51ÁÔÆæ

The Respondent had no clear and convincing evidence on which to decide on dismissal of the Applicant for violating Ivorian law in 2007 by accepting payment to produce false passports and committing fraud. On a literal interpretation of staff regulation 1.2(b), the Applicant engaged in misconduct. His negative response to the PHP question about prior indictments, fines or imprisonment amounted to an intentional withholding of required information pertinent to the Organization¡¯s background integrity checks. The answer was neither truthful nor honest. The Applicant certified in his PHP that he...

Neither party has¡ªrightly so¡ªdisputed the Appeals Tribunal¡¯s findings in Al Shakour that the United Nations Secretary-General was bound by the General Assembly¡¯s endorsement and adoption of the ICSC¡¯s determination regarding post-adjustment for United Nations staff in Geneva. In doing so, the Tribunal further notes that, as relevant to the present case and following Al Shakour, the General Assembly provided no alternatives for the United Nations Secretary-General on how to compute the relevant post-adjustment payment than by following the ICSC¡¯s determination. Accordingly, as relevant to the...

The Applicant cannot claim that the Administration had initiated a disciplinary process against her. The Applicant had no right to force the Administration to complete a disciplinary process against her. The Administration decided to suspend the consideration of initiating a disciplinary process in relation to the Applicant should she be employed with the Organization in the future. Therefore, as in Kennes, the Applicant¡¯s due process rights have not been violated. The note placed in the Applicant's Official Status File is merely informative in nature and does therefore have no impact on the...

Whether the facts on which the disciplinary measure was based have been established With respect to Count One, the Tribunal finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that the Applicant did not disclose his spouse¡¯s and his father in law¡¯s involvement with two UNICEF implementing partners, of which the Applicant was the responsible Programme Manager on behalf of UNICEF. In his application, the Applicant does not dispute this fact either. Turning to Count Two, the Tribunal is convinced that the Applicant received a spouse dependency allowance to which he was not entitled. Moreover, the...

The Applicant did not appeal a final administrative decision carrying direct legal effects. The application was therefore not receivable ratione materiae. The contested decisions had no nexus with the Applicant's former employment with the Organization, the application was therefore not receivable ratione personae.

Scope of judicial review The Applicant only challenged the dismissal of his complaint against his FRO and SRO by way of management evaluation. Recalling the general requirement of staff rule 11.2(a), the Tribunal will limit its scope of judicial review to the decision not to investigate the Applicant¡¯s complaint against his FRO and SRO. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider appeals against the MEU¡¯s responses to the Applicant¡¯s request for management evaluation. Therefore, it will not adjudicate the Applicant¡¯s arguments against the MEU¡¯s responses to his request for management...

OIOS acted in accordance with the procedures set down in ST/SGB/2019/8 and ST/AI/2017/1, taking into account all relevant considerations in reaching its decision under section 5.1 of ST/AI/2017/1 to take no action on the complaint. Accordingly, there was no foundation for the substantive claim made by the Applicant, nor any foundation for any award of compensation. An investigation would not resolve the dispute between the Applicant and the SRSG, since there clearly was and remains inter-personal differences between them. Instead, it would likely deepen the divide between them. An...

The Tribunal was satisfied that the Applicant¡¯s complaint was reviewed in accordance with the applicable legal framework. The Applicant did not present a prima facie case of harassment as the claims were unsubstantiated and she did not provide adequate proof to support them. The facts did not amount to misconduct or prohibited conduct. The conduct the Applicant alleged even if true, was not harassment within the meaning of ST/SGB/2008/5. Consequently, the Administration had a legitimate basis not to proceed with an investigation into these matters. The Applicant did not proffer any evidence to...

In relation to the Applicant¡¯s first claim, the Tribunal held that pursuant to staff rule 6.2 the entitlement to sick leave does not follow a cycle calculated since the date of appointment as argued by the Applicant, but, rather, is calculated pursuant to its own cycle determined by the date of the sick leave. The Tribunal thus concluded that the method used by the administration to calculate the Applicant's sick leave days was consistent with staff rule 6.2, while the method advocated by the Applicant was not. Accordingly, the application failed on the score of sick leave. On the Applicant¡¯s...

The application was not receivable because the Applicant was contesting an MEU response, which is not an appealable administrative decision.