly balanced with the need to protect human lives.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
34.\t<\/span>Moreover, as a way of further assuring the rights of the detainee, and in light of the temporary nature of the Law, during the duration of the Law, the Minister of Justice would be obligated to report to the Committee of Constitution, Law and Justice of the Knesset on the implementation of the law every six months. The report would include, inter alia, detailed information concerning postponements in bringing a detainee before a judge (including the number of cases in which the postponement occurred and the duration of such postponements). <\/p><\/div>\n\n
35.\t<\/span>According to information received from the Israel Security Agency, brought before the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, from July 1, 2006 up until December 31, 2006 – the arraignment of one<\/strong> person was postponed between 48-72 hours in accordance with Section 3(1) of the Law, and the arraignment of two<\/strong> persons was postponed between 72-96 hours in accordance with Section 3(2) of the Law. In 2007, the arraignment of four<\/strong> persons was postponed between 48-72 hours in accordance with Section 3(1) of the Law, and the arraignment of one<\/strong> person was postponed between 72-96 hours in accordance with Section 3(2) of the Law. In 2008, the arraignment of two<\/strong> persons was postponed between 48-72 hours in accordance with Section 3(1) of the Law, and the arraignment of none (0)<\/strong> was postponed between 72-96 hours in accordance with Section 3(2) of the Law.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
\t<\/span>5.\t<\/span>Reply to the issues raised in paragraph 5 of the list of issues<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n
36.\t<\/span>Please see the first paragraph to Israel's response to Question 3, above. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
\t<\/span>6.\t<\/span>Reply to the issues raised in paragraph 6 of the list of issues <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n\n
37.\t<\/span>In addition, Israel maintains its position that the provisions of the Law are in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
38.\t<\/span>Arraignment before a judge<\/u> – Please see Israel's reply to Question 4, above.<\/p><\/div>\n\n
39.\t<\/span>An extension of an arrest must be held before a judge, as a rule, within 24 hours, and that is the case in the absolute majority of cases. This limitation is deviated from only in rare instances, and even in those cases, the maximum delay is a total of 96 hours. <\/p><\/div>\n\n
40.\t<\/span><\/span>Access to legal counsel<\/u><\/span> –<\/span> <\/u><\/span>the authorities take every measure to limit the use of the provision allowing the postponement of meeting with <\/span>legal counsel<\/u><\/span>; hence, the use of this tool in Israel is exceptional. Prevention for over 10 days is seldom used. <\/span><\/p><\/div>\n\n
41.\t<\/span>Note also that for the purpose of extension of the arrest period, the suspect is brought before a judge. <\/p><\/div>\n\n