51ÁÔÆæ

Pursuant to section 3 of ST/AI/371, in determining if the preliminary investigation appears to indicate that the report of misconduct is well founded, the head of office or responsible officer is vested with a wide discretion. That discretion is to be exercised judiciously in the light of what the investigation has revealed. The discretion cannot and should not be used capriciously. It is incumbent on the person vested with that discretion to scrutinise the evidence carefully before deciding whether any act of misconduct as defined has been committed. A judicious exercise ofthe discretion...

From the moment that the new Executive Secretary took up his functions at ESCWA, the Deputy Executive Secretary was no longer competent to decide, on 8 August 2007, to reassign the Applicant. Indeed, there is no documentary evidence that he had received delegation of authority from the Executive Secretary to take the contested decision, which is thus illegal. However, on 16 August 2007, the Executive Secretary confirmed the decision taken on 8 August 2007 by his Deputy. This new decision is legal but it does not have the effect of regularizing ex post facto the decision of 8 August 2007...

The Tribunal¡¯s findings were that the Respondent had sufficiently substantiated his allegations against the Applicant. It also found that due process had been afforded to the Applicant. Given that the Applicant failed to abide by staff regulation 1.2 (b) and former staff rule 110.1, the Tribunal concluded that the decision to summarily dismiss the Applicant was proportionate to the nature of the charges.

Break in service: The Tribunal has not found a policy on mandatory breaks in service and no document has been produced recording it. The respondent has failed to demonstrate a consistent application of the practice of enforced separation between temporary contracts. Further, there was a deliberate delay in progressing the appointment of the applicant which was to her detriment. Compensation: The applicant is to be placed in the position as if there had been no such break in service in May 2008. The manner in which the applicant was treated, aggravated by the exercise of an abuse of power...

The Respondent had sufficiently substantiated his allegations against the Applicant. It also found that due process had been afforded to the Applicant. Given the gravity of the allegations, the Tribunal decided that the decision to summarily dismiss the Applicant was proportionate to the nature of the charges.

No exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of time limits prescribed in former staff rule 111.2 (a) could be found. The Applicant having served for long time in the Organization, she had ample opportunity to become familiar with the applicable rules. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the applicant to be acquainted with the rules on time limits. The Applicant was not induced into error by MEU response as to the outcome she could expect from a procedure before the Tribunal. The transition to the new justice system cannot be said to have affected the Applicant¡¯s ability to timely...

There was substantial impact on the applicant¡¯s life and work, which was both foreseeable and a direct result of the breach. Injury to career prospects: It is reasonable to infer that the applicant will probably be promoted in due course and that this prospect has been delayed by his failure to achieve the position in Geneva. This is economic loss. The court proceedings were burdensome, stressful, and time consuming, but this matter is inextricably involved with the denial, up to the judgment, of the applicant¡¯s rights, and will be sufficiently recompensed as part of the award for the breach...

At the time the Applicant submitted his application to the Tribunal, the Administration had already reviewed its initial decision to grant the Applicant a three-month extension and extended him for an additional nine-month period. The Tribunal determined that since the contested decision was de facto rescinded by the Administration before the application was filed with the Tribunal, the application is not receivable. Had the Administration rescinded its decision after the filing of the application, the application would have become moot during the proceedings and the Tribunal would have...

The Tribunal takes note that the Applicant has failed to file his application within the deadline given to him in the Tribunal¡¯s Order of 22 January 2010 and even beyond. It also notes that the Applicant has not provided any reasonable explanation as to why he did not comply with the Order of the Tribunal. By his behaviour and attitude the Applicant has displayed a singular blatant ignorance of a court order. His conduct is one of contempt of the Tribunal. This attitude does not befit persons who like the Applicant come to seek justice and a vindication of their rights before the Tribunal.

In accordance with article 18, paragraph 2, of its rules of procedure, the Tribunal may order the production of evidence for either party and the parties have to provide such evidence, even though they consider it to be confidential. According to article 18, paragraph 4, of its rules of procedure, it falls upon the Tribunal to assess the confidentiality of the evidence and, if it finds the evidence to be confidential, it is the Tribunal¡¯s responsibility to ensure that measures are taken to preserve such confidentiality. In the instant case, the Tribunal did not use the confidential documents...