51ÁÔÆæ

The Tribunal found established the facts of which he was accused and considered they constituted misconduct, no irregularity was identified in the procedure and the sanctions were not deemed disproportionate. However, unlike the written censure and demotion, the prohibition of promotion for a certain period of time was not among the range of disciplinary measures foreseen in former staff rule 110.3 (a), which rendered its imposition unlawful, pursuant to the principle nulla poena sine lege. Hence, the said sanction was rescinded and CHF1000 granted as compensation for the loss of chances...

It was not disputed that the Applicant borrowed money from a Sales Manager working in a company doing business with MONUC. In the light of the applicable law and in particular the financial and procurement rules, the Tribunal found that misconduct had been properly established. Nonetheless, the Tribunal found a certain number of mitigating factors such as the fact that he repaid the loan in full and that it was a ¡°one-off decision¡±. Therefore, the Tribunal took the view that the sanction was not proportionate.

The applicant was not separated because of an organisational necessity neither because of the expiry of his short-term contract -he did not have a signed contract. He was separated because of a disciplinary measure following the findings of the selection panel. The separation of the applicant was unlawful for two reasons: the decision was made without proper delegated authority (the authority to terminate a short-term appointment as a result of disciplinary measures has not been delegated by the Secretary-General in accordance with ST/AI/234/Rev.1) and the process was in violation of the rules...

The applicant was not separated because of the expiry of his short-term contract -he did not have a signed contract- but because of a disciplinary measure following the findings of the selection panel. The separation of the applicant was unlawful in two respects: the decision was made without proper delegated authority (the authority to terminate a short-term appointment as a result of disciplinary measures has not been delegated by the Secretary-General in accordance with ST/AI/234/Rev.1) and the process was in violation of the rules governing separation as a disciplinary measure, including...

Compensation for stress and anxiety The Applicant produced medical evidence of stress and anxiety. The Tribunal finds that this aspect of the claim is made out. Also, the actions of Mr. Stephen Lieberman, Chief Administrative Officer, described in the Tribunal¡¯s Judgment on liability, were high-handed and grossly disproportionate and the attempt at misleading both the JAB and JDC panels, as well as Counsel for the Respondent and the Tribunal in the present proceedings, constitute aggravating factors which the Tribunal finds heightened the distress experienced by the Applicant. In arriving at a...

Placing the Applicant on SLWFP. The Tribunal agrees with and adopts the Kamunyi reasoning that former staff rule 105.2 did not permit placing a staff member on SLWFP where an investigation was being made into possible wrong-doing by that staff member. The formal nature of the OIOS/PTF investigation. A preliminary investigation under ST/AI/371, sec. 2, is differentiated from a formal investigation under ST/AI/371, sec. 6, as occupying different places within the overall structure of ST/AI/371. For an investigation to be regarded as merely preliminary in nature, some ¡°reason to believe¡± must...

The Tribunal finds that the application is not receivable because the contested decision is not a disciplinary measure within the meaning of staff rule 11.2(b) and accordingly the time limits applicable under art. 8.1(d)(i) of the Tribunal¡¯s Statute should have been complied with. It clearly follows from staff rule 11.2(b) that the exemption from the requirement to request the management evaluation of a disciplinary measure only applies to disciplinary measures imposed following the completion of a disciplinary process.

The Tribunal found that the Applicant¡¯s rights to defence had been breached during the disciplinary procedure because the investigation report and all its attachments had not been shared with him. It concluded however that such a procedural flaw did not affect the established facts, since the Applicant had admitted to them, and did not warrant the rescission of the contested decision, since the established facts amounted to misconduct. The Tribunal nevertheless rescinded the summary dismissal on the ground that it was disproportionate to the established facts. It ordered: (i) the reinstatement...

The Initial Reprimand. The provisions of ST/AI/292 and the doctrine of audi alteram partem were not observed in that the Applicant was not afforded an opportunity to see and to comment on the reprimand before it was issued for which reason he had no opportunity to comment on it in advance. The Reinstated Reprimand. The Tribunal identified the following difficulties with the Reinstated Reprimand: (1) as with the Initial Reprimand, the Applicant was not permitted to see and to comment on the Reinstated Reprimand in accordance with ST/AI/292; (2) the rules and regulations of the Organization...

The Applicant made good faith efforts 51ÁÔÆæ his financial disclosure obligations for 2005. The Secretary-General failed to take into account the various mitigating factors in favour of the Applicant when determining the sanction against him. The disciplinary sanction imposed on the Applicant was far more excessive than was necessary for obtaining the desired purposes of the financial disclosure program. The appropriate disciplinary measure in the present case should be a reprimand.